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According to Jessup, the field of transnational law studies those aspects of law that are neither 
national nor international. The common challenge of the field is to overcome the tension 
between the non-state regulatory phenomena that it studies and the state origin of the lens – 
law – that it uses. 
This thesis structures one particular debate in transnational law – the resolution of large 
financial institutions in national, European, and transnational law - according to this 
challenge, by critically examining the notion of bi-polarity, defined as the reliance on 
distinctions that are based on the distinction between non-state and state.  
The proposed framework – formalized as a matrix with six rows that distinguish the 
parameters to understand the implications of the non-state/state distinction and three columns 
that represent the legal contexts in which transnational phenomena affect law -  illustrates the 
current debate on transnational law and its need to overcome bi-polarity. 
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  Thesis Summary 
Following Jessup, the field of transnational law studies those aspects of  law that 
are neither national nor international. The common challenge of the field is to 
overcome the tension between the non-state regulatory phenomena that it studies 
and the state origin of the lens – law – that it uses. 
This thesis structures one particular debate in transnational law – the resolution of 
large financial institutions - according to this challenge, by critically examining 
the notion of bi-polarity, defined as the reliance on distinctions that are based on 
the distinction between non-state and state. 
The framework may be summarized in a matrix, as below (Chart I). Its rows 
distinguish six parameters according to which the implications of the non-
state/state distinction for law can be disentangled.   
Its columns represent the legal contexts in which transnational phenomena affect 
law. The column of national law entails all law produced within and by the state; 
namely national and international law. European law entails the law of the 
European Union and transnational law entails all regulatory phenomena that do 
not fit the other categories.  
From applying the framework on the debate on the regulation of the resolution of 
large financial institutions to the three contexts of transationalization, the field of 
transnational law can be structured according to its success in transcending the 
non-state/state dichotomy. 
From the application to national law, it appears that the debate is largely bi-polar, 
opposing non-state and state visions of transnationalization. The importance of 
courts in questions of transnationalization emerges as a consequence of this bi-
polarity: it falls upon the court to find the compromises between opposed 
approaches.  
In European law, a difference between parameters becomes visible. In the first 
three categories of the framework – legality, politics and governance – the law-
making of the EU blurs bi-polar categories. However, in the remaining three – 
legitimacy, values and polity – the outcomes depend largely on the institutions of 
the EU.  
Transnational law approaches that focus on law-making parameters are motivated 
by the same desire to overcome bi-polarity. However, with regard to the 
legitimacy, values and polity parameters, the debate is split between top-down and 
bottom-up approaches, and this only recreates bi-polarity. The framework 
provided below (Chart II) illustrates the current debate on transnational law and 
its need to overcome bi-polarity.  
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National law European law Transnational law 
Legality Procedural Formal Procedural Formal Procedural Formal 
Legitimacy Thin Thick Thin Thick Thin Thick 
Politics De-Politicized Politicized De-Politicized Politicized De-Politicized Politicized 
Values Dependent Independent Dependent Independent Dependent Independent 
Governance Assimilated Disintegrated Assimilated Disintegrated Assimilated Disintegrated 
Polity Supranational National Supranational National Supranational National 
Chart I: The framework for the analysis of the debate on transnationalization and law 
according to bi-polarity 
 
National law European law Transnational law 
Legality       
Politics       
Governance       
Legitimacy       
Values       
Polity       
Chart II: The debate on transnationalization and law according to the framework 
The non-state/state 
tension is put in the 
context of the co-
existence of 
organizational principles 
in legal thinking and the 
importance of state 
institutions. Bi-polarity 
becomes an index of 
law’s dependence on the 
state. 
Several examples in the 
parameters of legality, 
politics and governance 
show that European law-
making can overcome 
bi-polarity. 
In the parameters of 
legitimacy, values and 
polity bi-polarity 
persists 
Authors forward either 
state like or non-state 
like visions of European 




While different in 
degree, the same 
blurring of bi-polar 
categories as in 
European law-making 
can be observed 
In these parameters bi-
polarity reemerges, dividing 
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0. Overview of the Thesis 
This thesis poses a framework for the structuring of the field of transnational law, as well as a 
starting point of a more promising way forward. 
Transnational law according to Jessup, is the law that is neither national nor international.
1
 It 
refers to developments like regulation by private actors or informal meetings of national 
executives and challenges our understanding of law. Not only do these developments cause 
practical difficulties as conflicts between regulatory developments and national law intensify, 
but the relevance of the law as a means of regulation of social interaction itself is at stake. 
However, current legal thinking continues to struggle to reconcile the non-state character of 
the developments with the state origin of law.  
The effort to clarify the meaning of these developments for law has led to the field of 
transnational law. The field entails approaches as varied as global constitutionalism, global 
administrative law, private law beyond the state, and private regulation. The names of the 
different approaches point to the struggle of the field to reconcile the need to stretch beyond 
the state (global) with the statist origin (ism) of the mother discipline. 
This thesis puts the tension between non-state and state and the question of how this tension 
can be addressed at the core of the debate of transnationalization of law, the framework it 
proposes as well as the approach it suggests.  
Chapter 1 will propose a framework. The framework will allow the classification of 
approaches to transnationalization in national, European and transnational law, according to 
their stances regarding the non-state/state distinction. This distinction will be made with 
regard to the legitimacy, legality, politics, values, governance and polity of law. Each 
parameter will distinguish approaches that embrace the non-state tendency and approaches 
that remain faithful to the state origin of law. From this structuring exercise the elements of an 
approach to transnational law will be taken. 
The analysis of the debate of national law and transnationalization in Chapter 2 will reveal 
that most of the debate can be split in non-state/state categories. This importance of the non-
state/state distinction in legal thinking will be referred to as bi-polarity throughout this thesis. 
                                                 
1
 Jessup, Philip C., “Transnational law”, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1956.   
Ph.D. Thesis  




The analysis of national law links bi-polarity to the importance of courts and other state 
institutions and therewith bi-polarity becomes an indication of state dependence. Bi-polarity -
the competition of a non-state and a state position in legal thinking- makes law dependent on 
a managerial effort by state institutions, and is hence identified as one of the factors that limit 
law in its ability to account for transnationalization. Legal thinking in transnational law must 
hence focus on ways to overcome this bi-polar view, as the practice cannot relay exclusively 
on institutions in the transnational context.  
The structuring of the debate on European law and transnationalization in Chapter 3 will show 
that bi-polarity of legal thinking can be overcome in questions of legality, politics and 
governance, where a management between the poles develops in law-making. In the 
parameters of legitimacy, values and polity, bi-polarity persists and European institutions play 
an important role. The approaches in European law are hence classified between the ones that 
focus on law-making and aim at expanding it, the ones that focus on the difficulties to 
overcome bi-polarity in legitimacy, values and polity and the third group that proposes 
multilevel approaches in order to address the discrepancy between the two groups of 
parameters.  
In Chapter 4, the debate on transnational law will show that a large portion of the discussion 
does not fit the non-state/state categories. With regard to the law-making parameters a parallel 
to European law can be drawn as similar ways of overcoming bi-polarity in law-making can 
be observed. However, in the parameters of legitimacy, values and politic, bottom-up 
approaches are presented in opposition to top down approaches and in this sense a bi-polar 
tension persists.  
These insights will be brought together in Chapter 5 and the outcome of a structuring of 
transnational law according to bi-polarity will be forwarded.  
In the following, the framework, the outcome of it, the example that will be used for 
illustration and the overall methodology will be introduced. 
0.1. Structuring the debate on law and transnationalization: 
A Framework  
Transnationalization of law - the development of law that is neither national law nor 
international law – challenges the understanding of law by definition as it asks for the 
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engagement of law with something foreign; not law. A multitude of approaches has developed 
aiming to address the meaning of transnationalization for law. Yet the resulting body of 
writing has reached a stage where its size and internal doctrinal quarrels undermine the 
insights that were most certainly produced. Therefore a structured overview of existing 
literature is in order.   
The framework of this thesis will allow classifying approaches to transnationalization 
according to their stances on the non-state/state distinction with regard to different parameters 
of law. The classification is made according to the non-state/state tension at the heart of the 
transnationalization debate. The framework consists of rows representing the different 
parameters of law affected by the non-state/state distinction and columns distinguishing 
between the different legal contexts in which the transnationalization debate is held. 
 National law European law Transnational law 
Legality Procedural Formal  Procedural Formal  Proc. Formal 
Legitimacy Thin Thick Thin Thick Thin Thick 
Politics De-politicized Politicized De-politicized Politicized De-pol. Politicized 
Values Dependent Independent Dependent Independent Dependent Independent 
Governance Assimilated Disintegrated Assimilated Disintegrated  Assimilated Disintegrated  
Polity Supranational National  Supranational National  Suprana. National  
Chart I: The framework for the analysis of the debate on transnationalization and law according to bi-
polarity 
The parameters are legality, legitimacy, values, politics, governance and polity of law. They 
result from breaking down or ‘disentangling’ the non-state/state distinction: the three sub-
distinctions of the non-state/state distinction are the non-law/law, the private/public and the 
international/national distinction. 
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Chart III: Disentangling the non-state/state distinction 
 
The non-law/law distinction refers to the consequence of the non-state/state distinction on the 
meaning of law. It has a formal component (the parameter of legality) and a component on 
substance (legitimacy). The private/public distinction reflects to relationships of power 
between dominant and weaker parties. It again has two perspectives: an economic one, the 
market/society relation (the parameter of values of law) and a political one, the 
regulated/regulator relationship (the parameter of politics). The national/global distinction 
refers to the state and the environment beyond or around the sate. It has an institutional 
component (the parameter of governance) and an identity component (the parameter of 
polity). These six parameters of ‘law beyond the state’ provide the horizontal categories of the 
grid according to which vertically the challenge of transnationalization can be disentangled. 
Within each parameter the state non-state distinction will be manifest in a different tension.  
The columns of the framework of the transnationalization debate represent the different legal 
contexts in which this debate is held. It is distinguished between national law, European law 
and transnational law. National law is defined here to entail all state-produced law, be that 
nationally or internationally through treaties.
2
 European law refers to the law of the European 
Union and transnational law is defined in the negative sense as all law that does not figure in 
                                                 
2
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the first two categories. In all three contexts, the debate will be structured according to the 
stances taken with respect to the non-state/state within the different parameters. In Chapter 4, 
the non-state/state categories will be transformed into spectra and applied to the theories of 
transnational law. The result will be a specific framework for the field of transnational law.  
Structuring the transnational law debate accordingly will demonstrate the impact of the 
transnational state/non-state tensions in the different contexts of law and the ways these 
tensions are dealt with. It will also highlight which parameters of law could be the best fit to 
focus the effort of overcoming this tension on. The insights gained from the structuring 
exercise will be used as the starting points of an approach to transnational beyond bi-polarity. 
While Chapters 2, 3, and 4 will structure the debate in national, European and transnational 
law, Chapter 5 will focus on these insights.  
0.2. Outcome of the framework: Transnational law beyond 
bi-polarity? 
From each chapter and its bi-polar categorization of the transnationalization debate an insight 
on bi-polarity and transnationalization will be drawn and summarized in an outcome of the 
framework in chapter 5.  
From the analysis of the debate in national law, it will become clear that bi-polarity in legal 
thinking is paralleled by a practice of state institutions that produce compromises. The 
persisting bi-polarity will be put in the wider context of contemporary legal thinking. The 
inability of the debate to overcome bi-polar categories will be portrayed as an illustration of 
the co-existence of organizational principles in contemporary legal thinking. This co-
existence and the dependence on state institutions it entails, ultimately limits legal thinking to 
the confines of the state. It is institutions of the states that make the compromises between bi-
polar arguments. Overcoming bi-polarity is hence crucial for transnationalization in the 
context of national law. 
The analysis in European law, will show that with regard to some parameters – legality, 
politics and governance-, the legal debate has moved beyond bi-polarity and found 
compromises also on the theoretical level. In other parameters – legitimacy, values and polity 
- the practical compromises depend on European institutions. This put into question the 
relationship between European law-making and its theoretical backdrop regarding legitimacy, 
values and polity. Around this questions the approaches to European law can be classified into 
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the ones that encourage law-making in spite of persisting tensions in the other parameters, 
authors that insist on limiting law-making according to the latter parameters or build on 
European institutions to find compromises in legitimacy, values and polity or multilevel 
approaches that combine law-making on European level with legitimacy, values and polity 
from the Member State level.  
In the context of transnational law, the same difference between law-making parameters and 
theoretical backdrop parameters can be seen. In law-making ways can be seen of overcoming 
bi-polarity. Global Administrative Law (GAL) provides examples of how this can be 
achieved. Yet, at the same time, it faces difficulties to provide answers to questions of 
legitimacy, values and polity and remains limited to the improvement of transnational law-
making. The approaches that elaborate on the parameters of legitimacy, values and polity can 
be divided in bottom-up and top-down approaches. However, as the analysis according to 
System Theory will show, a ‘new’ tension between bottom-up and top-down emerges. 
Transnational law remains hence haunted by bi-polarity in all three contexts of law. With this 
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 National law European law Transnational law 
Legality       
Politics       
Governance       
Legitimacy       
Values       
Polity       
Chart II: The debate on transnationalization and law according to the framework 
0.3.   Context of illustration: The Key Attributes  
It is beyond doubt that the main contribution of this thesis is the framework for the structuring 
of the theoretical debate around law in the context of transnationalization. Yet, while the 
primary ambition of this thesis is a theoretical one, the framework will be illustrated in a 
practical context. A specific piece of transnational law will be taken and the debate it spurred 
in the three different contexts will be structured according to the non-state/state distinction.  
The pieces in question are the Financial Stability Board Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Authorities (Key Attributes, KAs)
3
 and the parallel developments in the European 
                                                 
3
 FSB Recommendations, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions” October 
2011 endorsed at the G-20 Summit in Cannes, November 2011. 
The non-state/state 
tension is put in the 
context of the co-
existence of 
organizational principles 
in legal thinking and the 
importance of state 
institutions. Bi-polarity 
becomes an indiex of 
law’s dependence on the 
state. 
Several examples in the 
parameters of legality, 
politics and governance 
show that European law-
making can overcome 
bi-polarity. 
In the parameters of 
legitimacy, values and 
polity bi-polarity 
persists 
Authors forward either 
state like or non-state 
like visions of European 




While different in 
degree, the same 
blurring of bi-polar 
categories than in 
European law-making 
can be observed 
In these parameters bi-
polarity reemerges, 
dividing bottom- up and 
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 Mandated by the G20, the Financial Stability Board developed the Key Attributes as 
recommendations in the wake of the financial crisis of the late 2000s as part of its framework 
for systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs).
5
 The framework has been developed 
in the context of a general effort to address the danger of failing large financial institutions, 
without creating moral hazard. The crisis has shown that the failure of large financial 
institutions can be tremendously painful and expensive.
6
 Yet the bail-outs have not only 
caused public outrage, but also, it has been suggested that they contributed to further risk 
taking by institutions that knew or assumed that their failure would be prevented (moral 
hazard).
7
 The FSB Key Attributes entail recommendations for national authorities for the 
building of resolution regimes that would allow for an orderly resolution without causing 
harm to the financial system or taxpayers, while at the same time inflict enough pain on the 
institution to prevent the creation of moral hazard and institutions becoming ‘too big to fail’ 
(tbtf).
8
 The example is chosen as it illustrates many of the factors that complicate the role of 
law in a context of transnationalization.  
The financial sector in general is paradigmatic for the variety of ways in which this tension 
emerges: it is an industry with an incredibly high volume of cross-border interactions that at 
the same time faces an enormous effort of regulation at the national level. The cross-border 
nature and complexity of the activity and the power and wealth of the private actors involved 
                                                 
4
 For a summary of the general approach, Draghi Mario, “The future of global financial stability”, in the 
European View, 9, 2010, pp. 23-27. More specifically on the issue of bank resolution, Alexander Kern, “Bank 
Resolution and Recovery in the EU: Enhancing Banking Union”, European Law Academy Forum, 14, 2013, pp. 
81-93 and “Reforming European Financial Supervision: Adapting EU Institutions to Market Structures”, 
Academy of European Law, Trier, 11 June 2011. Attinger Barbara Jeanne, “Crisis Management and Bank 
Resolution: Quo Vadis, Europe?”, Legal Working Paper Series, No. 13, European Central Bank, 2011.   
5
 Group of 20, London Declaration, 2009, for the framework consult FSB Statement, “Policy Measures to 
Address Systemically Important Financial Institutions”, 4 November 2011. For an analysis of the Key Attributes 
refer to Huepkes Eva, “Resolving systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs): The Financial Stability 
Board key attributes of effective resolution regimes”, in LaBrosse John Raymond, Olivares-Caminal and Singh 
Dalvinder, (eds.),“Financial Crisis Containment and Government Guarantees”, Edward Elgar, Northampton, 
2013 
6
 For example: Summe Kimberly Anne, “Lessons Learned from the Lehman Bankruptcy”, in Scott Kenneth E., 
Shultz George P., Taylor John B., (eds.), “Ending Government Bailouts as We Know Them”, Hoover Institution 
Press, Stanford, 2009. 
7
 In general on moral hazard for bank: Galloway Tina M., Lee Winson B. and Roden Dianne M., “Banks’ 
changing Incentives and Opportunities for Risk Taking” in Journal of Banking & Finance, Vol. 21, Issue 4, 
1997, pp. 509-527, a general account in the context of the last crisis: Schnurman Mitchell, “The Big Bank Model 
Must Change to Avoid Future Bailouts”, in Gerdes Louise I., (ed.), “Are Government Bailouts Effective?”, 
Greenhaven Press, Detroit, 2013 and a specific example in context of the last crisis: Eisenbeis Robert A., Frame 
W., Wall Larry D., “An Analysis of the Systemic Risk posed by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and an Evaluation 
of the Policy Options for Reducing Those Risks”, in the Journal of Financial Service Research, 31, 2007, pp. 75-
99. However, not all authros agree on the issue of moral hazard: Moosa Imad A., “The Myth of Too Big to Fail”, 
Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2010. 
8
 “The “too-big-to-fail” (TBTF) problem arises when the threatened failure of a SIFI leaves public authorities 
with no option but to bail it out using national public funds to avoid national and international financial 
instability and economic damage.” FSB, TBTF Progress report, 2013, p. 2. 
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illustrate the challenges nation states face. The legal status of the KAs, developed to address 
this challenge, is unclear but led to reforms on national as well as European levels.
9
 The 
private actors that are regulated are very powerful, yet at the same time also dependent on a 
degree of regulation and embedded in national jurisdictions. Lastly, the financial market 
illustrates the enormous wealth and possible destruction of it that is at stake in cross-border 
interaction and hence the importance of regulating it.   
From a methodological point of view, the choice of example demands justification as it covers 
such a small piece of regulation. In the vast reforms that took place in the wake of the crisis of 
the late 2000s, these regulations are not only a mere needle in the haystack, but they also risk 
losing their relevance altogether as the reformist enthusiasm on which they ultimately depend 
vanishes. However, the limited scope is justified to allow combining the theoretical focus of 
this thesis with a useful overview of an illustrative example.  
The debate on the introduction of the key attributes in national law will illustrate that non-
state and state arguments compete and that it is left to state institutions like courts to find a 
compromise between the two.
10
  
In the EU, the attributes were introduced into European law via the Bank Recovery and 
Resolution Directive (BRRD).
11
 However the debate moved beyond arguments on national 
level about resolution or bankruptcy. Approaches that adopt a non-state approach to European 
law justify the development of a single resolution mechanism by its contribution to the 
functioning of the common market, while approaches that insist on a state-like future for the 
EU aim for the development of a banking union based on a treaty change. However, with 
                                                 
9
 The ‘legal status’ of the KAs has been debated. This will be further discussed in Chapter 4. For a general 
account refer to Riles Annelise, “Is New Governance the Ideal Architecture for Global Financial Regulation”, in 
Monetary and Economic Studies, November 2013, p. 77. Describing how the ‘recommendations’ develop into 
‘international standards’.  
10
 Kroener William F. III, “Expanding FDIC-Style Resolution Authority”, in Scott Kenneth E., Shultz George P. 
and Taylor John B., (eds.), “Ending Government Bailouts as We Know Them”, Hoover Institution Press, 
Stanford, 2009 in the same book but defending an opposite argument: Jackson Thomas H., “Chapter 11F: A 
Proposal for the Use of Bankruptcy to Resolve Financial Institutions”, the dispute on the approporiate approach 
in national law is also taken up in Scott Kenneth E. and Taylor John B., “Bankruptcy Not Bailout: A Special 
Chapter 14”, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford, 2012 and Wright Robert E., “Bailouts: Public Money, Private 
Profit”, Columbia University Press, New York, 2010. In Chapter two it will be discussed according to examples 
taken from the practice, taken from the FSB Peer Review Report, “Thematic Review on Resolution Regimes”, 
11 April 2013. 
11
 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council 
Directive 82/891/EEC, and Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, 2007/36/EC, 
2011/35/EU, 2012/30/EU and 2013/36/EU, and Regulations (EU) No 1093/2010 and (EU) No 648/2012, of the 
European Parliament and of the Council Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 173, 12.6.2014, p. 190–348. 
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regard to legality, politics and governance, the debate cannot be easily classified in the bi-
polar categories. It appears that European law-making has moved beyond the bi-polar 
categories. However, with regard to legitimacy, values and polity the tensions remain. The 
debates on the role of the European Court of Justice
12
 and the uncertainties regarding the 
banking union
13
 will be forwarded as illustrations of this tension.   
The transnational context is the actual ‘home’ context of the key attributes. With their dubious 
legal status
14
 they fit in no other category. The functioning of the FSB, the measures that aim 
at enhancing the collaboration between states, as well as processes like peer review and 
disclosure mechanisms will hence be looked at in this context. Global administrative law 
proves to be a promising approach, as it captures the developments that go beyond bi-polarity. 
However, this success is limited to the parameters of law-making. In the parameters of 
legitimacy, values and politics bi-polar categories persist.  
By developing a framework and applying it to the Key Attributes, this thesis structures the 
debate on law and transnationalization according to bi-polarity. Ultimately, even if bi-polar 
tensions persist, the exercise will provide insights into the meaning of the non-state/state 
distinction for legal theory.  
0.4. Methodology 
Some clarification is in place regarding the aim of this thesis and how it will be approached. 
The crucial elements of this theoretical exercise are on one hand the bi-polarity – the non-
state/state tension – that is inspired from Jessup’s definition of Transnational law and six 
parameters that are forwarded to disentangle the meaning of it for law.  
The ambition is limited to a structuring of the debate for two reasons:  
                                                 
12
 Grimmel Andreas, “Judicial Interpretation or Judicial Activism? The Legacy of Retionalism in the Studies of 
the European Court of Justice”, in the European Law Journal, Vol. 18, Issue 4, pp. 518-353, 2012. Azoulai Loïc, 
“The Court of Justice and the Social Market Economy: The Emergence of an Ideal and the conditions for its 
Realization”, in the Common Market Law Review, 45, 2008, pp. 1335-1356. 
13
 An introduction in the Banking Union project from the commission Commission Statement, “Finalizing the 
Banking Union: European Parliament backs Commission’s proposals (Single Resolution Mechanism, Bank 
Recovery and Resolution Directive, and Deposit Guarantee Schemes Directive)”, Statement/14/119, Brussels, 15 
April 2014. In way of illustration of some worries with regard to the Union, Veron Nicolas, “A Realistic Bridge 
Towards European Banking Union”, Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 20013/09, June 2013 a more positive 
picture is drawn in Alexander Kern, “Bank Resolution and Recovery in the EU: Enhancing Banking Union”, 
European Law Academy Forum, 14, 2013, pp. 81-93 at criticism from the point of view of legitimacy: Scharpf 
Fritz W., “Political Legitimacy in a Non-optimal Currency Area”, MPIfG Discussion Paper, 13/15, 2013. 
14
 Riles, 2013, p. 77. 
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I have chosen a theoretical perspective and I am presenting the various approaches of 
transnational law, I am not discussing whether a thesis or approach is right or wrong, whether 
there is evidence or not, whether transnational law is more constitutional or more private or 
something in between. My intention is to structure the debate around the leading academic 
discourses and to demonstrate why particular theories are strong with regard to some 
parameters and weak with regard to others. That is why I let the academics speak for 
themselves. I quote them where necessary, which might be sometimes a bit of a burden 
sometimes. 
The purely theoretical approach is put into a practical context. Again, the aim is not to provide 
an application of a specific theory to a context or to prove or disprove its suitability for such 
an exercise. Nor is it to develop or argue the existence of a ‘lex resolutionis’.
15
  The recourse 
to a practical context is made to help illustrate the contingencies of the theoretical debate and 
provide a red thread through the theoretical analysis. Among the many reasons why the Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes offer themselves to this analysis their relevance in 
the three context and the way they illustrate differences between these contexts, the powerful 
illustration of the challenges of transnationalization provided by the financial market and the 
wide and interesting academic debate that they have spurred.  
They will be presented in detail in part 1.3 and provide for illustration of the bi-polar 
arguments in the following chapters. Discussed will be their reception in national law and the 
discussion it spurred in chapter 2, their introduction into European law and their relevance in 
the context of the Banking Union in Chapter 3 and their functioning as undefined object of 
transnational law in the context of the FSB itself in Chapter 4. In Chapter 5, the Key 
Attributes will no longer be used as an illustration, but instead the outcomes gained from their 
previous analysis will be seen as indices to understand the meaning of bi-polarity in 
transnational law.    
  
                                                 
15
 This hint to the proliferation of various “lex” in the field of transnational law shall be forgiven. Meant, of 
course, is that no claim about existence of a distinct legal regime with regard to the resolution of large financial 
institutions, shall be made here. For an illustration of the use of “lex” in transnational law refer for example to 
Fischer-Lescano Andreas and Teubner Gunther, „Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search for Legal Unity in the 
Fragmentation of Global Law“, in the Michigan Journal of International Law, Vol. 25, 2004, p. 1013. 
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1. Setting the Scene: Framework, Outcomes and Context of 
Illustration 
The first chapter will present the elements of this thesis. First, by introducing the notion of bi-
polarity, the parameters of law and the three contexts of law and transnationalization, the 
framework is developed. Then, the outcomes that are drawn from the application of the 
framework to the three contexts are presented, and finally, the context of illustration – the 
resolution of lager financial institutions – is introduced.   
1.1. Framework for the Analysis of Transnationalization 
and Law  
The academic debate assessing the role of law in the context of transnationalization is in need 
of a framework that allows structuring the different approaches. This thesis provides such a 
framework.  
The non-state/state distinction will be put at the center of this structuring exercise, as it is 
identified as the core challenge of the field. Transnational law struggles to reconcile the state 
origin of law with non-state regulatory developments. The framework will distinguish 
between approaches that cling to the traditional state conception of law and approaches that 
embrace the non-state trend in law.  
The framework consists of rows disentangling the state/non-state tension according to its 
aspects in the different parameters of law and columns distinguishing between the national, 
European and transnational legal context in which legal thinking struggles with 
transnationalization. Central to this classification exercise is the importance of the state/non-
state distinction for theories of transnational law.  
Attributing significance to distinctions in transnational law is in no way new in transnational 
legal thinking. It is an attempt to capture the impact of cross border interactions on the role of 
the state and law. In the following, the centrality of the distinction between what is beyond the 
state and the state and the ways in which it impacts law as well as the horizontal and vertical 
categories of the framework will be introduced. 
1.1.1. Bi-polarity: the non-state/state distinction in law  
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The existence, meaning and characteristics of distinctions or on the contrary hybrids are 
important topics throughout the field of transnational law.
16
 This is not surprising, as the 
object of transnational law is being defined as all law that is neither national law nor 
international law.
17
 The hope is that the changing meaning of distinctions allows insight into 
the impact of the transformation of the state and the consequences thereof for law. While 
private/public
18
  and global/national
19
  are popular distinctions to look at, in the following, the 
non-state/state distinction will be forwarded as the main or principal distinction that entails a 
set of sub-distinctions according to which the impact of the non-state/state distinction on law 
can be disentangled (refer to Chart II).  
What is the meaning of the non-state/state distinction for law? I will approach this question by 
inquiring in what ways the non-state/state distinction orients law.
20
 These orientations reflect 
the underlying understanding of the role of law in a democratic society in this thesis, 
preconditioned by a background and upbringing but at the same time with the potential to 
capture the debate of transnational law. The six parameters of law that result from 
disentangling the meaning of the non-state/state distinction accordingly and thereby finding a 
substitute for it as a means of orientation for law are presented in the following. In each 
parameter the non-state/state distinction manifests in a non-state/state tension created though 
transnationalization.  
In a first step, I am dividing the non-state/state distinction in three sub-distinctions that all 
reflect one dimension in which the non-state/state distinction orients law. The first one 
reflects the fact that we draw conclusions on legality from the non-state/state distinction. This 
                                                 
16
 Micklitz Hans-W., “Rethinking the Public/Private Divide”, in Maduro Miguel, Tuori Kaarlo and Sankari Suvi, 
(eds.), “Transnational European Law and Legal Thinking,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014. The 
author approaches the challenges legal thinking faces in transnational law from the perspective of the 
public/private divide.  
17
 In the words of the founding father: "I shall use, instead of ‘international law’, the term 'transnational law' to 
include all law which regulates actions or events that transcend national frontiers." Jessup, Philip C., 
“Transnational law”, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1956, p. 1. Furthermore “In effect, the very idea of 
transnational law is an epitome of legal hybridization” 
18
 Some prominent examples are provided by Micklitz Hans-W. and Svetiev Yane, “A Self-Sufficient European 
Private Law – A Viable Concept?” EUI-ERC Working Paper 1/2012. Reich Norbert, “The Public/private divide 
in European Law”, in Cafaggi Fabrizio and Micklitz Hans-W. (eds.), “The European Private Law after the 
Common Frame of References”, Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2010, p. 56. Azoulai Loic, “Sur un sens 
de la distinction public/privé dans le droit de l’Union Européene” in Revue trimestrielle de droit européen, 2010, 
pp. 842-860. Michaels Ralf and Jansen Nils, “Private Law Beyond the State? Europeanization, Globalization, 
Privatization”, Duke Law School Faculty Scholarship Series, Paper 78, 2007 
19
 Zumbansen Peer, “Sustaining Paradox Bounders: Perspectives on Internal Affairs in Domestic and 
International Law”, in the European Journal of International Law, 15, 2004, pp. 197-211. Zumbansen Peer, 
“Neither Public Nor Private, National Nor International: Transnational Corporate Governance form a Legal 
Pluralist Perspective”, Journal of Law and Society, Vol. 38, Issue 1, pp. 50-75, 2011. 
20
 The difficulty has been presented by Michales Ralf, “Globalization and Law: Law Beyond the State” In order 
to analyze the effects of transnationalization without falling into the trap of methodological nationalism 
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is the non-law/law distinction. The second reflects the message on the power relationship that 
is implied by the non-state/state distinction; the private/public distinction and lastly the spatial 
judgment in the global/national distinction.  
Each of these distinctions will be further disentangled into two parameters that again entail a 
distinction. The non-law/law distinction has a formal dimension. This is the parameter of 
legality in which the non-state/state distinction manifests as procedural/formal distinction. 
The substantive side of the non-law/law distinction is captured in the parameter of legitimacy 
in which the non-state/state distinction translates as a thin/thick distinction.  
The private/public divide provides an understanding of the power relation in law in two 
ways:
21
 firstly, in its economical dimension it refers to the relationship between the market 
and society: this is the parameter of values. With regard to values, the non-state/state 
distinction distinguishes between a dependent consideration of social interests from market 
interests and an independent consideration of social interests from market interests. Secondly, 
in its political dimension it defines the relationship between the state and its citizens or more 
generally, that of regulator and regulated: this is the politics parameter. In this parameter the 
non-state/state distinction is reflected in the de-politicization/politicization distinction.   
The global/national divide provides orientation in two ways: firstly, following an institutional 
dimension, there is a distinction between national structures and structures outside of the 
national: this is the governance parameter. In the governance parameter the non-state/state 
distinction manifests as assimilated following an ideal of independence and dis-integrated in 
the sense of checks and balances. Secondly, the global/national has an identity dimension, 
distinguishing between national citizen and global community: this is the polity parameter. 
According to the non-state/state distinction a polity can be either global or national.  
The non-state/state distinction hence appears in six parameters of law. Transnationalization 
causes a non-state/state tension in each of them. These are the parameters of law beyond the 
state because they allow to understand the meaning of law independently from the non-state 
or state label attached to it. Of course the choice of these six parameters is not beyond debate.  
 
 
                                                 
21
 This understanding of the private/public divide is inspired by Chapter 5 of Arendt Hannah, “The Human 
Condition”, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1958. 
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Parameter non-state/state tension  
Legality Procedural/formal 
Legitimacy Thin/thick 




Chart III: Bi-polarity: The non-state/state tension in the different parameters of law 
1.1.2. The parameters of a law beyond the state 
In the following I will introduce the six ‘parameters’ of law in which the effects of 
transnationalization – the transcending of the non-state/state distinction – manifests and 
according to which I will structure the debate of law and transnationalization. The term 
parameter is borrowed from mathematics where it is used for a constant or a variable that 
determines the specific form of the function but not its general nature. This speaks to the 
current undertaking, as we aim at looking at six different variables of law that are affected by 
transnationalization but do not determine its nature of non-law or law. These parameters are: 
legality, legitimacy, politics, values, governance and polity.  
Each of these parameters is seen to show one aspect of the non-state/state distinction 
formulated as six different tensions; the tensions between procedural and formal, thin and 
thick, de-politicization and politicization, market and society, assimilation and dis-integration, 
global and national. The way this tension is looked at will provide the basis to look at the 
debate in the national, European and transnational contexts in Chapter 2, 3 and 4 respectively. 
Chapter 5 will look at the outcomes gained from the analyses of bi-polar approaches in view 
of the different legal contexts. It will allow classifying the approaches to transnational law 
according to their strengths and weaknesses, similarities and differences. With regard to the 
parameters the distinction between law-making parameters (legality, politics and governance) 
and theoretical backdrop parameters (legitimacy, values and polity) will certainly be the most 
important one that will contribute better to the understanding of the non-state/state divide for 
legal theory of transnational law. 
1.1.2.1. Legality 
The parameter of legality entails the formal side of the non-law/law distinction and reflects 
the non-state/state tension with the procedural/formal distinction. Arguments on the 
importance of the flexibility of procedural law and the speed and expertise of technocratic 
governance in the context of transnationalization are faced with statist positions that insist on 
the importance of formal law and legal safeguards.  
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Procedural approaches in general promote the benefits of speed, expertise and flexibility in 
the face of increasing cross-border interactions. Formal arguments are based on notions like 
coherence of the legal system and legal certainty. Within this parameter, the 
transnationalization debate is put in context of the debate of delegation in administrative law 
and the extent to which the functional development of law should be enhanced or controlled.
22
 
In the context of the European Union, this debate confronts the supporters of functionalism 
with calls for treaty changes and formalization of law.
23
 At the same time, the delegation 
debate in transnational law opposes procedural and formal approaches on issues such as 
regulation by private actors,
24
 globalized state agencies,
25
 networks of such agencies
26
 and 
self-regulation by market participants.
27
  
Procedural law is appreciated by pluralism
28
 for the accommodation it allows for and by 
functionalism for its self-driven development.
29
 Theories of private regulation forward 
efficiency arguments. Formalist approaches on the other hand, point to the danger of legal 
uncertainty and promote implementation, legal safeguards and judicial review.
30
 Institutional 
constitutionalism forwards charters and institutional structures that allow for the ‘hardening’ 
of transnational law.
31
 Approaches on the legalization of global governance advance decision-
making procedures as similar means of formalizing law. Global administrative law shares the 
                                                 
22
 An excellent overview is provided by Taggart in Taggart Michael, “From ‘Parliamentary Power’ to 
Privatization: the Chequered History of Delegated Legislation in the Twentieth Century” in the University of 
Toronto Law Journal, 55, 2005, pp. 575-628. 
23
 Chapter 3.  
24
 For instance in McBarnet Doreen, Voiculescu Aurora and Campbell Tom, (eds.), “The New Corporate 
Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law”, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007. 
25
 Writing about the spheres of influence of state and non-state actors, Sassen observes that some activities do 
not fit this distinction. She observes a embeddedness of the global “that requires at least a partial lifting of these 
national encasements and hence signals a necessary participation by the state [in globalization]” according to 
her: “Key among these are some components of the work of ministries of finance, central banks, and 
increasingly specialized technical regulatory agencies.” Sassen Saskia, “The Participation of States and Citizens 
in Global Governance”, in the Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies, Vol. 10 No. 5, Issue 1, 2003, p. 10 and p. 
9.  
26
 Barr illustrates this according to the Basel Committee of Banking Suerpvision in Barr Michael, “Global 
Administrative Law: The View from Basel”, in The European Journal of International Law, Vol. 17, No. 1, 
2006, pp. 15-46.  
27
 For instance in Cafaggi Fabrizio, “Reframing Self-Regulation in European Private Law”, Kluwer 
International, London, 2006. 
28
 Krisch Nico, “Beyond Constitutionalism: The Pluralist Structure of Postnational Law”, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2010, p. 23 
29
 For example in Ladeur Karl-Heinz, „The Evolution of General Administrative Law and the Emergence of 
Postmodern Administrative Law“, Osgoode CLPE Research Paper, No. 16/2011. 
30
 Calliess Gralf-Peter and Renner, Moritz, “Between Law and Social Norms: The Evolution of Global 
Governance”, in Ratio Juris, Vol. 22, No. 2, 2009, pp. 260-280. 
31
 Schwöbel elaborates on some examples of institutional constitutionalism in Schwöbel Christine E. J., “Global 
Constitutionalism in International Legal Perspective”, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2011, p. 3. As an 
example it can be referred to Petersmann Ernst-Ulrich, “Human Rights, Cosmopolitan Denocracy and the Law of 
the World Trade Organization”, in Fletcher Ian, Mistelis Loukas and Cremona Marise (eds.) “Foundations and 
Perspectives of International Trade Law”, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2001. 
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The legality parameter covers the question of the formal distinction between law and non-law. 
The question on the substantive difference between law and non-law is covered by the 
legitimacy parameter. 
1.1.2.2. Legitimacy 
The legitimacy parameter refers to the substantive and relational counterpart of the aspect of 
legality and investigates the extent to which law conveys the impression that it ought to be 
observed.
33
 As the state provides for many elements that sustain this impression, the challenge 
of transnationalization to legitimacy is how the same belief can be nourished outside of the 
nation state. The distinction that allows structuring this debate is the thin/thick distinction. 
Thin approaches argue that liberal or performance based (output) notions of legitimacy are 
better suited or more appropriate in the context of increased cross-border interactions. Thick 
approaches on the other hand, insist on the importance of republican and democratic (input). 
Transnationalization leads to a tension between the output legitimacy and input legitimacy, as 
transnationalization threatens to evade control of the democratic process.
34
 In European law, 
ordo-liberal arguments attempt at solving this tension through multilevel approaches.
35
 







 and aim at conceptualizing legitimacy outside the nation state and in 
difficult environment for of democracy. To a large extent, they correspond with the 
procedural approaches of the previous category. Private regulation and private law beyond the 
                                                 
32
 Carotti Bruno and Casini Lorenzo, “A Hybrid Public-Private Regime: The Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Number (ICANN) and the Governance of the Internet”, in Cassese Sabino, Carotti Bruno, Casini 
Lorenzo, Macchia Marco, Euan MacDOnald and Savino Mario, (eds.), “Global Administrative Law: Cases, 
Materials, Issues”, IRPA and IILJ, Rome and New York, 2008. 
33
 This approach is influenced by Scharpf’s functional and relation definition of legitimacy. Scharpf Fritz W., 
“Legitimacy in the Multilevel European Polity”, MPIfG Working Paper, 09/1, 2009, p. 5.  
34
 According to Scharpf the legitimacy deficit of the European Union can be understood accordingly. Scharpf, 
2009, Scharpf Fritz W., “What have we learned? Problem-solving capacity of the multilevel European polity”, 
MPIFG working paper, No. 01/4, 2001 and more recently Scharpf Fritz W., “Legitimacy Intermediation in the 
Multilevel European Polity and Its Collapse in the Euro Crisis”, MPIfG Discussion Paper, 12/6, 2012. 
35
 This will be further elaborated in Chapter 3.  
36
 Scharpf, 2009, p. 6. 
37
 An interesting summary on performance-based notions of legitimacy is provided by Bartl Marija, “Legitimacy 
and European Private Law”, EUI Thesis, 2012, pp. 52ff.  
38
 Roughan Nicole, “Authorities: Conflicts, Cooperation, and Transnational Legal Theory”, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2013. 
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state approaches often make performance-based legitimacy arguments.
39
 Others, in the 
context of the debate on the declining role of states in transnational contexts,
40
 point to the 
limits of representative- or participatory mechanism to tackle transnational challenges. Thick 
approaches emphasize the importance of upholding republican requirements also in the 
context of transnationalization
41
 or to limit the participation of a state in transnationalization 
to the limits in which democratic legitimacy can be provided.
42
   
1.1.2.3. Politics 
The parameter of politics covers the political aspect of the private/public divide and raises the 
question of the role of politics in law. The non-state/state distinction opposes approaches of 
de-politicization and politicization, the first supporting the increasing distance between law 
and politics and the second resisting it.  
De-politicized approaches emphasize the potential of private law and the importance of 
shielding it from public policy invasions.
43
 In this context beyond the state, de-politicized 
approaches forward the ordering potential of contracts and the importance of independent 
technocratic governance.
44
 Such de-politicization is impossible for others theorists. 
Approaches of politicization either focus on the role of power as an obstacle to de-
politicization or they focus on distributive realities and urge for non-law and law to be 
politicized accordingly. According to authors like Koskenniemi, law is just one more 
discourse according to which political claims for domination are formulated.
45
 Other authors 
focus on the rising power of private actors and the political nature of industry self-regulation 
and the danger of the capture of state institutions by industry actors and state-industry-
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 Faced with this reality of power, some politicizing approaches support the 
introduction and politicization of underrepresented currents in non-law and law.
47
  
The parameter of politics covers the political aspect of the private/public divide. The 
economic aspect of this divide is entailed in the parameter of values. 
1.1.2.4. Values 
In the parameter of values, approaches that advocate the dependent consideration of social 
interests on market interests compete with approaches that conceive social interest 
independent from market interests.  
The dependent consideration of social interests on market interests urges non-interference of 
law with the market while the state vision of law treats substance independently; opposing 
objectives are accommodated through balancing/consensus building within the political 
process. 
Approaches that opt for a dependent consideration of social interests on market interests see a 
market-enabling role for law. According to these approaches, law should focus on market 
disciplines, as the benefits of a functioning market for society are superior to those of a 
protection of social interests that potentially harms the market.
48
 According to independent 
approaches, social and market interests must be considered independently by law and 
consequently balanced against each other. These approaches urge for consideration of the 
dependence of the market on society as well as that of society on the market.
49
 From this 
mutual dependence, an independent consideration of both is needed. Dependent approaches 
on the other hand, argue that this balancing is not possible in the absence of state structures. 
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This explains and supports the economic embeddedness of transnationalized law.
50
 The 
protection of social interests such as the protection of the environment through pollution 
certificates and the like can, according to them, only be provided through the market,.
51
 
Independent approaches on the other hand, argue that the challenges of transnationalization 




The parameter of governance covers the institutional aspect of the national/global sub-
distinction of the non-state/state distinction.  
For non-state approaches, transnationalization urges assimilated governance structures across 
national and other distinctions that match the challenges at hand. To statist approaches, this 
assimilation is either impossible as national interests prevail, or not desirable as dis-
integration provides for checks and balances.  
Assimilated approaches to governance structures propose a structure that develops according 
to the challenge of transnationalization. Authors of system theory and functional integration 
illustrate this approach.
53
 In the face of challenges of transnationalization - like global climate 
change, terrorism or migration - governance joins forces and disregard national, sectorial and 
other delineations that might prevent their collaboration in the development of law. 
Approaches focusing on dis-integration on the other hand, either forward the dis-integrating 
force of power such as Koskenniemi
 54
 or the importance of maintaining checks and balances 
within and beyond the state like authors of global governance or global constitutionalism.
55
  
The parameter of governance covers the institutional aspect of the national/global distinction. 
The community
56
 aspect of this distinction is entailed in the polity parameter.  
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The ‘polity’ parameter of law relates to the social order in reference to which law is 
developed and the polity aspect of the national/global distinction. 
The non-state/state tension is reflected in the debate whether transnationalization itself leads 
to the development of a polity or polities. The sense of belonging is no longer limited to a 
local or national understanding but can be based on different ideas.
57
 Examples of 
supranational polities are for instance functionally defined.
58
 National approaches on the other 
hand, limit the reference to social order of law to polities that correspond to the national 
conception of a polity and corresponding, more local sense of belonging.  
Supranational polity conceptions can be global in reach or only partially global. They can co-
exist with other polities or have priority over others: the community of traders that is 
imagined to use the so-called lex mercatoria is, for instance is an example of a functionally 
defined polity. On the other hand, in environmental or climate change regulation, an overall 
polity is referred to that reflects a global common interest.  
According to the national conception of the polity, the priority is given to the only real kind of 
polity, the national one that takes the legitimacy of this priority from a sameness or identity of 
its people.  
Approaches opting for a supranationalized polity point out that the effects of 
transnationalization cut across the delimitation of national polities and thereby create new 
forms of polities. For national polity approaches the national polity persists and remains the 
most important social entity and reference for law. Supranational approaches insist on the 
need for cooperation in the interests of overarching newly emerging polities, while national 
polity approaches see harmonization of legal orders as sufficient reaction to transnational 
challenges. 
Legality and legitimacy, politics and values, governance and polity, are the six parameters 
within which the non-state/state distinction manifests itself in law. In the following the three 
legal contexts in which these effects are looked at will be introduced.  
1.1.3. The different contexts of law and transnationalization  
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The columns of the framework represent the three legal contexts in which transnationalization 
affects law. They are the legal contexts of national law, European law and transnational law. 
National law, for the purpose of this thesis, includes national as well as international law: law 
that is produced within or with agreement of the nation state. European law is the law 
produced within the European Union. Transnational law is law that is, according to the 
general definition, neither national nor international and also not, according to our definition, 
European.  
In each context of law, the debate on transnationalization is split in the six parameters, 
distinguishing between non-state and state arguments. Chapter 2 will look at the debate on 
national law and transnationalization opposing non-state and state approaches to legality, 
legitimacy, politics, values, governance and polity. Chapter 3 and 4 will structure the debate 
on transnationalization in European law and transnational law in the same way. In the 
following, all three chapters will be introduced.  
1.1.3.1. National Law  
Chapter 2 focuses on the debate of transnationalization and national law. The arguments on 
law and the increase of cross-border interaction will be structured into the bi-polar categories, 
distinguishing between arguments reflecting non-state trends spurred by transnationalization 
and state-based notions of law in all parameters of law. 
The parameter of legality can be assessed as either procedural (non-state) or formal (state). 
With regard to the aspect of the legality of law, the non-state/state tension manifests itself 
between procedural and formal approaches. On the procedural end, the debate on 





 pointing out the suitability of procedural law and the comparative 
advantage of the executive that can react faster and in a more flexible manner to the challenge 
of increased cross-border interactions. On the other hand, formal approaches emphasize the 
predominance of ‘hard law’ and the power and practical relevance of the judiciary
61
 as well as 
the dangers of an uncontrolled executive branch. The parameter of legality allows us to 
identify this tension along a non-state/state scale.  
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With regard to the parameter of legitimacy, the empowerment of the executive and the shift 
of law making away from the core sources of legitimacy has been accompanied with 
arguments in favor of thinner conceptions for the legitimacy of national law in the context of 
transnationalization. Transnationalization can be seen as just an additional layer of complexity 
that is and has been challenging and over-burdening parliaments for a long time.
62
 However, 
just as there have always been warnings against the expansion of the executive,
63
 
transnationalization is also seen to call for the strengthening of democratic legitimacy and 
returning to thicker conceptions of legitimacy of law.
64
 
In the politics parameter, approaches of de-politicization object to the interference of public 
policy decisions in private law, while politicization approaches on the other hand argue for the 
priority of policy goals over private law and judicial activism in transnational emergencies.
65
 
In the national law context, transnationalization has added to the debate on the public law 
private law divide. To de-politicization approaches, public policy should not intervene in 
contract law. Politicization approaches on the other hand can justify limitations of property 
rights on public policy grounds. 
With regard to the value parameter, the increase of cross-border interactions has given 
momentum to approaches emphasizing the liberal or economic turn of law in the context of 
transnationalization
66
 that advocate a role of law limited to market imperfections. These 
approaches can be contrasted with authors that focus on the independent protection of social 
interests in law in contexts of transnationalization.
67
  
In the debate on the governance structure, some authors see or support an assimilation of 
governance structure across sectorial and national boundaries in the face of 
transnationalization. Others insist that such assimilation is impossible as – especially national 
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– divisions persist or that such assimilation is undesirable, as it replaces a system of checks 
and balances that is important also in the context of transnationalization.  
Finally, in the polity parameter, non-statist approaches observe the formation of alternative – 
supranational - polities in the face of the imperatives of transnationalization. These polities 
can be global and all-encompassing or ‘functional’ reflecting the assimilated governance 
structure that was build along one particular transnational challenge. Statist approaches on the 
other hand, call for the protection of the national polity in the face of transnationalization.
68
 
To them, polities remain defined by sameness and belonging that can only develop at the 
national level. Supranational polities hence either do not exist or do not have to be given 
priority to national ones.   
Along these lines, Chapter 2 will structure the debate on transnationalization in national law. 
It will become apparent that the strong opposition of positions emphasizes the importance of 
courts and other state institutions to find compromises in specific transnational cases. In 
Chapter 5, the bi-polarity of the debate of law and transnationalization in national law will be 
seen as symptomatic of the co-existence of organizational principles in contemporary legal 
thinking. The dependence on state institutions, illustrated by the crucial role of courts in the 
context of transnationalization, ultimately limits legal thinking to the state. 
1.1.3.2. European law 
Chapter three will focus on European law as an example of a debate on law and 
transnationalization. The debate will again be structured into non-state and state arguments 
across the six parameters of law. The bi-polar categories however, will not be able to capture 
all developments. In the context of the parameters of legality, politics and governance, 
European law has developed beyond bi-polarity. On one hand, this observation hints to the 
special place the study of European law has in the debate on law and transnationalization and 
will be further analyzed in the fifth Chapter. On the other hand, this observation introduces 
the distinction between law-making parameters (legality, politics and governance) and 
theoretical backdrop parameters (legitimacy, values and polity). The difference between these 
two groups and the take authors take on it will allow to structure the debate on European law 
and transnationalization.  
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With regard to the legality parameter there is a bi-polar debate on European law, where 
procedural approaches are opposed by formal approaches. The first for instance, support the 
functional expansion of EU law into more and more domains.
69
 Formal approaches on the 
other hand, insist that this development be accompanied with treaty adaptations. However, at 
the same time, by combining the three requirements of proportionality, subsidiarity and legal 
basis, the legality of European law moved beyond bi-polar categories and allowed for a debate 
to take place beyond bi-polarity.  
On the other hand, in the context of the parameter of legitimacy, the debate in the European 
context remains largely confined to the non-state/state categories. Among the thin approaches, 
proponents of the ordo-liberal heritage emphasize the role of the Union in securing 
competition in the growing single market. While they might disagree on the purpose, 
functionalist approaches portray the Union still as a purposeful entity, justified as long as it 
fulfills its purpose. From a performance point of view, the democratic deficit is justified either 
in view of the purpose, or it is to be addressed on the national level. Thick approaches on the 
other hand take the lack of republican elements at EU level more serious. One can distinguish 
between approaches that aim at the development and strengthening of representation at EU 
level and approaches that aim at strengthening the participation across the multilevel system. 
They aim to do so either by limiting the EU to its Member State given mandate and thereby 
strengthening national democratic accountability, or, by reaching out in order to include 
citizens directly in the European law–making.  
Within the parameter of politics, de-politicization approaches can also be traced back to the 
ordo-liberal origin and its distrust of politics. Technocratic and privatized law-making are 
praised for reasons of efficiency and independence from other institutions.
70
 Again private 
law is forwarded as an apt means of regulation that should be protected by intrusion from 
public policy.
71
 Politicized approaches on the other hand, see a distribution reality that should 
be accounted for, either through politicization on a Union level, through more input for 
Member States, or on a citizen level, through the inclusion of citizens in law-making 
processes and strengthening the role of the European Parliament. In the practice of European 
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law, many instances can be observed where de-politicization and politicization are combined, 
balanced and merged. The parameter of politics is another example where the debate on 
European law has moved beyond bi-polar categories, by merging or combining elements of 
both poles –de-politicization and politicization.   
On the values parameter of European law, approaches that forward the dependent 
consideration of social interests on market interests are opposed by authors urging for the 
independent consideration of social interests from market interests. Dependent approaches 
refer back to the founding ethos of fostering peace through economic integration. The market 
and integration of it, to them, is still the key for the provision of welfare and the furthering of 
social interests.
72
 Social interests are hence considered through an economic lens. Independent 
approaches on the other hand, advocate the independent consideration of social interests, 
either by taking a supranational position an advocating a social Europe, or by taking a 
national position and advocating for the immunization of national welfare states from EU 
law.
73
       
Regarding the governance parameter of European law, assimilated approaches advocate 
centralist models and integrated agencies in order to overcome national differences. On the 
other hand, dis-integrated approaches urge for the accommodation of pluralism with regard to 
national distinctions and advocate for the importance of checks and balances at the Union 
level.
74
 As the analysis in Chapter 3 will show, many governance structures developed that 
cannot be put in either an assimilated or dis-integrated category, but that merge elements of 
the two.  
The debate on the polity parameter of European law is split into approaches that conceive 
the European polity as a supranational polity distinct from national polities and approaches 
that project an ideal of a European polity similar to the national one.  Amongst the 
supranational approaches, the European polity has been seen as a community of Member 
State or it has, for instance, been conceived as a polity of economic rather than political 
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 National approaches aim at the development of an identity or sameness similar on 
European level or dismiss the possibility of a European polity altogether. However, the 
bipolar categories with regard to the parameter of polity can hardly be overcome.  
The analysis of the debate on transnationalization in European law supports the intuition that 
European law takes a special place in legal thinking. While it moves beyond non-state/state 
distinctions in some parameters it remains trapped by them in others. Applying bi-polar 
analysis to European law helps distinguishing between such instances. Chapter 5 will look at 
these differences more closely.  
1.1.3.3. Transnational law 
In Chapter 4, the transnational law debate will also be structured according to the bi-polar 
categories of the non-state/state distinction in all six parameters of law. The aim will be to see 
in what ways the transnational law debate has been able to move beyond non-state/state 
categories. On the basis of the insights drawn from that exercise, Chapter 5 will forward 
elements of an approach to transnational law beyond bi-polarity.  
However, the development of a framework for the structuring of the transnational law debate 
is an important aim in itself. The framework in the transnational context will be elaborated on 
a bit more elaborated as, after all, providing a tool to structure approaches in transnational law 
is the central aim of this thesis. The bi-polar dichotomy will be transformed into a spectrum 
according to which the theories of transnational law also will be classified. Micklitz’ 
classification of the transnational field according to the vanishing public/private divide will be 
taken and extended to include the parameters of the non-state/state tension.
76
  
1.1.3.3.1. Bi-polarity and the field of transnational law  
The idea of organizing the transnational law debate according to the non-state/state distinction 
is not new. Examples are for instance the classification of global governance according to 
legalization by Calliess and Renner
77
, or Micklitz’ classification of transnational theories 
according to the vanishing public/private distinction. The approach in this thesis is based on 
the latter, yet suggests that the public/private distinction is just one of the aspects to be 
considered. Disentangling the non-state/state distinction into six different parameters allows 
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one to distinguish more subtly between the various approaches and thereby to discern more 
specifically where their potential regarding legal thinking beyond bi-polarity lies.  
Micklitz classification of four approaches – constitutional pluralism, global administrative 
law, private law beyond the state and private regulation – is taken as a starting point. Then the 
differentiation according to the six aspects will be added to further distinguish between 
approaches. This will form a framework of two ideals – global constitutionalism and private 
regulation – between which six spectra allow classifying transnational theories in view of 
their ability to overcome the non-state/state distinction (Chart VI). In the following, I will 
introduce Micklitz’ framework and the four theoretical strands of transnational law according 
to him. However, within each one, I will show how introducing the six parameters can help to 
further distinguish between approaches.  
This presentation of the approaches to transnational law remains limited. However, the extent 
of the debate becomes clear as well as the difficulty to provide a satisfactory structuring grid. 
Many approaches have different focuses, and a comparison between them is not easy. 
According to this thesis, part of this confusion is due to the fact that the non-state/state tension 
affects law in a range of ways and the approaches of transnational law focus on various of 
these impacts. In order to disentangle the non-state/state tension, the framework here will 
entail six parameters of law, within each the tension manifests in another facet. 
Global constitutionalism and constitutional pluralism 
Under the label of global constitutionalism and constitutional pluralism, this thesis will refer 
to approaches that forward notions of order for the functioning or making of transnational 
law. In the case of global constitutionalism, this order is over all or universal: in the case of 
constitutional pluralism it is a dis-order of orders that is thought of.
78
 In this thesis, global 
constitutionalism will be presented as strongly dependent on a state vision of law, requiring 
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Micklitz sets aside the overall debate on global constitutionalism and constitutional pluralism 
even though he sees important interconnections with private law theories. For him, global 
constitutionalism is the dominant public perspective.
80
 Here a similar approach is taken; the 
idea of order that runs through all theories of constitutionalism is seen as evidencing closeness 




Beyond this point of commonality, global constitutionalism
82
 is a very varied field. There is a 
distinction between normative, institutional, social and analogical constitutionalism, and there 
is also constitutional pluralism.
83
 Constitutional pluralism will be put in the same category, 
distinguished just by the degree of order and hence publicness or state attachment as global 
constitutional pluralism applies constitutional ideas on the regime or system level.
84
 
In such a vast field, categorizing approaches according to the six parameters is useful. In 
normative constitutionalism, approaches that forward a notion of world law
85
 and approaches 
of fundamental norms as ideas
86
 might be interesting with regards to different parameters. 
While the first focuses more on legitimacy and legality, the latter is more interesting with 
regard to the role of values and politics in law.  
Institutional constitutionalism entails such different approaches as Petersmann’s stands of the 
WTO
87
 and Peters’ global governance perspective on participation of citizens in international 
(or transnational) law-making.
88
 Distinguishing them according to the parameters could be 
useful as they surely differ in their stands on governance and politicization. Both currents in 
institutional constitutionalism share a lot with global administrative law and blur the 
theoretical categories in this regard. Alexander, Dhumale and Eatwell provide an illustration 
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of this overlap of theories with their attempt to devise a global governance structure that can 
efficiently regulate financial markets while adhering to principles of accountability and 
efficiency.
89
 Again, the parameters advanced in this thesis can be useful to tease out 
differences between constitutionalism and global administrative law as they most likely differ 
in their ambitions regarding legality, politicization and legitimacy.  
Analogical constitutionalism in the context of the European Union includes authors like 
Walker and Kumm.
90
 The first speaks to the parameters of legitimacy, polity, and governance, 
while the latter provides more insight on the parameter of politics. Arguments of ‘hardening’ 
transnational law through decision-making bodies mix analogical constitutionalism with 
transnational private law
91
 as well as global administrative law.
92
 Thinking about the 
parameters of values or politics might help in differentiating these currents better.  
Global administrative law (GAL) 
The category of GAL considered here entails approaches that draw parallels between national 
administrative law and transnational law. Placed second on Micklitz’ spectrum, GAL shares 
the public origin, yet focuses on the old debate of delegation of law-making powers away 
from the nation state.
93
 Micklitz naturally focuses on the delegation to private actors, yet in 
the context of the changing nature of the state through transnationalization public/public or 
hybrid delegation also remains an interesting topic in the writings of GAL. The field of GAL 
is growing fast, as it overlaps with a wide range of approaches to global governance that – 
similar to analogical constitutionalism – engage in a form of ‘analogical administrative law.’
94
 
GAL is based on the idea of a (self-) ordering that takes place in administrative law logic.
95
 
As such GAL bridges a constitutional perspective to the other end of the spectrum, with 
authors arguing for the prevalence of administrative principles in private regulation.
96
 This 
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blurring of categories is further enhanced though GAL’s strong functionalist perspective that 
is shared across many approaches to transnational law. Distinguishing the different 
approaches according to the non-state/state distinction in the six parameters of law can be 
useful.  
GAL is defined as “comprising the mechanisms, principles, and supporting social 
understandings that promote or otherwise affect the accountability of global administrative 
bodies.”
97
 Central in the GAL approach according to Kingsbury et al. is the existence of an 
accountability deficit that appeared as a consequence of the growing transnational regulatory 
power.
98
 In contrast to this, Ladeur puts emphasis on the potential of GAL to overcome 
hierarchical structures through networks. The first hence focus on the parameters of legality 
and legitimacy, while the latter centres on legality and governance.  
The approach of Kingsbury et al. has been applied to a large range of different examples of 
global governance. According to the GAL approach this resulted in “various transnational 
systems of regulation or regulatory cooperation that have been established through 
international treaties and more informal intergovernmental networks of cooperations, shifting 
many regulatory decisions form the national to the global level.”
99
 The parameters are useful 
to distinguish among them as some focus on governance structures and others on the role of 
politics. Barr’s account on the Basel Committee from a GAL perspective focuses mainly on 
governance and legitimacy while Meidingers account on forest certification and public-
private partnership provides more interesting from a politics and values perspective.
100
  
Due to the case study chosen in this thesis, GAL will be of central importance in our analysis. 
However, the categorization into bi-polar non-state/state arguments and especially its limits 
with regard to the theory of GAL will also be taken as evidence that its traditional 
preoccupation with delegation between public and private and more generally state and non-
state grants an important role to this theory in transnational law.  
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Private law beyond the nation state 
Private law beyond the nation state (PLBS) focuses on a range of authors
101
 that have been 
focusing on international private law and its ‘public’
102
 or regulatory potential. According to 
Micklitz’s spectrum, private law beyond the state and private regulation are distinguished by 
the top-down or public-ordering ambition of the former and the bottom-up focus on private 
ordering of the latter. Again there are important overlaps. 
PLBS entails authors that focus on the conflict-solving potential of international private law 
following the tradition of the “grand codifications of the 19
th
 century and the rise of 
international private law to organize the linkages between different national private legal 
orders”
103
 and the endeavor of finding similar linkages between the different regulatory 
entities that make up the pluralistic transnational space. Wai, for instance forwards the 
‘interlegality transnational private law’ as a “decentralized and intermediate form of 
transnational governance that recognizes and manages the multiplicity of norms generated by 
plural systems in our contemporary world society.”
104
  
Looking at the range of coordination between legal orders that approaches of PLBS find 
private law to provide, we find the topic of codification, as well as combinations of private 
law and GAL or global governance. For these approaches, a differentiation according to the 
legality and politics parameters would be interesting.  
Muir Watt’s studies the contractualization of transnational law and advocates the 
improvement of it though the furthering of accountability and transparency in the legal 
principles of good governance.
105
 She thereby makes a connection between private law 
beyond the state and GAL that could be analyzed through the parameters of legality, 
politicization and legitimacy. As Micklitz points out, Cafaggi makes a bridge between private 
regulation and GAL. His effort can be disentangled according to the parameters of legality, 
politics and governance.  
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The approaches of private regulation focus on the ordering potential of private law from a 
bottom-up perspective. Again, this is a very large theoretical strand as it catches all authors 
that investigate the role and function of private rule-making. 
The starting point for most writers is an observation of functional integration. Functional 
integration has been most famously developed by Teubner in his application of Luhmann’s 
system theory to the context of law. The same ‘regime-focus’ is shared in writings about so-
called lex-mercatoria, lex sportiva and lex digitalis. One important difference between these 
approaches is the degree of interaction that is seen to exist between regimes. The governance 
or polity parameters allow one to account for this distinction.  
The degree of interaction forwarded by these approaches remains debated in most cases.
106
 In 
system theory some sort of minimal interaction or communication between these systems is 
suggested but remains vague.
107
 Instead of political and legal order, systems are connected 
though nodes that work through functional integration. The state, politics or law, thereby lost 
their overall steering capacity.
108
 Caliess Zumbasen similarly start with a bottom-up 
perspective on private law, yet then make links to a whole range of other theoretical 
categories. For instance the importance of transparency and accountability closely connects 
them to GAL. The proposal to include the notion of ‘affectedness’ into the thinking about the 
legitimacy of transnational law borrows from global governance more generally.
109
  The six 
parameters allow one to classify the various combinations of approaches and to account for 
subtle non-state/state compromises that are achieved through the combinations. 
1.1.3.3.2. A framework for the field of transnational law 
Similar to the context of national law and European law, the debate on transnationalization 
and law in transnational law is structured according to a framework. The non-state/state 
distinction – bi-polarity – is however changed into a spectrum, in order to allow for a more 
subtle differentiation of the stances of the different theories on the distinction.  
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Legality Legitimacy Politics Values Governance Polity 
Global 
constitutionalism 
Formal Thick Politicized Independent Dis-
integrated 
National 
GAL       
 
Private Law 
beyond the state 
      
Private 
Regulation 
Procedural Thin De-politicized Dependent Assimilated Supranational 
Chart VI: Framework of transnational theories according to their ability to overcome bipolarity in six 
parameters of law 
The framework put forward by this thesis allows a structures of the debate in legal thinking on 
transnationalization in the context of national, European and transnational law. In the context 
of transnational law, faithful to the focus of this thesis, the framework is further elaborated, 
structuring approaches to transnational law according to their stances on the non-state/state 
tension. It is however hoped that the structuring exercise will also provide some insights for 
the study of transnational law. The following part will introduce the aim of Chapter 5 to draw 
some insights form the structuring exercise that prompt the development of an approach to 
transnational law beyond bi-polarity.  
1.2. Outcomes from the framework: a plea for an approach 
to transnational law beyond bi-polarity 
The main outcome of the analysis of the framework is that an approach to transnational law 
beyond bi-polarity should be developed. The persistence of bi-polarity throughout the 
contexts of law and transnationalization indicates that there are fundamental tensions in legal 
theory that ultimately limit our understanding of transnational law. This will follow from a 
range of different outcomes presented according to the chapters of the different contexts of 
law and transnationalization.  
1.2.1. National law: Bi-polarity and dependence on state institutions 
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The outcome of the analysis of national law according to the bi-polar framework will be that 
legal thinking in national law is dominated by two competing organizational principles and 
therefore depends on state institutions.
110
  
This argument will be sustained by presenting the analysis of the framework in national law 
as an illustration of what Kennedy called the ‘legal thinking of the third globalization’ that is 
characterized by the management between two opposed ideals and the mixed outcomes of this 
management. The way in which courts are at the same time considered very important but 
also criticized for conducting judicial activism will illustrate this point. The compromises that 
are achieved in law-making remain superficial and ultimately leave it to the courts to strike a 
balance between legal formalism and policy analysis. Bi-polarity indicates hence an 
underlying tension that makes law dependent on a managerial effort that must be provided by 
state institutions. 
The two organizational principles and the influence of their co-existence on contemporary 
legal thinking will be explained and illustrated according to the analysis of national law and 
transnationalization in the six parameters of law. The preference of thin legitimacy, 
depoliticized law, dependent consideration of social interests, assimilated governance and a 
supranational polity will be put in the context of the organizational principle of the will theory 
and the premise that “law should be the coherent working out of the idea of individual 
freedom so far as compatible with the like freedom of others.”  Similarly, arguments for thick 
legitimacy, politicized law, independent consideration of social interests, dis-integrated 
governance and a national polity will be attributed to the premise of social interdependence. 
Transnationalization will be presented as one further issue in which this tension manifests. 
The role of courts in each of the six parameters will be used to illustrate that they have a 
crucial role in managing between the two ideals. As transnational challenges enhance 
procedural developments of law, courts are called upon to provide legal safeguards. At the 
same time it is true that in the face of increasingly performance-based notions of legitimacy 
and technocratic and assimilated governance structures, courts are seen to be the last – or at 
least one of the last- guardians of national interests.  The role of the courts will also indicate a 
difference between the parameters; in legality, politics and governance bi-polar categories 
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seem to blur, the compromises found in law-making remain superficial and the actual finding 
of compromises is left to the court. 
1.2.2. European law: differences between parameters 
The impression of a difference between parameters will be confirmed in the analysis of 
European law. The difference between law-making parameters (legality, politics and 
governance) and parameters of the theoretical backdrop (legitimacy, values and polity) will be 
the outcome of the chapter on European law.  
Management between the poles can be achieved in the parameters of legality, politics and 
governance but bi-polarity persists in the parameters of legitimacy, values and polity.  
In Chapter 3 this becomes apparent, as certain developments in the legality, politics and 
governance of European law, do not fit the bi-polar categories. With regard to legality, 
European law has to combine characteristics that satisfy procedural as well as formal 
requirements. Similarly, law-making in the European Union creates for closeness to political 
institutions in some instances and for distance from them in others and lastly, various forms of 
governance structures that co-exist, combine assimilated structures with dis-integrated 
structures. 
However, European law does not serve as a blueprint for transnational law because in the 
parameters of legitimacy, values and polity it depends very much on European institutions. In 
these parameters, the bi-polar tensions persist, and approaches that forward non-state like 
visions of European law collide with state-like visions. By way of illustration, the debate on 
the role of the European Court of Justice is examined according to this distinction.  
The European Court of Justice is, at the same time, crucial in the development of European 
law, and it is harshly criticized for engaging in judicial activism.
111
 Should the European 
Court of Justice give predominance to the four freedoms? Or respect the national welfare 
systems?
112
 Or advance social protections by itself?
113
 The debate remains bi-polar because as 
the legality of European law combines legal formalism and policy analysis, it remains to the 
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judge to ultimately strike the balance between the two.
114
 This outcome on one hand raises the 
question about the relationship between the two groups of parameters and on the other hand 
shows that European law cannot be a blueprint for transnational law. 
1.2.3. Transnational law: haunted by another bi-polarity 
The same difference between parameters applies to the context of transnational law. While 
approaches that focus on law-making overcome bi-polarity in these parameters, there are 
other approaches that take a stances in the parameters of legitimacy, values and polity. 
However, the outcome of the bi-polar analysis of transnational law will be that while they 
overcome the non-state/state distinction at first sight, bi-polarity re-appears on a more 
fundamental level. Ultimately, transnational law cannot overcome bi-polarity and legal 
thinking remains limited by it.  
With reference to examples taken from GAL it becomes clear that transnational law-making 
can overcome bi-polarity. Differences to European law-making exists; the legality of 
transnational law does not reach the robustness of the legality of European law. On the other 
side, the variety of governance structures in transnational law outmeasures the one in 
European law.  
With regard to the parameters of legitimacy, values and polity a theoretical choice has to be 
made. The questions can be either approached from a top-down or a bottom-up perspective. 
Elaborating on system theory, the bottom-up perspective will be illustrated. At first the 
reflexive development of system internal legitimacy and values for a functionally defined 
polity are explained and finally bi-polarity seems overcome. Within the system the choice of 
thin legitimacy, dependent consideration of interest and supranational polity seems 
convincing. However, when considering the external face of the system, its relation to its 
environment and other systems, the tension reappears. What is the relationship between the 
thin legitimacy in the system and the thin common normative horizon that all systems share? 
What is the relationship between the dependent consideration of all interests according to the 
rationality of the system and the rationality of other systems or values like the protection of 
the environment? What is the relationship between the functionally defined polity of the 
system and the global civil society?  The analysis of the parameters according to system 
theory will raise these questions and conclude that the bi-polar tension between non-state and 
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state is transformed into a tension between laws internal and external face. Ultimately legal 
thinking remains limited by bi-polarity.  
1.3. Context of illustration: The FSB Key Attributes of 
Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions 
Our framework is illustrated with the Financial Stability Board Key Attributes of Effective 
Resolution Regimes (Key Attributes, KAs).
115
  In the flurry of reform spurred by the financial 
and economic crisis of the late 2000s, the newly transformed Financial Stability Board 
developed these standards as part of the efforts to end the too big to fail (TBTF) problem 
associated with systemically important financial institutions.
116
  
The Key Attributes are part of the FSB SIFI framework and aim at addressing the systemic 
risks and the associated moral hazard problem for institutions that are seen by markets as 
TBTF.
117
 The framework that was endorsed by the G20 in November 2011 entails measures 
for effective resolution regimes and policies, requirements for additional loss absorption 
capacity to make banks more crisis resistant, more intense and effective supervision, and the 
strengthening of core market infrastructures.
118
  
In the following, I will provide an introduction into the debate of the Key Attributes according 
to the framework of this thesis. First, I will present the KAs as a piece of transnational law. 
Then I will show the tension that the non-state/state distinction causes in the six parameters of 
law, and finally, I will provide an introduction into the developments it caused in the three 
contexts of national, European and transnational law. Before starting this analysis, I will 
provide an overview of the so-called KAs: 
The Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions, lie out the 
characteristics that a resolution regime for financial institutions should have according to the 
FSB. A resolution regime is an alternative to a bankruptcy procedure and aims at ‘resolving’ 
or liquidating a failing institution in an ‘ordered’ way so that the financial market does not 
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suffer disruptions.  The FSB puts forward twelve such Key Attributes. In the following they 
are listed and their content summarized in one simplified sentence: 
Nr. Title Shorthand 
1 Scope of the resolution regime  (KA 1, Scope), 
2 Resolution authority (KA 2, Resolution authority) 
3 Resolution Powers (KA 3, Resolution powers) 
4  
 
Set-off, netting, collateralization, segregation of 
clients’ assets 
(KA 4, Set-off rights) 
5 Safeguards (KA 5, Safeguards) 
6 Funding of firms in resolution (KA 6, Funding) 
7 Legal framework conditions for cross-border 
cooperation 
(KA 7, LFCRC) 
8 Crisis Management Groups (KA 8, CMG) 
9 Institution-specific cross-border cooperation 
agreements 
(KA 9, COAGs) 
 
10 Resolvability assessments (KA 10 Resolvability 
assessments) 
11 Recovery and resolution planning (KA 11, RRP) 
12 Access to information and information sharing (KA 12, access to information) 
Chart VII: Overview of the Key Attributes 
 
KA 1: Scope of the resolution regime (KA 1, Scope),  
Lists all the institutions that should fall within the scope of the resolution regime. 
KA 2: Resolution authority (KA 2, Resolution authority),  
Lists amongst others its statutory objectives and functions, the extent of its authority and its 
independence. 
KA 3: Resolution Powers, (KA 3, Resolution powers) 
Enumerates the various powers the authority should have throughout the resolution process 
and the different measures it should be able to carry out in this process. 
KA 4: Set-off, netting, collateralization, segregation of clients’ assets, (KA 4, Set-off rights) 
Ph.D. Thesis  




Stipulates that, in order to gain the necessary time to organize the resolution, the legal 
framework should, with the adequate safeguards, be able to suspend statutory or contractual 
set-off rights or other measures that entail automatic early termination rights.
119
 
KA 5: Safeguards, (KA 5, Safeguards) 
Stipulates that the hierarchy of claims, the principle of “no creditors worse off” and legal 
safeguards for creditors and other legal remedies should remain in place and not be harmed. 
KA 6: Funding of firms in resolution, (KA 6, Funding)  
Holds that funding should be planned and available so that the resolution authority is not 
constrained to rely on public ownership or bail-out funds. 
KA 7: Legal framework conditions for cross-border cooperation (KA 7, LFCRC) 
Holds that the legal framework should empower and encourage the resolution authority to 
cooperate with foreign authorities. National laws and regulations should not discriminate 
against creditors on the basis of their nationality.  
KA 8: Crisis Management Groups (CMG) 
Forwards that home and key host authorities of all global SIFIs (G-SIFIS) should form and 
maintain CMGs in order to coordinate and facilitate the management of a potential resolution. 
KA 9: Institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements (COAGs) 
Demands that for all G-SIFIS an institution-specific cooperation agreement between the home 
and relevant host authorities should be in place and formulates the content of such an 
agreement. 
KA 10: Resolvability assessments,  
Holds that such assessments should be in place to evaluate the feasibility of resolution 
strategies and facilitate the predication of impacts on the overall economy.  
KA 11: Recovery and resolution planning (RRP) 
Demands that an ongoing process for recovery and resolution planning is put in place in all 
jurisdictions. At least all G-SIFIs are required to develop such plans in place.  
KA 12: Access to information and information sharing. 
Forwards that no legal, regulatory or policy impediments should exists that hinder the 
exchange of information.  
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In order to facilitate the reading quotations from the KAs will be formatted in italic and put 
apart from the text.  
1.3.1. The KAs as a piece of transnational law 
Looking at the KAs provides an example of the nature of a transnational challenge, the 
regulatory development it spurs and the challenge it causes to law.  
The resolution of large financial institutions
120
 is an incidence of transnationalization in two 
interconnected ways; firstly, large financial institutions do often have a cross-border 
component in either their corporate form, clientele or at least activity; secondly their size – 
acquired through this cross-border activity – out-measures that of states. This double 
challenge, as well as the resolution of large financial firms in general has attracted much 
writing since the financial crisis of the late 2000’s where under the catch phrase of ‘too big to 
fail’
121




As the piece of transnational law that was developed in reply to this challenge, the KAs 
exemplify the unclear legal status of transnational law and the various impacts it has on 
national and European law, as well as the interactions between the three that helped its 
development.  
In the crisis of the late 2000s, national jurisdictions faced with struggling financial institutions 
mostly disregarded the bankruptcy regimes they had in place and reacted to the crisis with 
emergency measures and legislation. Later these measures led to the development of 
resolution authorities, the strengthening of powers of supervisory agencies, or alternative 
arrangements with the same aim. These developments in national jurisdiction were paralleled 
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by efforts of groups of states to concert the reforms.
123
 Firstly, because in the face of the 
globalized market in financial services there is an interest in harmonization and secondly the 
practical challenge of resolving a financial institution that operates in different jurisdictions 
demands a degree of cooperation.
124
  
These efforts, driven by the G20 and led by the FSB, were finally formalized in the Key 
Attributes. They match the definition of transnational law, as they are neither national nor 
international law. Instead they have been formulated as recommendations and are now, after 
the endorsement by the G20, referred to as international standards.
125
 The legal value of these 
standards remains unclear; however, they led to further reforms in national law.
126
  
1.3.2. Resolution of large financial institutions: non-state/state tensions in all 
parameters of law 
The aim of the Key Attributes is to enable the resolution of financial institutions without 
severe systemic disruption and without exposing taxpayers to loss, while protecting vital 
economic functions through mechanisms which make it possible for shareholders and 
unsecured and uninsured creditors to absorb losses in a manner that respects the hierarchy of 
claim in liquidation.
127
 At the same time, they entail measures that aim at the establishment of 
institution-specific cross-border colleges in order to enable the resolution of global SIFIs and 
measures to facilitate the cooperation and exchange of information between jurisdictions.  
Dealing with the failure of large financial institutions has challenged law in all of its six 
parameters. In the following, I will shortly provide an overview of the challenge and the 
tensions they created within each parameter of law. 
What form of law is better fit to deal with the challenge of struggling financial institution? 
Should the emphasis be on flexibility or on legal certainty?
128
 The legality of formal law is 
challenged, as its lack of flexibility and speed does seem unfit for the tackling of financial 
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 On the other hand, legal uncertainty in national orders fueled through 
procedural approaches makes cross-border resolutions even harder.
130
 Large administrative 
powers, untested enforceability of netting and collateral rights, and policy decision in 
depositor and creditor protection hinder planning of cross-border resolutions. The Key 
Attributes display a mix of both, procedural and formal approaches, by promoting flexibility 
for best enabling resolution agencies while at the same time providing for legal safeguards, 
promoting learning and feedback to accommodate national differences and closely monitor 
implementation.   
The confusion is equally large with regard to the parameter of legitimacy; by holding 
consultations on a regional as well as global level, while at the same time insisting on a very 
exclusive membership, the stances of the Key attributes with regard to legitimacy are not 
clear.
131
 How is its legitimacy to be understood? What is the legitimacy of law under 
transnationalization? How is the common good that should be served evaluated? What is the 
understanding of the common good that should be served? Policies developed with liberal 
notions of legitimacy in mind clash when their outcomes are evaluated to republican 
legitimacy standards. But how should the resulting legitimacy deficit be addressed? Should 
the focus be on accountability, or on participation? 
With regard to the values and relationship of the market and society the central importance 
attributed to taxpayer protection seems to indicate the will to protect society form the market. 
On the other hand, most measures in the KAs do not in fact intervene very restrictively into 
the market but aim to enable market discipline through transparency. What should be the 
relationship between market and social interests? Should we intervene more in the markets?
132
 
Ending bailouts is justified with a double aim. What is the relationship between protecting 
taxpayers and safeguarding market discipline (limiting moral hazard)? Conceptions 
considering social interests as dependent on market interests clash with conceptions that 
consider social interests independently from market interests.   
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The role of law with regard to politics proposed in the KAs, their strong reliance on 
delegation seems to indicate a de-politicization approach, but overriding public policy 
consideration give the opposite impression. What should be the relationship between law and 
politics in transnationalization? Should law be politicized in order to achieve policy goals, or 
should functional or technocratic approaches be fostered? 
The challenge of transnationalization crosses sectorial and national borders. Information 
sharing and cooperation is needed to manage resolution. Should therefore governance 
structures be assimilated or will that only aggravate the national particularities?
133
 The 
formation of regulatory colleges and strong independent agencies seems to indicate 
assimilative tendencies in the KAs. On the other hand, reliance on courts and tolerance 
towards sectorial differentiation suggest dis-integration.  
Finally with regard to polity, the reference to global systemic risk and the global economy 
allude to a polity beyond the state. At the same time, the majority of the measures of the KAs 
are aimed at the improvement of national resolution agencies and the harmonization of their 
practices. The challenge of transnationalization implies that the countries bearing the risk of 
failure might not be the countries of incorporation.
134
 Does that mean that law should protect 
the national polity through ring-fencing and preferential treatment of home depositors and 
creditors?
135
 Or does it mean that it should allude to a polity beyond the national that shares 
the common interest to tackle financial institutions? 
The resolution of large financial institutions as a challenge of transnationalization causes 
tension in all aspects of law.  It is hence a good choice for the illustration of the debate on law 
and transnationalization. Even more so, as shown in the next part, it has led to developments 
and hence debate in all three contexts of law looked at in this thesis.  
1.3.3.  The Key Attributes in the three contexts of transnationalization and law 
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The Key Attributes led to developments in all three contexts of law. In national law they 
spurred reforms in FSB member states.
136
 On a European level, the Resolution and 
Restructuring Directive (BRRD) incorporated not only the KAs into European law but mark 
an important step in the development of the banking union. Lastly, of course, the KAs are a 
development in transnational law, according to the rules and procedures of the FSB and 
endorsed by the G20.  
Thereby, the KAs offer an illustration not only of regulation developed in the face of a 
transnational challenge, but also of the impact of this regulation in different contexts of law as 
well as the debate it spurs in them. 
The KAs entail a series of recommendations that are aimed at the improvement of national 
resolution authorities. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, these recommendations, their reception in 
national jurisdictions and the debate around them will be structured according to the 
framework that is developed here. This analysis will largely be based on the 2013 Thematic 
Peer Review Report. This report provides illustrations for difficulties faced in specific 
countries as well as trends regarding the implementation of the different KAs, priorities given 
to them, and the like. The reception of these KAs will be looked at with regard to all six 
parameters of law. It will become apparent that within each parameter transnationalization 
leads to a tension that reflects the non-law/law tension of the bi-polar approach.    
The role of European law as a potential pioneer for transnational law defines how this thesis 
will be looking at the Key Attributes and European law in this thesis. The Bank Resolution 
and Restructuring Directive
137
 (BRRD) introduced the Key Attributes into European law. This 
network of national resolution authorities has been complemented by a Single Supervisory 
Mechanism and - in the Euro zone - a Single Resolution Mechanism. The BRRD is part of a 
larger effort to strengthen the financial framework of the single market. Key in the 
strengthening of the framework is the ‘single rulebook’ for all banks in Europe. It is made up 
by the implementation of Basel III in the EU legal Framework
138
 for stronger prudential 
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requirements, the new Directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes
139
 and the Bank Recovery 
and Resolution Directive as an attempt to strengthen and harmonize the tools for dealing with 
the bank crisis across the EU. The pillars of the banking union are the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). While both regimes now 
co-exist they provide competing visions of the future of European law in financial market 
regulation.
140
 Chapter 3 will classify the debate on the resolution of large financial institutions 
in European law according to the bi-polar categories. The ways in which European law 
overcomes the non-state/state tension and the limits thereof will become apparent. Thereby, 
the framework will provide a better understanding of the particular place European law has in 
the study of transnational law. 
The functioning of the FSB itself as well as the KAs that aim at transnational cooperation will 
be used to illustrate the framework in the context of transnational law. The focus will be on 
the rules on the functioning of the FSB (its legal form and its mechanism of enforcement), and 
the measures aimed at global systemically important financial institutions (GSIFIs) that 
develop regulatory fora beyond the state level. With regard to the functioning of the FSB, its 
Charter
141
 as well as its thematic peer review mechanism will be looked at more closely.
142
 
The peer reviews are part of the FSB Framework on Strengthening Adherence to International 
Standards
143
 alongside with leadership by example and the adherence toolbox and are part of 
the responsibilities of the Standing Committee on Standards Implementation (SCSI). Chapter 
4 will structure the debate on these KAs as well as on the functioning of the FSB. The 
analysis will unveil the instances where transnational law provides avenues to an approach 
beyond the non-state/state distinction and where it remains limited by it.  
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2. The Bi-polar Debate on National Law and Transnationalization 
This Chapter will examine the debate that has been inspired by transnationalization in national 
law and will structure that debate according to the non-state/state distinction and its sub-
distinctions in the six parameters of law; legality, legitimacy, politics, values, governance and 
polity. This bi-polar analysis provides an insight into how non-state/state tension persists in 
legal thinking about national law and transnationalization. Bi-polar arguments do not solve 
this non-state/state tension; in fact they sustain that tension and the final compromise in most 
cases is left to the courts or the political institutions of the nation state.  
By way of illustration, this Chapter will refer to the Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Authorities (Key Attributes) that are being transferred into 
national law. The focus is on the implementation of FSB standards in national jurisdictions 
and the debate that this spurs. Considerable tension may be observed as the developments 
caused by transnationalization have given momentum to non-state arguments and the criticism 
of state institutions and state characteristics of law while on the other hand, law remains 
closely attached to the state, and arguments of a state-based vision of law persist. The actual 
resolution regimes that develop in the nation state can be seen as compromises developed 
under and within this tension.  
The KAs aimed at national implementation are: 
Nr. Title Shorthand 
1 Scope of the resolution regime  (KA 1, Scope), 
2 Resolution authority (KA 2, Resolution authority) 
3 Resolution Powers (KA 3, Resolution powers) 
4  
 
Set-off, netting, collateralization, segregation of 
clients’ assets, 
(KA 4, Set-off rights) 
5 Safeguards, (KA 5, Safeguards) 
6 Funding of firms in resolution (KA 6, Funding) 
7 Legal framework conditions for cross-border 
cooperation 
(KA 7, LFCRC) 
12 Access to information and information sharing (KA 12, access to information) 
Chart VII: Overview of the Key Attributes relevant in the context of national law 
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These are all KAs with the exception of KA8 (Crisis Management Groups) and KA9 
(Institution-specific cross-border cooperation agreements). These two along with the 
transnational law applications of KA10 (Resolvability assessments) and 11 (Access to 
information) will be looked at in Chapter 4. 
The focus in this Chapter is hence the debate as to how national jurisdictions deal or should 
deal with the challenge caused when large financial institutions get into difficulty and risk 
failure. It will be argued that in all parameters of law, the question with regard to the non-
state/state distinction is not ultimately resolved. Instead, bipolar arguments sustain the non-
state/state tension and the role of courts illustrates a dependence on a management effort by 
state institutions. 
2.1. Bi-polar approaches to the legality of law 
Bi-polarity in legal thinking about the legality of law in transnationalization entails arguments 
of procedural law on one hand and arguments on formal law on the other.  
Many see the complexity and speed of transnationalization as favoring procedural 
approaches.
144
 On the other hand, others point to the high stakes and uncertainty caused by 
transnationalization as a reason to heighten or at least adhere strictly to formal requirements 
of law-making in these contexts.
145
 Procedural approaches emphasize the importance of speed 
and expertise in the context of dealing with financial institutions and the added benefit of 
flexibility in cross border resolutions. The formalist approach on the other hand, focuses on 
the role of legal certainty and legal safeguards. On one hand they are pointing to the 
formalization of emergency measures on the other hand to the judicial limits to cross-border 
cooperation throughout national jurisdictions. 
In the context of resolution regimes this is partly reflected by the debate on bankruptcy law 
framework versus resolution authorities for the resolution of financial institutions. The FSB 
approach is based on the latter but tries to accommodate formalistic demands through judicial 
safeguards and clear mandates for resolution authorities.  
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2.1.1. Procedural legality approaches 
Procedural approaches are forwarded on basically three grounds; firstly, speed and flexibility 
are suitable for complex regulatory challenges, secondly, they allow for the consideration of 
public policy goals and finally, they are more likely to facilitate cross border interactions.  
The debate on the legality of measures to deal with large financial institutions illustrate this 
point, as FSB type resolution authorities are seen to be superior to the formalist bankruptcy 
framework solutions.  
Speed and flexibility are forwarded as advantages of procedural approaches in the face of the 
complexity of transnationalization. Sassen, for instance, argues that globalization emphasized 
the comparative advantage that the executive can have over the other branches of the state.
146
 
The underlying factors that led to this empowerment have been discussed in general 
administrative law.
147
 Procedural approaches are seen to be faster than judicial ones.
148 
This is 
especially important in the context of resolutions of financial firms but also in the context of 
transnationalization in general. It is agreed that prompt action in banking resolution is crucial 
to limit the cost of that resolution.
149
 “In bank resolution, time is of essence. Resolution need 
to be triggered earlier than under corporate insolvency law, before balance sheet insolvency of 
the bank.”
150
 This is reflected by the KAs: 
 “The resolution regime should provide for timely and early entry into 
resolution before a firm is balance- sheet insolvent and before all equity 
has been fully wiped out.”
151
  
By comparison, bankruptcy proceedings are portrayed as being slow. “The most important 
advantage on bank resolutions [over bankruptcy law] is the speed, and resulting preservation 
of value, due to earlier intervention and the absence of an automatic stay. In bankruptcy, by 
comparison, there is an automatic stay of uncertain but possibly considerable duration while a 
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plan is developed by creditors and submitted for judicial approval.”
152
 Bank resolution models 
on the other hand can put in place solutions, even temporary ones, more quickly.
153
 While of 
course the bankruptcy vs. resolution authority debate is a question that persists independently 
of the context of transnationalization, the importance of speed and expertise are emphasized 
in the cross-border setting, because of the added complexity of cross-border interactions. The 
magnitude of the stakes is increased and the reaction of the market can be more intense. It 
also connects to the next section on cooperation, as judicial formalism is seen to hinder 
cooperation in cross-border resolutions.
154
  
The other widely praised advantage of procedural approaches relates to the possibility of 
using them to better consider public policy goals. It is generally suggested that the executive, 
through its day-to-day exposure to the practical problems involved in the application of law, 
has more expertise.
155
 In the context of resolution authorities, “There is a form of expert 
decision-making involved, by experienced financial agency personnel, rather than an Article 
III judge, in determining the nature of resolution.”
156
 Limitations in the legal system have 
been seen as a key reason for sub-optional results in bank restructuring. While most claims 
regard the lack of powers of executive agencies that will be further discussed, the ‘insufficient 
knowledge of judges on banking matters’ is named as well:
157
 “even the best-intentioned 
bankruptcy process is assumed to lack sufficient expertise to deal with the complexities of a 




Finally, the flexibility of procedural tools (like standards)
159
 or actors (like executive 
agencies
160
 or private standard setters
161
) is said to be beneficial in cross-border settings. 
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Formal supervisory crisis management tools appear to be limited when a financial institution 
needs to be stabilized rapidly and the continuity of business needs to be ensured in more than 
one jurisdiction. They can on the contrary “undermine market confidence or may trigger 
termination and close-out netting events in financial contracts, with counterproductive 
effects.”
162
 Judicial safeguards are thought to hamper cross-border resolutions. The FSB KA 
on judicial safeguards insists very much on the importance of limiting these safeguards: 
KA 5.4  “the legislation establishing resolution regimes should not 
provide for judicial actions that could constrain the implementation of, 
or result in a reversal of, measures taken by resolution authorities 
acting within their legal powers and in good faith.” 
KA 5.5 “In order to preserve market confidence, jurisdictions should 
provide for flexibility to allow temporary exemptions from disclosure 
requirements or a postponement of disclosures required by the firm, for 
example, under market reporting, takeover provisions and listing rules, 
where the disclosure by the firm could affect the successful 
implementation of resolution measures.”
163
 
Procedural arguments are hence on the forefront in questions of transnationalization. 
However, and especially in the context of national law, the state context and its arguments 
persist also with regard to the legality of law. 
2.1.2. Formal legality approaches  
Formalist approaches focus on the importance of legal certainty and legal safeguards. The 
emphasis is on the role of courts, widespread formalization of procedural developments, and 
legal safeguards to administrative action.
164
 On one hand, general arguments in favor of legal 
certainty and legal safeguards are forwarded. On the other hand, the peer review report is seen 
as an illustration of the importance that national jurisdiction give to legal safeguards in 
general and on cross-border context in particular. 
The cornerstones of arguments in favor of formalist approaches to law in the face of 
transnationalization reflect those of the general discussion about administrative law to a 
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 Legal certainty and legal safeguards are seen as being essential for the 
smooth functioning of financial markets and for counterbalancing the dangers of politicization 
that come with the procedural approach.
166
 Furthermore, the application of procedural 
approaches in cross-border resolution is limited, as national courts are seen as being inclined 
to act in the national interest. 
Examples of legal formalism are widely found, especially as the mainly procedural 
emergency measures have been followed by legal reforms in most national jurisdictions.
167
 




It is further felt that the flexibility that comes with procedural approaches calls for safeguards. 
According to Attinger, an intervention like saving a financial institution is difficult because it 
is difficult to justify why: (i) creditors should be deprived of (part of) their claims; and (ii) 
shareholders should accept an interference in their rights.
169
 For some this means that no 
interference should take place at all.
170
 Other formalist approaches emphasize the role of 
courts in these instances. According to FSB KA 5: 
“The resolution authority should have the capacity to exercise the 
resolution powers with the necessary speed and flexibility, subject to 
constitutionally protected legal remedies and due process.”
171
  
The majority of cases provide for a right of judicial review either under general administrative 
law or as an explicit right under the resolution regime.
172
  
Lastly, the peer review report illustrates that procedural tendencies are seriously limited with 
regard to the cross-border aspect of resolutions. On one hand, the powers of administrative 
agencies in general remain limited in these contexts; on the other hand, the powers of courts 
are more accentuated. The thematic peer review brought to light that only a few jurisdictions 
encourage their resolution authorities to cooperate with foreign authorities seriously and only 
some have explicit powers to do so.
173
 Most FSB jurisdictions report that the powers they 
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have over branches of foreign banks are not special resolution powers but stem from the 
domestic insolvency framework.
174
 It is hence the courts that have more power in this regard. 
They also have more power as, while about a third of the FSB jurisdictions are said to have a 
mechanism for the giving of legal effect to the decisions of foreign authorities, they depend in 
most cases on application to the court.
175
 
Formalist approaches can also point to the national interest as a limit to the cooperation that 
can be expected to be achieved through procedural law. According to the report of the Cross-
border Bank Resolution Group that evaluated the cases of Fortism Dexia, Kaupthing and 
Lehman Brothers, the “crisis has illustrated that it is national interests that are most likely to 
drive decisions.”
176
 There are eight jurisdictions of the FSB that have provision for 
differential treatment of certain claims – mostly deposits – according to the location of their 




Attempts to reform this situation and to open the national legal frameworks for cooperation in 
cross-border resolutions have not been very successful so far. According to the FSB peer 
review, KA 7 on the development of national legal frameworks for cross-border cooperation, 
has been the least well-developed in member states.
178
 This supports the bi-polar approach of 
law to transnationalization that reserves procedural development within law to the legal 
framework. 
The debate about the form in which the law should address the failure of large financial 
institutions illustrates that the non-state/state tension persist in this context. Procedural and 
formal arguments co-exist and the outcome will depend on the courts or on political decisions. 
2.2. Bi-polar approaches to the legitimacy of law 
Bi-polarity – competing non-state and state arguments- in legal thinking about the legitimacy 
of law and transnationalization opposes arguments of thin and thick conceptions of 
legitimacy.  
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Transnationalization has given momentum to thin conceptions of legitimacy. Following the 
functionalist approach to legality, performance and efficiency-based arguments have come to 
the forefront. Such ‘output’ oriented arguments are made for instance in the case of 
independent agencies or self-regulation. Other thin approaches point to the limits of thick 
‘input’ oriented conceptions, arguing that democratic procedures – electorates or parliaments 
– are not able to decide on complex issues of transnationalization. Approaches in favor of 
thick conceptions of legitimacy on the other hand argue that in the face of 
transnationalization, democratic structures are even more important and must be strengthened 
through enhanced participation. 
The FSB KAs on resolution powers and legal safeguards seem to illustrate a thin approach as 
they promote very wide-ranging powers and rather limited legal safeguards. On the other 
hand, in the wake of the crisis the legitimacy of financial market regulation in general has 
been questioned and higher democratic accountability was demanded. 
2.2.1. Thin legitimacy approaches 





 notions of legitimacy resonate with the delegation and privatization 
that has been witnessed in administrative law in general.
181
 The focus on the protection of 
individual freedom makes them suitable for thinking about legitimacy beyond the state and 
fits into the parallelism of neo-liberalism and liberal theory (thin approaches to legitimacy) 
developing together.
182
 In the context of resolution authorities, the independence of agencies 
and their powers are illustrations for thin conceptions of legitimacy.  
The ability of these agencies to solve problems has been seen as justifying their actions.
183
 
The increasing distance from the legislator and its representative function has been seen as 
positive for a more neutral focus on substance instead of politics.
184
 Approaches discussing 
the comparative advantage of national banks and supervisory agencies refer to such 
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 In the following paragraphs I will first elaborate on instances of private actor 
involvement and then more specifically on the independence of resolution authorities as 
presented by the FSB KAs.  
Performance-oriented notions of legitimacy are forwarded, for instance, in the context of 
private actor involvement. For example, private actor involvement was widely discussed in 
the context of the use of industry-developed risk calibration methods for the calculation of 
capital reserves.
186
 Arguments of expertise are crucial in this context. However, arguments of 
efficiency are also frequently made, especially in the context of self-regulation. Self-
regulation in the financial market has a long history
187
 and is still very important in many 
domains like securities markets, rating agencies and stock exchanges. Efficiency of self-
regulation is also often forwarded against the inefficiency of government institutions. “Self-
regulation’s relative efficiency increases with uncertainty over institutional implementation, 
populism, and political polarization.”
188
  
In the context of the resolution of SIFIs the KAs illustrate a thin approach, as the wide-
ranging powers in KA 3 (Resolution powers) are not matched by legal safeguards or increased 
representation or participation. The resolution powers include the removal and replacement of 
senior management, the operation and resolving of the firm, the transfer or sale of assets, the 
carrying out of bail-ins and many others (in total twelve individual points). The exercise of 
these resolution powers is subject to several principles and safeguards; however, there should 
not be room for judicial decisions that reverse actions taking by the resolution authorities 
within these large legal powers and in good faith.
189
   
Other thin approaches focus on the inability of thicker, input-oriented conceptions to ‘produce 
results.’ One example that has been picked up from this perspective is the Icelandic “No” to 
the bail-out referendum. It did not change the reality of the debt the country was facing due to 
the collapse of its financial sector. “The three Icelandic banks that expanded their operations 
to the UK and continental Europe, particularly the Netherlands, gambled with derivatives 
using the depositors’ money. On becoming bankrupt they left behind them on the shoulders of 
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all stakeholders, a heavy legacy - and the Icelandic people were asked to supply hefty 
amounts of money to pay for the damage. The case was put for a public decision to 
referendums in Iceland: it was rejected but still came back in modified forms.”
190
  
Thin approaches embrace efficiency and performance that seem more suitable for the context 
of transnationalization. Thick approaches on the other hand, see that suitability as being the 
very reason why participation of all parties involved or the citizens at large, should be 
enhanced.  
2.2.2. Thick legitimacy approaches 
Thick approaches are based on an understanding of the common good that is determined by 
democratic mechanisms.
191
 These approaches focus on issues like representation and 
participation.  
As the economic crisis struck, an extreme return to republican discourses could be observed. 
This is seen as not only mirroring the increased demand of legitimation in the face of the 




The outcry on the illegitimacy of bailouts was not only focused on actual legal powers but on 
the unfairness of taxpayer burdening without involvement. Thicker conceptions of legitimacy 
focus on the more participatory ways in order to determine what the common good is. The 
outrage caused by the bailouts was the result of the perception that it was illegitimate to make 
taxpayers pay without their involvement in the decision-making that would lead to deciding 
how to deal with the debt. Thick approaches support referenda in these cases or may urge 
more generally to put the liberalization of financial markets under more popular control. In 
the context of the protests that accompanied the bail-outs, questions on the popular 
involvement in liberalization were asked. It was felt that populations should have a say about 
how their national financial sectors are meant to operate and more generally how their states 
participate in globalization.
193
 It has even been suggested that the moment of crisis posed a 
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In the wake of the massive bailouts that governments around the globe provided for their 
financial institutions, the legal frameworks were perceived illegitimate not only because they 
failed to provide smooth resolutions, but especially because they implied the burdening of 
taxpayers thereby harming the common good.   
The tension between thin and thick conceptions of legitimacy is important in the debate about 
the legitimacy of national law in transnationalization and no obvious compromise follows 
from these arguments.  
2.3. Bi-polar approaches to politics and law 
With regard to the role of politics in law, bi-polarity in legal thinking confronts arguments 
about de-politicization with arguments of politicization.  
Approaches of de-politicization are for instance provided by the advocates of contract law and 
the immunity it should enjoy in resolution proceedings. On the other hand, approaches of 
politicization are propose interference with contracts on public policy reasons, as in the 
context of stays, closeout netting,
195
  and early termination rights.  
The continental debate about the distinction between private law and public law is providing 
interesting insights into the tensions between de-politicization and politicization. The 




2.3.1. De-politicization approaches  
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De-politicization idealizes distance from the political institutions of the state as being 
conducive to the unimpaired rule of expertise and limiting market distortions. This distance 
can be achieved through delegation to more remote administrative bodies or through 
privatization.
197
 Such approaches can also focus on the importance of private law and support 
the contention that it should be shielded from public policy limitations. If private law is 
limited, judicial review is essential but has to be free from judicial activism.  
Trends of the de-politicization of law have focused on the ability of private law to substitute 
public law in the context of transnationalization with private ordering
198
 and on limits to the 
interference of public law.   
In the context of resolution authorities, de-politicization is apparent in the scope and 
independence of resolution authorities, as it has been discussed in the thin approach to 
legitimacy. Furthermore, in the context of contract law, de-politicization approaches warn of 
the danger of resolution regimes to interfere with contract law.
199
 This interference is not only 
market-distorting; it also makes the system dependent on judicial review. Bankruptcy law is 
to be preferred, as it provides for the respect of contracts.  
However, within resolution proceedings at least set-off and netting rights should not be 
overturned by public policy decisions. On the contrary, stays should not be allowed.
200
 If there 
are stays, resolution regimes should respect the creditor hierarchy and principles like “no 
creditors worse off”
201
 as they will increase the role of judicial review.    
The potential of private law and especially contract law to act as a neutral, efficient and 
market friendly regulatory option has been widely discussed.
202
 Together with arguments on 
technocratic governance it forms the most important component of de-politicization 
approaches.  
2.3.2. Politicization approaches  
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Politicizing approaches focus on instances when the law is put in the service of politics. On 
the one hand, the emphasis is put on the limits of de-politicization in the face of power and on 
the other hand, law is seen as a tool that should help the less powerful. In the context of 
resolution authorities, politicization approaches are more favorable to the overriding of 
contracts for public policy reasons. 
As pointed out previously, bankruptcy law can be seen as being of limited use in the context 
of failing financial institutions because it focuses on the parties before the court, and not 
systemic worries or public policy concerns.
203
 Resolution regimes have therefore been largely 
portrayed as attempts to balance sensible regulation and shareholder rights.
204
 This reflects the 
debate on the “rise of the state and the decline of private law”, suggesting that in the pursuit of 
public policy, private law is less powerful.
205
  
“Given the manifest public interest in the case of bank failure in preserving stability and 
avoiding contagion, a special resolution for banks is needed to allow the public authorities to 
intervene to protect this public interest.”
206
 According to KA 4 (set-off rights), this 
intervention also targets private law. The legal framework of set-off rights, contractual netting 
and collateralization should for instance not hamper effective implementation of resolution 
regimes.
207
 Resolution powers should also not be seen as a trigger for statutory or contractual 
set-off rights. Instead the possibility of a stay, although limited, should exist.
208
 
The rationale is that bank resolution interferes with the property rights of the shareholder and 
the contractual rights of creditors. Hence, national law provides compensation or judicial 
redress for creditors and shareholders.
209
 “Resolution powers should be exercised in a way 
that respects the hierarchy of claims while providing flexibility to depart from the general 
principle of equal (pari passu) treatment of creditors of the same class, with transparency as 
to the reasons for such departures, if necessary to contain the potential systemic impact of a 
firm’s failure or to maximise the value for the benefit of all creditors as a whole.”
210
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Provisions like the no worse off principle “make clear that the SRR takes account of the 
legitimate interests of the transferors and this their shareholders and respects their property 
rights, but at the same time leaves no room for a bail-out.”
211
 According to Attinger, this is a 
good example of how to “strike a fair balance between the demands of the general interests of 




According to the FSB, “The majority of jurisdictions provide a right to such judicial review, 
either under general administrative law or as an explicit right under the resolution regime and 
in most cases, remedies other than monetary compensations are available. In such cases, the 
legal framework needs to strike an appropriate balance between protected legal remedies on 




However, as illustrated by Scott, in writing on the development of insurance funds that would 
prevent the use of public funds for bailouts, one has to remain cautious, as there is always the 
possibility for a bail-out for political motives. According to Scott: “The best that can be done 
is to try to design a resolution process that makes it somewhat less justifiable economically 
and less attractive politically.”
214
 The public interest in a viable financial system justifies a 
special regime. The consequential politicization stretched quite far into the legal regime. 
According to the FSC peer review, all of its jurisdictions report having created specific 
powers to restructure and/or wind up banks that are distinct from ordinary insolvency that 
often – like in the case of the UK – restrict judicial review in the interest of the public interest 
and allow overriding of private interests.
215
  
Bi-polar legal thinking does not solve the tension of de-politicization and politicization in the 
context of resolution authorities. The public law/private law debate provides avenues to think 
about ways to overcome the tension. Yet, much remains to be done as Cherednychenko 
concludes: “The real question is not whether or not one should make a distinction between 
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public and private law, but what should be the right balance between them in a certain period 
of time.”
216
 Transnationalization has certainly not made this question any easier to answer.  
2.4. Bi-polar approaches to the consideration of social and 
market interest in law  
With regard to the relationship of social and market interests in law, bi-polar thinking in law 
opposes arguments on a dependent relationship and an independent relationship of social and 
market interests.  
Approaches that view social interests dependent on market interests urge for an enabling role 
of law for the market. The advocates of bankruptcy or competition law for the prevention of 
future bailouts or the proponents of incentive based approaches like corporate governance 
provide examples for such approaches. FSB KAs entail such approaches, as the establishment 
of resolvability plans and resolvability assessments is based on the hope of increasing 
transparency and market discipline. On the other hand, approaches considering social and 
market interests independently are preoccupied with the protection of interests from the 
market and advocate a role for law to limit the market. Examples of such approaches suggest 
limitations to financial activities such as the Volker rule, size caps for institutions or even 
their nationalization. Also the installation of a resolution authority could be seen as an 
example of an independent approach depending on how far the goal of taxpayer protection 
limits market activity. 
2.4.1. Dependent considerations of social and market interests approaches 
 Faithful to the thin conception of legitimacy that we discussed earlier, approaches that 
consider social interests as dependent on market interests are based on the contention that law 
must enable and not distort the market in order to keep operating costs low.
217
 With regard to 
the failure of large financial institution, the concept of a resolution procedure disagrees with 
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this approach; this further distortion of the market will only lead to more moral hazard in the 
system. Moral hazard, fueled by flat deposit insurance and the presence of social cost of 
failure, leads to excessive risk-taking.
218
 Such subsidies allow banks to grow to an extent were 
they become too big to fail, which is conducive to more moral hazard as it constitutes an 
implicit guarantee.
219
 One can distinguish between approaches aimed at the fostering of 
market discipline and approaches aimed at inducing the right behavior in market participants 
via incentives.  
Approaches that aim at strengthening market discipline focus on overcoming market failures 
like imperfect information or distortions through imperfect competition.
220
 According to these 
approaches, the bailouts were a catastrophe. “All this [measures of bailouts]
221
 represents a 
tremendous distortion in terms of moral hazard, long term effects in market structure, 
protection of inefficient incumbents, and creation of an uneven playing filed (among different 
institutions and different countries). For example, assisted institutions which have proven to 
be TBTF end up with lower cost of capital than other (not only in the short term but also in 
the long-term because of the implicit guarantee they obtain). Ex-ante this fosters incentive to 
take excessive risk. ”
222
 
Instead, market discipline should be restored by reintroducing competition, abolishing 
implicit and explicit subsidies and fostering transparency. In the context of large financial 
institutions and the prevention of bailouts, the revival
223
 of competition law, limits to state 
ownership
224
 and the strengthening of bankruptcy law have been advocated as approaches 
which follow this logic. “The public aid programs distorted competition and created an 
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uneven playing field in the cost of capital. Merges have created weak competitive 
environment and increased concentration within and across countries, and across business 
lines”
225
 With regard to bankruptcy law it is said that if we seek to end Bailouts, their failure 
needs to be a strong possibility and the consequences of failure need to fall on the parties who 




Public disclosure should be used to provide information and secure market functioning.
227
 
Certain authors present the proposal of wind-down plans according to this logic.
228
 Also the 
proposals in KA 10 regarding the resolvability assessments can be understood as a measure to 
increase information and transparency in the market. According to KA 11.2 every jurisdiction 
should require that robust and credible recovery and resolution plans are in place also 
requiring input by the senior management.
229
 
Lastly, dependent approaches focus on incentives that can be created to induce desirable 
behavior. The underlying contention is that individuals can respond to laws in an economic 
way.
230
 The best way for law to operate – the lowest operating costs – are hence to induce the 
right behavior by getting the incentives right. The law must thus “organize incentive 
structures such that these rational individuals, out of their own self-interest, do what the 
government wishes.”
231
 In the context of financial market regulation, incentives are widely 
discussed
232
 and it has been suggested that corporate governance reforms are essential to 
prevent a repeat of the financial crisis.
233
 With regard to large financial institutions, conflicts 
of interest and the role of ownership and shareholders have attracted a lot of attention.
234
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All of these approaches have in common the final aim of enabling the market. This final aim 
is justified, as the distortion of the market caused by the protection of social interests would 
be more harmful than it would be helpful. Social interests are hence dependent on market 
interests.  
2.4.2. Independent consideration of social and market interests approaches 
Independent approaches on the other hand adopt a logic of protection of public policy goals 
and consider social and market interests independently.  
The logic of protection is apparent with regard to consumer protection or – regarding the 
failure of financial institution more importantly – ‘taxpayer’ protection. The aim of protecting 
the taxpayer has justified the conception of resolution authorities that intervene with the 
functioning of the market. The logic is hence one of protection from the market rather than 
one of enabling the market. This protection then also calls for more stringent legal limitations 
to the market. 
Kennedy has formalized the effort of putting law at the service of the protection of social 
interests as the second globalization of legal thinking. It was driven by discontent with the 
individualism idealized by legal thinking from 1850 to 1914. Individualism had “ignored 
interdependence, and endorsed particular legal rules that permitted antisocial behavior of 
many kinds.”
235
 The social crisis caused by the market forces “derived from the failure of 
coherently individualist laws to respond to the coherently social needs of modern conditions 
of interdependence.”
236
 To counter this and give law its proper place, it had to be rethought as 
a purposeful activity and a regulatory mechanism.
237
  
The stabilization of financial markets though capital insurance and the installation of a public 
lender of last resort function as an illustration of Kennedy’s rise of the social. The risk 
inherent to maturity transformation at the heart of financial intermediation led to runs and 
crises throughout history. In the wake of the Great Depression, the free market was regarded 
as being unable to either protect depositors or to maintain the stability of the banking 
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 Law was put forward as a means of change with the creation of deposit insurance 
and lender of last resort. It was felt that: “this bill rests upon the theory that banking which is 
unsafe for the depositors ought to be prohibited by law. Banking is not the individual right of 
a citizen and when we charter an institution to engage in banking to receive the deposits of the 
public, it is the duty of the government to see that deposits of the public are protected.”
239
 
The creation of resolution authorities is a similar instance. In the aftermath of the crisis of 
2007/08, it was felt yet again that the market could not provide for stability. Instead, 
resolution regimes were developed that would allow resolving financial institutions in an 
orderly manner without taxpayer exposure to loss from solvency support, while maintaining 
continuity of their vital economic functions.
240
  
Again, the debate comparing resolution authorities against bankruptcy law is illustrative: “The 
bankruptcy code does not sufficiently protect the public’s strong interests in ensuring the 
orderly resolution of a nonbank financial firm whose failure would pose substantial risks to 
the financial system and to the economy.”
241
 This argument follows from the reasoning that in 
the context of the Great Depression led to the regulation of banks more generally. The 
essential role that banks play in the economy (e.g. provision of credit, deposit taking and 
operation of payment systems) as well as the devastating consequences of a banking crisis, are 
seen to justify the support of banks. In the same vein the failure of such banks is of public 
concern.
242
 “In bank resolutions, there is an explicit focus on spillover systemic effects. This 
is a significant advantage where the principle purpose of the operation is to protect against 
systemic external effects not explicitly taken into account in bankruptcy proceedings.”
243
 
However, the rationale of protection of policy interests seems to imply a limitation of the 
market. Independent approaches have forwarded such proposals as the Volker rule that is – at 
least in theory- aimed at reintroducing the separation between depository banks and 
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institutions, which are more conducive to more speculative business.
244
 Other proposals are, 
for instance, the limitation of activities of banks or the development of caps to their size. 
The FSB KAs do not propose such intrusive measures. In the U.S., the Volker rule found its 
way into law however, with a diluted protective or market limiting effect. In general, market-
limiting measures remain rare.
245
  
The tension between dependent and independent consideration of market and social interests 
in national law is accentuated in the context of transnationalization. As illustrated by the 
example of resolution regimes, they are instituted as a protection of social interests, yet they 
aim at minimizing market intrusion.  
2.5. Bi-polar approaches to governance structures in law  
The bi-polar debate on the governance structure of law in transnationalization opposes 
arguments on assimilated and dis-integrated governance structures. Assimilated approaches 
promote proposals to overcome sectorial and national boundaries in the face of transnational 
challenges. Approaches emphasizing dis-integrated governance structures focus on the public 
policy rationale of sectorialization and the importance of checks and balances between 
resolution authorities, national banks and courts.  
Assimilating approaches are illustrated by the FSB efforts to establish a level playing field 
and extend supervision to other systemically important firms. Dis-integrating approaches on 
the other hand are apparent in national jurisdictions where sectorial differentiation persists 
and overarching systemic risk institutions remain neglected.  
2.5.1. Assimilated governance approaches 
In the context of resolution authorities, transnationalization has led to the questioning of the 
disintegration of governance.
246
 The fact that regulation follows sectorial and national 
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delimitations hindered taking into account the complexity of certain corporate structures. It is 
also seen to have led to regulatory competition that fueled the risk-taking and was essential in 
the growth of the shadow banking system. The division of powers between administrative 
agencies and courts is seen as prolonging a process that depends very much on speed. 
Therefore a more assimilated governance structure is supported. In the context of the KAs, 
this approach is apparent with regards to the scope of resolution regimes that suggest 
overcoming sectorial disintegration and cross-border arrangements that target disintegration 
across borders.  
Pre-crisis legal frameworks around the globe treated many institutions involved in financial 
markets differently. This made intervening in their failure very difficult. The case of  Lehman 
Brothers has been forwarded as an illustration thereof.
247
 However, the problem with dis-
integration of governance according to sectors has been taken up by the FSB that recommends 
to develop similar standards for financial holding companies, systemic banks and systemic 
non-financial institutions. KA 1 defines the scope as:  
“Any financial institution that could be systemically significant or 
critical if it fails should be subject to a resolution regime that has the 
attributes set out in this document […] it should extend to: (i) holding 
companies of a firm; (ii) non-regulated operational entities within a 
financial group or conglomerate that are significant to the business of 
the group or conglomerate; and (iii) branches of foreign firms.”
248
    
 
Assimilated approaches also put forward arguments for a limitation on the number of actors 
involved in resolution. The expertise and speed needed in the context of complex situations 
has been forwarded as a reason to limit judicial review.
249
 Furthermore the FSB supports 
limiting the number of agencies involved or at least strengthening cooperation among them. 
Indeed, nearly all jurisdictions with multiple agencies involved “report having some form of 
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coordination arrangements in place between the authorities.”
250
 While the adequacy of these 
arrangements have not been analyzed by the peer review, worries were voiced with regard to 




In the aftermath of the crisis, agencies, bureaus and councils with a focus on ‘financial 
stability’ have been created. They provide an example for attempts to overcome disintegration 
in the face of transnationalization. Some are limited to a supervisory or observatory role from 
the outset; others have more powers, but their impact still has to be tested in practice.   
In these points, the KAs reflect how transnationalization can be seen as urging a more 
assimilated governance structure of law that accords better to the magnitude of the 
transnational challenge. 
2.5.2. Dis-integrated governance approaches 
Dis-integrated approaches see benefits in the existences of a range of bodies involved in 
governance or point out limits of assimilation. Among the benefits are again the observance of 
public policy goals, the importance of checks and balances and the respect of national 
particularities that at the same time is also the most prominent limit that is forwarded to 
assimilation. 
According to dis-integration approaches, different sectors are treated differently depending on 
their importance to the public interest. The extent of regulation reflects the extent to which 
public policy considerations are made in the sector in question. According to the FSB peer 
review, all jurisdictions report that they have specific powers to restructure or resolve banks 
that are distinct from corporate insolvency law. While eight jurisdictions limit these powers to 
banks that are systemically important, it is true that resolution powers are most developed 
with regard to the banking sector. They are almost entirely exempt from bankruptcy codes. 
Powers with regard to insurance firms are the second best developed. These regimes are 
different, institutionally as they often involve a different authority, and conceptually as they 
typically rely upon a combination of ordinary insolvency law supplemented by powers for 
supervisory authorities. In most FSB jurisdictions, specific restructuring and wind up powers 
are limited to cases of financial holding companies (FHC) that are regulated as banking or 
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insurance groups. Only eight resolution authorities have the ability to use powers for FHC that 
are not themselves a bank or another regulated institution.
252
 Only seven jurisdictions have 
direct powers in relation to non-regulated operations entities within a financial group. In the 
sector of securities or investment firms, resolution regimes are much less developed. Only 
thirteen jurisdictions have some specific powers for the resolution of such firms in place
253
 
and many of them refer to an authority that does only have some sector-specific powers for 
restructuring or winding up but does not have administrative resolution powers as are in place 
for banks.  
The notion of checks and balances in the context of the large financial institutions stretches 
beyond judicial review. In fact, the task in dealing with large financial institutions in most 
cases involves more than one entity. Furthermore, there are significant differences amongst 
countries regarding the division of labour and power between these agencies.
254
 “Many 
jurisdictions confer the primary responsibility and powers for the resolution of banks on 
supervisory authorities with different degrees of functional separation.”
255
 The involvement of 
different agencies helps to keep them in check.
256
 
This point already hints to national particularities as limits to assimilation. With regard to 
resolution regimes, these limits are very important. The peer review report concludes that the 
KAs aiming at cross border cooperation show the lowest implementation in national legal 
orders. In many jurisdictions resolution agencies are not given powers to engage with foreign 
agencies but depend on court decisions to do so. From a dis-integration approach, this judicial 




Transnationalization fuels efforts to assimilate governance structures, yet national 
jurisdictions remain reluctant. Again even if structures are being assimilated, this only 
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enhances the role of courts as judicial review is essentially seen as guarding the national 
interests.  
2.6. Bi-polar approaches to the polity of national law  
Finally, regarding the polity parameter of law, bipolarity in legal thinking opposes arguments 
on a national polity to arguments on a supranational polity for law.  
Supranational approaches, for instance, forwarding a notion of global systemic risk, pointing 
to the inability of states to tackle the failures of large financial institutions and the limits of 
harmonization in achieving the cooperation needed in this context. The polity that is at stake 
is hence different from the national one. It is not based on an idea of sameness or identity, but 
on common global interests. In view of protecting global common interests, harmonization is 
not enough; a more cooperative solution must be found. Proponents of the national polity, on 
the other hand, point to the national consequences of transnationalization. As law is to serve 
the national interests, harmonization is the most that should and can be achieved in the 
national interest.  
2.6.1. Supranational polity approaches 
Supranational approaches focus on the challenges of transnationalization that stretch beyond 
national borders. These are seen to be of a magnitude that cannot be addressed by single states 
but ask for a common approach. The harmonization of law, in order to avoid regulatory 
arbitrage, is not enough, as there is a common – supranational – interest emerging that 
demands steps toward cooperation.  
The regulation of large financial institutions has been forwarded as a transnational challenge 
that demands cooperation across national borders. It is commonly agreed that the financial 
crisis that started in 2007 turned from national subprime mortgage-backed securities in the 
United States into a financial and economic crisis with impacts around the globe.
258
 With 
financial risk with the potential to cause harm far beyond national borders, calls for the 
consideration of systemic risk effects in other jurisdictions have been voiced. The rationale is 
that in the face of a risk that stretches beyond borders, there is a common interest in finding 
solutions that widen the national definition of interests.  
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Harmonization is aimed at limiting regulatory arbitrage and, in the case of resolution of large 
financial institutions, it is hoped to facilitate cross-border cooperation “by having comparable 
approaches in place, as well-known solutions are far easier to accept than unfamiliar 
approaches. Therefore, close convergence and (ideally) the harmonization of resolution tools 
and powers would increase the effectiveness of cross-border resolution.”
259
 However, 
according to supranational approaches, harmonization is not enough. Much more needs to be 
done in order to improve the cross border supervision of large financial institutions. 
“Effective pre-crisis planning requires home and host regulators to share information and 
agree on resolution plans.”
260
 Therefore, more cooperative approaches have been suggested. 
KA 8 on Crisis Management Groups (CMGs) and KA 9 on Institution-specific cross-border 
cooperation agreements are suggestions in this direction. Certain large institutions are seen as 
creating a special supranational challenge that justifies cooperation among all of the states 
involved. However, these cross border agreements develop only slowly and “where such 
agreements do exist, they often are non-binding and lack detail on crisis roles, responsibilities, 
and information sharing methods.”
261
 
Supranational approaches to the polity on national law act as a bridge to Chapter 4 and 
transnational law. Also, bi-polar arguments are being made that oppose national and 
supranational interests as defining a polity of law in the face of transnationalization. 
2.6.2. National polity approaches 
While transnationalization has spurred arguments for a supranational polity, the reference to a 
national polity for national law persists. The resistance in national jurisdictions to any 
measure of cross-border cooperation beyond harmonization can be seen as an illustration of 
this persistence. Furthermore, national approaches point to the national bias of judicial and 
administrative action that is accentuated in times of crisis. According to national approaches, 
this will not be overcome, as the effects of transnationalization are ultimately felt at the 
national level.  
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While the crisis was followed by enormous legal reforms, they rarely stretch beyond 
harmonization. According to national approaches the findings of the FSB peer review report 
on the limited developments of cross-border arrangements is not a coincidence but a natural 
consequence of the national polity of law.  
For this national polity of law, harmonization is also sufficient, as in the face of 
transnationalization, only the establishment of a level playing field but not actual cooperation 
is sought for. National approaches find confirmation in the peer review report. The legal 
formalization of bi-lateral or multilateral cooperation frameworks remains notoriously low. 
No single jurisdiction of the FSB framework has formulated comprehensive obligations for 
domestic authorities to avoid taking resolution actions that may have an adverse effect on the 
financial stability of other jurisdictions.
262
 
Only a few jurisdictions encourage their resolution authorities to cooperate with foreign 
authorities seriously and only some have explicit powers to do so. Most jurisdictions neither 
require nor prohibit cooperation with foreign resolution authorities. Also, while most 
jurisdictions report to have some powers over branches of foreign banks, they are not special 
resolution powers but stem from the domestic insolvency framework.
263
 Only the Swiss 
national resolution authority has the power to recognize and make effective under local law 




National approaches suggest that the national bias will dominate judicial and administrative 
action.
265
 The report of the BCBS Cross-border Bank Resolution Group on the crisis seems to 
sustain this point; “the Fortis case illustrates the tension between the cross-border nature of a 
group and the domestic focus of national frameworks and responsibilities for crisis 
management. This led to a solution along national lines, which did not involve intervention 
through statutory resolution mechanisms”
266
  
Transnationalization causes a tension between a supranational and a national conception of 
the polity of law. The bi-polarity of legal arguments does not provide avenues to overcome it. 
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2.7. Conclusion: Persisting non-state/state tension and the 
importance of courts 
The present Chapter argued that legal thinking in national law struggles with the non-
state/state tension that transnationalization causes in law. The tensions that follow from the 
non-state/state tensions persist, are sustained by bi-polar arguments and ultimately depend on 
a management effort by state institutions to be solved. The debate on the implementation of 
the FSB illustrates this bi-polarity, as the standards themselves, as well as their reception in 
jurisdictions, cause bi-polar debate and require national courts to find compromises between 
the non-state and state arguments.  
Transnationalization gives momentum to non-state tendencies in law. It fosters procedural 
legality, resonates with thin legitimacy, is more suited to de-politicization, favors market 
interests and therefore the dependent consideration of social interests, calls for assimilated 
governance structures and is seen to create a supranational polity. At the same time, these 
developments also provoke an affirmation of the state and state tendencies of law that call for 
the safeguards of formal law, thick legitimacy, politicization, the independent consideration of 
social interests, dis-integrated governance structures and a national understanding of the 
polity.  
The FSB KAs, as an example of transnational law, are a mix
267
 of these two visions of law, 
the non-state and the state vision. Within this mix and its implementation into national law, 
courts and state institutions play an important role. Juridical safeguards are crucial to limit the 
procedural development of law. The performance-based legitimacy of the resolution authority 
is held in check by democratic institutions. The technocratic governance and importance of 
contract law is exposed to the constant possibility of public policy interventions and judicial 
activism. Assimilated governance structures are limited by courts that are acting in the 
national interests or policy decisions to treat sectors differently according to public interest 
considerations. Finally, cooperation agreements developed with a view to a supranational 
polity are limited by the laws and courts of the national polity.   
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Throughout the parameters of law, the debate on transnationalization and law remains bi-polar 
and the tension between non-state and state cannot be overcome. Courts and other state 
institutions are crucial in finding compromises between the two.  
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3. The Bi-polar Debate on European Law and 
Transnationalization 
This third Chapter looks at the non-state/state tension in the debates on European law. Again, 
the six parameters of law are treated individually. Within each of these six parameters, 
arguments are divided into bi-polar categories. 
The focus is on how academics conceive European law in the context of transnationalization. 
Is it a different development from state law (non-state) or should it to be considered in the 
same way as state law (state)? Bi-polarity opposes the proponents of a statist vision of 
European law with the ones that support or observe a non-statist conception. There are ample 
examples of bi-polar thinking in European Law; however, important differences between the 
parameters can be observed.  
With regard to the parameters of legality, politics and governance, European law developed 
compromises that can overcome bi-polarity. Non-state and state elements have been merged 
or combined into middle-ways that develop a functioning of their own. The legality of 
European law integrates procedural as well as formal requirements. A variety of measures 
aimed at achieving ‘better law-making’ opens the door to the politicization and de-
politicization of the technocratic governance of the EU in many ways and the governance 
structures that have developed within European law-making that allow for a combination of 
assimilated as well as dis-integrated governance structures.  
On the other hand, with regard to the parameters of legitimacy, values and polity, bi-polarity 
cannot be overcome. Visions of a thin legitimacy of European law collide with thick 
conceptions of that legitimacy. Arguments of a dependent consideration of social interest are 
opposed by arguments for an independent consideration and the protection of social interest. 
Concepts of a different, specific European polity are faced with authors that insist on a state-
like polity for European law.  
Throughout all six parameters the debate is strongly influenced by the development of 
European law from the European Coal and Steel Community to European Union and now the 
banking union and the different views of this development. For the analysis here, the debates 
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on the influence of German Ordo-liberalism
268
 and the remains of it today,
269
 the development 
of the economic constitution, the ‘regulatory state’-debate
270
 and the arguments about social 
regulation
271
 or a social constitution of Europe and its relationship to the economic 
constitution are particularly relevant.
272
 While there is overlap between the different 
arguments, the parameters and the bi-polar categories provide a useful structuring tool. 
By way of illustration, this Chapter considers the European response to the challenge of the 
failure of large financial institutions after the crisis of the late 2000’s. The tension between a 
non-state vision and a state vision as the answer to the challenges faced, is apparent in the 
tension between the decentralized effort of harmonizing and strengthening the resolution 
regimes in Member States and the parallel centralized development of a common banking 
union for the Member States of the Monetary Union. The FSB Key Attributes found their way 
into European law through the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive (BRRD).
273
 Its aim 
was to improve and harmonize the national resolution regimes
274
  – a non-statist vision of 
European law, focused on the coordination of Member States.  
The banking union, on the other hand is more ambitious and proposes a centralized regime for 
the Monetary Union,
275
 which represents a statist vision of European law. The pillars of the 
banking union are the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and the Single Resolution 
Mechanism (SRM) made up by two texts, one on the functioning of the Single Resolution 
Mechanism  and an intergovernmental agreement for the Single Resolution Fund.  
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While the regimes now co-exist, they provide competing visions of the way forward for 
European law in financial market regulation. The moves toward a banking union were 
justified by saying that “bank supervision and resolution need to be exercised by the same 
level of authority and be backed by adequate funding arrangements.”
276
  
The following sections will structure this debate and illustrate that important differences 
within parameters exist. With regard to legality, politics and governance, the bi-polarity – 
competing state and non-state visions – could be overcome. The different possible 
compromises are also apparent in the context of financial market regulation. However, in the 
parameters of legitimacy, values and polity, bi-polar arguments could not yet be overcome 
and the debate for a new vision of European law persists. Non-state approaches portray the 
SRM as an extension of the BRRD following a functionalist logic. Statist approaches, on the 
other hand, emphasize the banking union as a new level of integration that demands or 
projects higher - state like – standards of law.  
3.1. Bi-polar approaches to the legality of European law 
Bi-polarity exists in the debate on the legality of European law. However, as the legality of 
European law integrates two procedural conditions - proportionality and subsidiarity – with 
the condition of a formal legal basis, it also offers an approach to compromising the non-
state/state tension.   
The bi-polar debate on the legality of European law is marked by procedural approaches that 
complain about the loss of potential for accommodation through formalization
277
 and formal 
approaches that focus on the legal basis of European law.
278
 
The legality of European law however, provides a compromise as proportionality and 
subsidiarity requirements encourage the consideration of developments while the legal basis 
requirements provides limits thereto. It offers a way of thinking of a compromise between 
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non-state and state arguments, as it takes two procedural characteristics into consideration 
(proportionality and subsidiarity) as well as a formal one.  
In the following, I will demonstrate this argument in the context of SRM. While the SRM is 
accepted as a crucial element of the European banking union, its legal basis is been seen as 
one of the most contentious issues concerning the establishment of the SRM.
279
    
3.1.1. Procedural legality approaches 
Of course, arguments are made that European law is becoming too formalized, thus 
undercutting the flexibility and hence the accommodation that it provides.
280
 However, the 
legality of European law at least allows for consideration of procedural development with its 
procedural requirements of proportionality and subsidiarity. 
According to the principle of subsidiarity, the actions of the Union outside its exclusive 
responsibility are limited to actions that cannot be sufficiently achieved by Member States.
 281
 
Action should take place at the level best suited, ranging from local, to regional to central and 
finally to Union level.
282
 This allows the consideration of procedural developments for the 
legality of European law as long as they are with regard to issues that could not be addressed 
by Member States.  
According to the Commission: “Only action at the European level can ensure that failing 
banks are resolved with minimal spill-over effects and in a consistent manner pursuant to a 
single set of rules.”
283
 Furthermore, “Substantial differences between resolution decisions 
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taken at the national level, and subject to local specificities and funding constrains, may 
undermine the stability and integrity of the internal market.”
284
 
The Commission concludes that therefore it is “appropriate that the Union should propose the 
necessary legislative action to establish such resolution arrangements for banks supervised by 
the SSM. A regulation is the appropriate legal instrument to avoid discrepancies in national 
transposition and to ensure a unified institutional mechanism and level playing field for all 
banks in the participating Member States.”
285
  
The principle of proportionality
286
 is used for the review of community measures as well as 
the review of national measures.
287
 It has been held that the use of the proportionality test by 
the ECJ largely reflects the integration variable.
288
 At the same time, it provides for an 
allocation of powers and allowing to fill normative gaps.
289
  As an element of the legality test 
of European law, it cannot be fit into the bi-polar categories of procedural and formal legality. 
Rather it builds a bridge between the two. According to the Commission the creation of the 
SRM fulfills the principle. “The recent crisis highlighted the need for swift and decisive 
action backed by European level funding arrangements to avoid nationally conducted bank 
resolution from having disproportionate impacts on the real economy, and in order to curb 
uncertainty and prevent bank runs and contagion within the internal market […] The added 
legal certainty, properly aligns incentives in the Banking Union context, and economic 




Subsidiarity and proportionality are hence means that allow procedural developments to be 
taken into consideration. They therefore allow the integration of procedural arguments into 
the legality of European law. However, of course bi-polar procedural arguments persist, 
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insofar as the formalization that takes place can be seen as impeding the accommodation of 
pluralism.  
3.1.2. Formal legality approaches 
While calls for a treaty reform prove that bi-polarity persists, the third criteria for the legality 
of European law – the legal basis – integrates a functionalism perspective into formalist 
arguments.  
According to the Commission, the legal basis for the SRM is Article 114 TFEU, which allows 
the adoption of measures for the approximation of national provisions aiming at the 
establishment and functioning of the internal market.
291
 According to Germany 114 TFEU 
provides only a very thin legal basis for the establishment of the mechanism at risk of 
challenges in front of courts.
292
 
According to the Commission, the SRM is a measure needed to achieve approximation of 
national provisions. The resolution and restructuring directive is not sufficient according to 
the Commission, “Whilst the Directive brings a high level of harmonization, it still allows 
flexibility to Member States which means that a certain fragmentation in the internal market 
could remain.”
293
 Furthermore, the Commission has argued that the SRM has also for object 
the establishment and functioning of the internal market and therefore fulfils the second 
requirement of Article 114 TFEU. After all it is its goal to enhance the stability in the 
financial markets of the whole Union.
294
  
It will remain to be seen if legal challenges will be raised and how they will be solved. 
However, with regard to the question at hand here it can be said that Art 114 TFEU is a good 
illustration of a blurring of the procedural formal distinction in the legality of European law. 
The formal requirement of a legal basis opens the door to a functional argument and the EU 
legislator has been given a wide discretion as regards the harmonization technique most 
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approporitate for achieving a desired result.
295
 Hence the establishment of an agency might 
well be confirmed as such a legitimate measure.  
The formalist element of a legal basis hence takes a functionalist turn, as it calls for the 
attaching of the new measure to an existing legal basis. Of course, the bi-polar debate persists. 
The ‘robustness’ of the proposed legal basis spurs it anew. For some commentators, a change 
in the European treaties is needed “that will establish the robust legal basis needed for a 
sustainable banking union.”
296
 This treaty change is urged because firstly, while supervision is 
explicitly referred to in the treaties, resolution authorities are not. Moreover, according to 
Vernon, resolution regimes are closely related to insolvency, which is a national competence 
under the current treaties.
297
  
Notwithstanding it remains true that with its three requirements, the debate on the legality of 
European law has moved beyond the non-state/state tensions. 
3.2. Bi-polar approaches to the legitimacy of European law 
With regard to the legitimacy of European law, bipolarity cannot be overcome. Non-state 
visions of European law that accept and support its thin legitimacy are opposed by statist 
approaches that envisage a thick legitimacy for European law. For both approaches, 
rapprochement is limited to multilevel arguments that reflect the idea of limiting the 
development of European law to thick legitimation provided at the national level. 
Thin approaches portray the SRM as a mere continuation of the BRRD and rely on a 
functional argumentation and a performance argumentation
298
 by pointing to the inability at 
national level to take up transnational challenges. The reference to thick approaches is limited 
to a multilevel approach that suggests that functional development on the European level is 
paralleled by the provision of thick legitimacy on the national level.
299
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Thick approaches on the other hand, apply a state law-like legitimacy standard to European 
law. Thick approaches are to a large extent aspirational and provide prescriptions for the 
strengthening of democratic institutions on the European level.
300
 For instance, the role of the 
European parliament is looked upon as a potential mechanism to provide such legitimacy. To 
thick approaches, the banking union is a further step for the European Union towards 
statehood. The multilevel component comes in, when the development thick legitimacy is tied 
back to national legitimation, for instance by authors that demand a treaty adaptation for the 
development of the banking union.
301
  
The debate on the legitimacy of European law has developed very far. However, their 
arguments tend to include a multilevel approach that allows for a division of labour regarding 
the provision of legitimacy. These approaches hence do not allow the tension between non-
state and state to be overcome but actually accommodate it through multilevel arrangements. 




 will be examined.  
3.2.1. Thin legitimacy approaches  
Thin approaches to the legitimacy of European law emphasize its functional development and 
put forward notions of performance legitimacy. References to thick legitimacy are limited to 
multilevel arguments that suggest that the functional development on the European level is 
accompanied with the provision of thick legitimacy on the national level.  
Originally, the legitimacy of the EU was based on its goal to foster peace between its 
members.
304
 Even as this goal was enlarged, the EU has been defined through the limited 
purposes and goals it was aimed at pursuing that also limited the legitimacy requirements it 
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was meant to meet. This is the functional approach to the European Union and it has always 
been an important part of the debate on the legitimacy of the European Union.
305
    
Other thin conceptions of legitimacy that focus on performance refer to the inability of the 
national level to regulate in the face of transnational challenges. For instance, it is said that 
national parliaments are not able to address complex issues in the transnational context. They 
enhance the legitimacy of European law drawing “legitimation of European law by its 
potential to compensate structural democracy failures of nation states.”
306
 The failure at 
national level is not only a democratic one. In the context of financial market regulation, the 
ability of states is generally doubted. The European level is seen as more apt to provide for 
solutions with regard to large financial institutions.  
The initial ordo-liberal authors conceived of a division of labor between the European level 
and the national level and charged the latter with the responsibility of providing democratic 
legitimacy.
307
 Democratic contestation should be able to take place at the nation state level 
and thereby legitimize the developments on the European level. This argumentation remains 
timely, as for instance Scharpf criticizes the development of the banking union because it 
undermines a similar division of labour in the provision of legitimacy that he calls ‘legitimacy 
intermediation’. According to him, the limits on states responsibilities in monetary policies 
undercut their ability to provide for their share of the overall legitimation.
308
 The thin notion 
of legitimacy for the Union is hence linked to a limitation of activities according to a division 




Walker forwards an approach that disaggregates legitimacy, in terms of the characteristics of 
the political entity to which it refers. He distinguishes between performance, regime and 
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 This allows him to provide an interesting analysis of the performance and 
regime legitimacy of the European Union, yet it also illustrates that the EU ‘fails’ to produce 
polity legitimacy. While the performance is well discussed through the functional approaches, 
regime legitimacy is interesting as it covers a political organization, representative quality of 
the governing institutions and so on. This understanding bridges to the governance parameter 
and allows a deep analysis of the governance structures of the Union. However, with regard to 
legitimacy, it is polity legitimacy that would qualify for a thick notion of legitimacy. 
According to Walker, polity legitimacy means “the fundamental acceptance of the entity in 
question as a legitimate political community” that at the same time also inspires a “sufficient 
sense of identity and we feeling.”
311
  
3.2.2. Thick legitimacy approaches 
Polity legitimacy according to Walker, reflects a statist approach to the legitimacy of 
European law because it implies republican structures for the representation of this polity. 
Most approaches that forward thick legitimacy approaches to European law retain an 
aspirational or advocacy component as they urge for the development of thick legitimacy.
312
 
The focus is on ways that democratic institutions can be strengthened, for instance through the 
role of the European Parliament. The multilevel component comes in when, in search of this 
thick legitimacy, the vision turns to the national level. 
Since early on in the development of the European Union, high expectations on European law 
have been held.
313
 Such ambitious visions are still put forward.
314
 The SRM can be viewed as 
a self-standing European level body that will be in charge of resolving the systemically 
important banks within the Monetary Union providing a “steady-state banking policy 
framework.”
315
 However this view also heightens the legitimacy standard for this entity:  
“consolidation of authority at the European level implied by banking union cannot be 
sustainable without a parallel enhancement of the empowerment of European citizens in 
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The authors that aim at addressing the lack of republican elements beyond the nation state
317
 
are on the one hand looking both at institutions like the European Parliament and at law-
making itself and at initiatives that aim at increasing the participation of citizens more 
directly.  
With regard to the parliament an increasing role has been observed. However, on a more 
fundamental level it is also debated whether the European Parliament has  a representative 
function and, if so what it represents and what its relationship with national constituency is. 
Weiler for instance points out that the increased powers of the European Parliament would not 
bring about the desired goal of democratization, as the shift in decision-making is not 
accepted by the constituency.
318
 “Under the impact of Europeanization and globalization, 
contemporary societies experience an ever stronger schism between decision-makers and 
those who are impacted upon by decision-making. This schism poses a democracy problem 
for anybody defending the idea that the citizens of democratic polities should be able to 
interpret them as in the last instance…”
319
 Other arguments focus on the initiatives that aimed 
at increasing participation in law-making. In its White Paper on governance the Commission 
for instance proposes a reform of law-making aiming at the increased involvement of the 
citizens. On the one hand the openness of European institutions was increased through 
transparency and information while at the same time citizens themselves were more directly 
involved in law-making.
320
 Thick approaches support the development of such procedures 
also in the domain of financial market regulation. From a thick perspective on legitimacy 
many authors dismiss the development of the SRM or the banking union as illegitimate.
321
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If this thick legitimacy cannot be generated on the European level, then the focus is turned to 
the national level. Here again a multilevel aspect is introduced. With regard to the banking 
union, some authors suggest that the legitimacy of the banking union will ultimately depend 
on a change to the European treaties. According to Vernon it is “doubtful that the banking 
union agenda can be entirely delivered […] outside the EU framework. This is because of the 
need for resolution, insolvency and fiscal policy to be subject to adequate judicial review and 
political scrutiny.”
322
 The current treaties do not explicitly provide for a European resolution 
authority. From his analysis, Vernon concludes that changes to the European Treaties appear 
to be an “inescapable step on the path towards permanent banking union, and are likely to 




Hence it is also true of the thick approaches that a turn to the multilevel argument: there is an 
idea that there should be accordance between the legitimacy provided by the national level 
and the developments on the European level. However the bipolar tension between a non-state 
and a statist vision for European law cannot be overcome.  
3.3. Bi-polar approaches to politics and European law 
With regard to the relationship between politics and European Law, bi-polar approaches can 
be split into those focusing on de-politicization and those focusing on politicization. However, 
law-making in the European Union integrates elements of de-politicization and politicization 
and thereby moves the debate beyond bi-polarity. This is especially true with regard to the 
participation of European and national institutions in law-making but less so with regard to 
civil society participation.  
De-politicized approaches emphasize the independence of technocratic and expert governance 
and aim at increasing the insulation between law-making and the political process.
324
 
Politicized approaches either disbelieve that such a separation can work, or they suspect that it 
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hides political power plays.
325
  Politicized approaches focus on distributive realities and 
politicization in favor of underrepresented issues.
326
 
In the context of the SRM issues at the center of the politics debate regard the working 
arrangements between the ECB, the Commission and the Council, the composition of the 
Single Resolution Board and the distributive impact of the resolution mechanism. De-
politicized approaches emphasize the limited role of the Council with regard to the resolution 
plan, the independence of the Single Resolution Board from the Commission and the 
remoteness of the executive session of the Single Resolution Board from its plenary session 
and the bureaucratic functions of the national representatives in the board. Politicized 
approaches on the other hand emphasize the distributive implication of the mandate of the 
SRM, the politicized choice of having a board instead of a body that is part of the 
Commission, the national representatives and the political nature of the public interest 
requirement on which a Commission objection triggers Council involvement.  
Overall, the composition of the SRM and its board show a move beyond bipolarity as both, 
de-politicized and politicized elements are combined. However, while there is indeed a mix of 
de-politicization and politicization with regard to national and European institutions, the 
politicization of institutions from citizens remains limited.     
3.3.1. De-politicization approaches  
De-politicized approaches can be seen to follow from the ordo-liberal and functional 
arguments that hail the neutrality and efficiency of technocratic governance to overcome 
political tension within and between Member States.
327
  
De-politicized approaches suggest that the ordo-liberal origin of the European Communities is 
still decisive for the relationship between EU law and politics. On the one hand, the State has 
to constrain private power through competition; on the other hand it is prevented from further 
interference in the economy.
328
 On top of that, the politicization that occurs at the national 
level can be avoided at the European level. The neutrality of the technocratic decision-making 
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is also seen to be more efficient.
329
 De-politicized approaches can hence also accommodate 
neo-classical arguments, where the distance to politics is not increased though a 
technocratization but rather a privatization.
330
  
The functionalist approaches find examples in the working of the SRM. With regard to its 
technocratic staff it says for instance “If a bank fails, the SRM with clear decision-making 
rules for cross-border bank and highly experienced staff will be much more effective in 
carrying out resolutions than the existing patchwork of national resolution authorities.”
331
 It 
has also been suggested that with regard to ‘fields which are characterized by complex 
technical features’, the establishment of an agency and its independence will be considered 
justified.
332
 Furthermore, de-politicized approaches can emphasize the ‘delegation’ that 
happens within the mechanism. For example, the Commission’s proposal forwards a 
distinction between the executive and the plenary session of the board.  
“In its plenary session, the Board would take all decision of a general 
nature. In its executive session, the Board takes decision in respect of 
individual entities or banking groups. Such decisions range from 
resolution planning, early intervention powers to decision on resolution 
schemes […] In its executive session, the board comprises the Executive 
Director, the Deputy Executive Director and representatives appointed 
bt the Commission and the ECB […] Depending on the banks or groups 
to be resolved in each case, when meeting in tis executive session, the 
Board will also convene in addition […] members appointed by the 
relevant national resolution authorities.”
333
  
The example of the SRM also demonstrates that in the European context de-politicization can 
take place by avoiding political tensions between Member States as well as in one particular 
Member State. According to its press release form the 30
th
 of March 2014, it was important to 
the parliament that firstly, it was the ECB (instead of the Council or the Commission) that was 
empowered to trigger a resolution procedure and secondly that the involvement of the Council 
would be limited also with regard to the approval of the resolution procedure.
334
 This de-
politicization is interesting insofar as it aims at the limitation of interstate politics and inter-
institutional politics.   
                                                 
329
 Esty Daniel C., “Good Governance at the Supranational Scale, Globalizing Administrative Law”, in the Yale 
Law Journak, Vol. 115, No. 7, May 2006, pp. 1517. 
330
 Taggart explains the nexus between de-politicization, neo-classical ideologies and privatization in the national 
context, Taggert, 2005. 
331
 Commission Memo, April, 2014, p. 2.  
332
 For an analysis of the ECJ cause law from this perspective refer to, Zavvos and Kaltsoumi, forthcoming 2015, 
p, 11. 
333
 Commission Proposal, June 2013, p. 12.  
334
 Parliament press release, “Parliament negotiator rescue seriously damaged bank resolution system”, 
Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, 20.03.2014. 
Ph.D. Thesis  




3.3.2. Politicization approaches 
Politicized approaches emphasize the impossibility or undesirability of neutrality of law in the 
face of policy issues. The focus is on instances of closeness between politics and law-making, 
such as instance the participation of different actors in the mechanism, its integration of 
national bureaucrats instead of ‘neutral’ Commission bureaucrats and the implication of the 
mechanism for the public interests. On top of that, politicized approaches object to the multi-
level approach that justifies de-polarization on European level through the ‘natural’ 
politicization on the national level.  
The SMR hence entails instances of inter institutional as well as interstate politicization. 
However, politicization by civil society remains limited.  
The turn away from classic legal theory that Kennedy termed the turn to the ‘social’ has also 
had effects on the European Union level.
335
 The widening of the goals of the Union beyond 
pure market integration can be understood as a part of this development. The EU is 
increasingly urged to acknowledge the distributive realities and the impact on the welfare 
systems of the Member State.  
The normative implication of functional rationality has been neglected.
336
 Other authors doubt 
the potential of de-politicization altogether as they argue that “It would be entirely unrealistic 
to envisage bank resolution regimes, the aim of which is to maintain trust and to preserve 
financial system stability, as purely mechanic, rules-based processes.”
337
  
With regard to the SRM, the question of politicization is very apparent as the entity is located 
outside the Commission. According to an early proposal from the European Commission the 
Commission gave an important role to itself.
338
 The limited role of the Commission can be 
seen as an incidence of politicization. Instead of relaying solely on ‘neutral’ Commission 
bureaucrats, the board relies on national and ECB bureaucrats as well.  
This decision was not obvious. Other proposals that envisaged putting the Commission in 
charge of resolution have done so on grounds of technocratic neutrality and expertise
339
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However, the current structure opted for the involvement of more actors within the EU 
institutions and more importantly also included national ‘representatives.’ The SMR hence 
illustrates the potential for politicization in European law-making, at least across institutions 
and the European and national level. However, it remains limited with regard to civil society.  
In other areas of European law, the politicization towards citizens is more developed. 
Amongst the most obvious of these initiatives is of course the enlarging role of the European 
Parliament. However, the Commission also reached out to include the ones it was governing. 
In its White Paper on governance the Commission characterizes its reform as a wide-ranging 
democratic process aimed at the increased involvement of the citizens. On the one hand the 
European institutions were meant to be more open and attach more importance to 
transparency and communication in their decision-making, on the other hand, citizens must be 
more systemically involved in law-making.
340
 The ‘Open Method of Coordination’ is also 
forwarded as a mesure that allows for more politicization and inverse top-down approach an 
allow for feedback from Member States and even citizens.
341
 This political element was 
meant to lead to more direct participation. The limited extent of these developments in the 
context of financial market regulation reflects arguments with regard to the lack of 
independent consideration of social interests in European Union law-making.  
3.4. Bi-polar approaches to values in European Law 
In the debate on the values of European law, dependent and independent considerations of 
social and market interests also compete. As no compromise between the two has been 
formalized, both argumentations refer to multilevel arguments. 
While economic integration and the development of a common market has been joined by 
other priorities that guide the EU, the relationship between these goals remains up for debate. 
The debate is split into bi-polar categories of non-state approaches that prioritize the 
economic values of the EU as a means to also further its social goals, and more ambitious, 
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statist approaches that push for a consideration of social interests beyond or independently of 
market interest. The debate on the European Court of Justice is particularly illustrative of this 
bi-polarity. While some authors portray the court as expanding European law through the 
interpretation of the fundamental freedoms
342
 others urge for a stronger consideration for the 
protection of social interests of the court.
343
 Again a compromise has not been crystallized but 
multilevel approaches have been forwarded, such as the call for the Court to respect and act 
only within the limits provided for by national welfare systems.
344
 While in the context of the 
Single Resolution Mechanism not much can yet be said about the role of the ECJ, the bipolar 
framework could be useful to structure the debate about the Court in other contexts.  
The debate on the Single Resolution Mechanism can be split accordingly. Dependent 
approaches emphasize the importance of the SRM for the working of the single market and 
portray the private contributions to the single resolution fund as an internalization of risk into 
the market that benefits social interests as a consequence. Independent approaches on the 
other hand, see limits in this internalization of risk and instead demand an independent 
furthering of social interest either through the protection of different social interests or by 
embedding the banking union in a larger political union that that includes the protectction 
social interests, such as pensions, housing and tax.  
3.4.1. Dependent consideration of social and market interests approaches 
Echoing the functional and utilitarian justifications that we have discussed in the context of 
the thin legitimacy approaches, the dependent consideration of social interests on market 
interests is deeply ingrained in European law. The principles and values of the European 
Union have, since its beginning, been enlarged. Yet conceptions that consider social values 
dependent from economic values persist. With regards to the protection of social interests, 
dependent approaches often refer to the multilevel approach of the traditional ordo-liberal 
division of labour between national and European level. 
From a dependent perspective, the SRM is presented as being essential for the working of the 
internal market. The fact that deposit insurance is still largely national can be seen as part of 
the division of labor that counted on nation states to provide for the protection of social 
interests. 
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While the goal of economic prosperity has been joined by many others the predominance of 
economic values has maintained itself and dependent approaches still find ample evidence to 
sustain their view.  The importance given to competitiveness as a goal of the Union can be 
seen as an illustration of this. According to Joerges, it is still true today that “an 
institutionalization of economic efficiency is widely perceived today, either affirmatively or 
critically, as Europe’s core agenda.”
345
 The new social values that have been introduced are 
said to have changed little about the predominance of economic goals.
346
 For instance, it is 
argued that consumer protection has been “completely taken over by the pervasive 
performance narratives of international markets, economic efficiency and competition.”
347
 On 




The field of financial market regulation offers itself very well to a dependent view of social 
and market interests. The development of the SRM is foremost justified though its constituent 
contribution to the Banking Union:  
“swift progress towards a Banking Union is indispensable to ensure 
financial stability and growth in the Euro Area and in the whole 
internal market.”
349
 It is said that “By overcoming the financial 
fragmentation currently hampering economic activity, it [the SRM] will 
help ensure fair competition for and remove obstacles to the free 
exercise of fundamental freedoms not only in the participating Member 
States but in the whole internal market.”
350
 [The mechanism will] 
“complement the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) and [] ensure 
that – not withstanding stronger supervision - if a bank subject to the 
SSM faced serious difficulties, its resolution could be managed 
efficiently with minimal costs to taxpayers and the real economy.” [The 
improvement of market functioning will in turn] “strengthen confidence 
and stability in the financial markets and help restore lending to the 
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Hence, while the benefits of taxpayer protection are acknowledged, the argumentation on the 
benefit to the market functioning and its impact on the real economy thereby enhancing social 
interests indirectly can be and is sustained as well.  
Again, a multilevel approach exists also in the context of the values of European law; the 
predominance of economic interests at Union level can be justified with the securing of social 
interests in the national context.  
Some authors observe the same division of labour to the present day. Member State reluctance 
to surrender control in certain areas, as well as the factual difficulty and political impossibility 
of replacing the variety of European welfare state models and traditions by a European model 




With or without a reference to the protection of social interest at national level, dependent 
approaches to the values of European law prioritize market interests and only dependently 
consider social interests.  
 
3.4.2. Independent consideration of social and market interest approaches  
Independent approaches urge for a consideration of social interests in their own right. In 
European law, these approaches have argued that the increasing inclusion of social values has 
not yet found due consideration. Often formulated as a criticism to functionalism, these 
approaches demand a de-marketization of European Union law. If this de-marketization is 
deemed impossible, multilevel arguments are made, urging for the protection of social 
interests on the national level.  
Such approaches see the inclusion of more and more social objectives into the treaties as 
reason to defend these aims in their own right.
353
 According to such approaches, the 
development of a banking union is just one part of a wider political union that must 
encompass economic as well as social components such as housing and tax.
354
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From early on, the Treaties stated that the Common Market should achieve the progressive 
improvement of living and working conditions.
355
 Subsequent Treaty reforms added more 
elements like social policy, consumer policy, health policy and educational policy among the 
policies pursued by the EC.
356
 On these bases a debate has started on the question of a ‘social’ 
model of the European Union and the relationship thereof to the ‘economic’ model. Tracing 
the tension between social and market interests within the European Union to its very 
beginning,
357
 independent approaches aim at solving this tension by putting both interests in a 
relationship that will prevent their asymmetrical advancement
358




In the context of the resolution of financial institutions, the independent perspective suggests 
that resolution is not sufficient to prevent the exposure of public funds and that a banking 
union is only one aspect of a larger political union that must also necessarily include common 
tax, housing and other policies.  
The Single Resolution Mechanism is meant to complement the Single Supervisory 
Mechanism and will ensure that “if a bank subject to the SSM faces serious difficulties, its 
resolution can be managed efficiently with minimal costs to taxpayers and the real 
economy.”
360
 However, approaches arguing for an independent consideration of social 
interests see potential contradictions between the interests of taxpayers and real economy.  In 
the last crisis, the taxpayer interest had to cede for the sake of financial stability that was seen 
as crucial for the real economy. Therefore, resolution of financial institutions is seen as 
insufficient, and stricter limitations to the growth of financial institutions like caps or 
limitations of activities are demanded.  
At the same time, it has been held that the “banking union cannot be separated from parallel 
and significant progress towards fiscal union, economic union, and political union.”
361
 From 
his analysis of the crisis of the late 2000s Vernon argues that “a sustainable banking union 
may entail further policy integration in other areas than banking policy defined in a narrow 
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sense, including housing policy and various aspects of tax policy.”
362
 Schiek and others go 
even further, demanding the inclusion of social goals to the same extent as economic goals in 
general.
363
 In the context of the SRM, there was general worry that the common currency was 
an imbalanced commitment to market interests that threatened to overrule social values; it was 
feared that the “European social model would be ‘sacrificed on the altar of the common 
currency’.”
364
 Along this logic it has for instance been suggested, that in order to protect old 
age incomes from further crises, a European pension fund should be created.
365
 Furthermore, 
it has been criticized that a Euro-wide approach to the social effects of the crisis is lacking.
366
 
The post-crisis interventions have also been interpreted as a call for a new social pact.
367
 The 
EU has been and still can be shown as a transnational market with limited claims to 
transnational social solidarity.
368
 As a last resort, also to the independent approaches, remains 
the multilevel approach. From their perspective, what is important is the safeguarding and 
securing of the national welfare system from European law.
369
 
3.5. Bi-polar approaches to the governance structure of 
European Law 
With regard to the governance structure the bi-polar debate on EU law is split into approaches 
to emphasize assimilated governance structures and approaches the focus on dis-integrated 
governance structures. With its structure of being a clearly European institution which is 
nevertheless located outside of the Commission the SRM can be seen as an attempt to 
overcome the tensions between assimilation and dis-integration.  
In the context of the SMR, assimilated approaches can put forward that the mechanism is 
‘strong’ or independent giving a limited role for the Commission and the Council and instead 
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allow the working together on national representatives. Furthermore the mutualization of 
funds and the explicitly inclusive approach of the banking union can be interpreted as 
mechanisms that lead to assimilation across national borders. On the other hand, dis-
integrated approaches will point to the cumbersome inclusion of a wide range of institutional 
actors and the potential frictions this can entail. With regard to national frictions, dis-
integrated approaches can point to the need of an interstate agreement for the resolution fund 
and the neglected role of national courts. Lastly, for dis-integrated approaches, the SRM is 
really only a bank mechanism and so far there is no indication of how sectorial boarders will 
be overcome.  
The structure of the SRM hence constitutes a combination of assimilated and dis-integrated 
elements and allows the debate to overcome bi-polar categories.  
3.5.1. Assimilated governance approaches 
Assimilated approaches point to the institutional functioning of the mechanism including 
actors across national and institutional divisions. More importantly, the mutualization of funds 
and the inclusive approach of the banking union can be forwarded as examples of assimilation 
across national borders.  
According to assimilated approaches, law-making must take place in assimilated fora that are 
able to take up the transnational challenge together in a unified manner.
370
  
The SRM can be looked at from this point of view because it puts representatives of national 
jurisdictions and members of the Commission and the ECB together to take up the common 
challenge of bank resolution. The governance structure is set out so that “decision-making 
must ensure European decision, but involving MS, recognizing significance of bank 
resolution for national economies.”
371
 This mix is reflected in the composition of the board.  
‘The board would consist of an executive director, four full-time 
appointed members and the representatives of the national resolution 
authorities of all the participating countries. […] Most draft resolution 
decisions would be prepared in the executive session, composed of the 
executive director and the appointed members, with the representatives 
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of member states concerned by a particular resolution decision 
involved in a first stage.”372  
 
However, it falls short of an institution that would actually function within the Commission, 
where bureaucrats act outside the national interest. This will be taken up by the dis-integrated 
approaches.  
Assimilated approaches can however point to the mutualization of funds as a ‘mechanism’ to 
overcome national objection and a slow integration of funds towards truly common burden 
sharing. “This agreement, in line with terms of reference also approved today, would include 
arrangements for the transfer of national contributions to the fund and their progressive 
mutualization over a 10-year transitional phase.”
373
  
Lastly, the approach of the banking union and therefore also membership of the SRM is 
inclusive. The SRM is said to allow for a centralized “application of EU-wide rules for banks 
in the euro area (and any non-euro Member States that would want to join.)”
374
 In the words 
of the European Commission:  
“Swift progress towards a Banking Union, comprising single 
centralized mechanisms for the supervision and restructuring of banks, 
in indispensable to ensure financial stability and growth in the euro 
area […] building on the strong regulatory framework common to the 
28 members of the Single Market (single rulebook), the European 
Commission has therefore taken an inclusive approach and proposed a 




The SSM and the SRM are both open to all non-euro area Member States. “Member States 
outside the euro zone which join the Single Supervisory Mechanism will also join the Single 
Resolution Mechanism.”
376
 Furthermore, with regard to the external dimension, it can be 
argued that a unified and centralized approach within the EU will facilitate the interactions in 
cross-border resolutions with banks outside the EU.  
While being located outside the Commission, mutualization and the inclusive approach 
provide an overview of the SMR from an assimilated approach.  
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3.5.2. Dis-integrated governance approaches 
For dis-integrated approaches, assimilation is either impossible or undesirable. Dis-integration 
provides for a state-like system of checks and balances. 
Dis-integrated approaches will look at the institutional framework and point out the flexibility 
it affords nation states and the different European actors that are involved. With regard to the 
overcoming of sectorial boundaries the SRM remains altogether limited. Dis-integrated 
approaches are appreciative of the fact that the SRM is situated outside of the Commission 
and of the role that is given to national representatives. Also, dis-integrated approaches will 
emphasize that the mutualization of funds is conditional on an interstate agreement. 
 The practical working of the SRM can be viewed as being a very dis-integrated process that 
involves many different actors and provides for checks and balances. The decision to resolve 
a bank is triggered by the ECB that is the supervising body. If the ECB does not trigger it, the 
Board of the mechanism itself is able to do so. The Board will then adopt a resolution scheme 
specifying the tool and any use of the fund. Before adoption by the board, the Commission 
will assess the scheme regarding its compliance with state aid rules and resolution objectives. 
If the Commission significantly changes the amount requested from the fund or contests the 
public interest in the resolution, its decision will be submitted for approval or rejection by the 
Council. Where the Council or the Commission object to the resolution scheme, the Board 
will have to make amendments. Finally, national resolution authorities will then implement 
the resolution scheme, in accordance with national law including relevant provisions 
transposing the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
377
 This reception by national 
resolution authorities entails further potential for dis-integration, as the role of national courts 
has not yet been tested.  
Dis-integrated approaches can furthermore point to the need of intergovernmental agreement 
to establish the Single Resolution Fund. If an authorization is required by national rules, “such 
authorization shall be applied for” and “the national judicial authority shall control that the 
decision of the Board is authentic and that the coercive measures envisaged are neither 
arbitrary nor excessive having regard to the subject matter of the inspection.”
378
 Also the ties 
to the national parliaments are regulated; “national Parliaments of the participating Member 
States, through their own procedures, may request the Board to reply in writing to any 
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observations or questions submitted by them to the Board in respect of the functions of the 
Board under this Regulation.”
379
  
Regarding the inclusive approach and its potential assimilating force, dis-integrated 
approaches can point to the various categories of EU Member States that will develop 
between Euro Zone, banking union and Member States that are not part of any of them. 
Lastly, the external dimension of the SRM can also be looked at from a perspective of dis-
integration; while it aims at a coherent implementation of the FSB Key Attributes, it also does 
not specifically regulate the cross-border resolutions with non-EU states.   
The bi-polar categories are not suitable to analyzing the governance structure of the SMR. 
Assimilated and dis-integrated structures are mixed. European Union law-making in this 
regard, thus moves beyond bi-polarity.  
3.6. Bi-polar approaches to the polity of European Law  
The bi-polar debate on the polity of European Law opposes approaches that conceive of a 
European polity as a different, new, supranational kind of polity, to approaches that imagine a 
European polity similar to the national one. Authors that limit European citizenship to a 
purely economic perspective or that attach only symbolic meaning to European citizenship 
provide examples of supranational approaches. National polity approaches on the other hand, 




The different starting points of these approaches seem irreconcilable. While for supranational 
approaches, the European polity remains different, national polity approaches can, for 
instance, suggest that the creation of wealth leads to a loyalty that provides a basis for a polity 
like the national one. 
With regard to the SRM, emphasis on depositors and creditors illustrates partial, supranational 
notions of polities. The reference to ‘taxpayers,’ on the other hand, is more ambitious and can 
be attributed to a national polity approach.  
3.6.1. Supranational polity approaches 
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In the context of European law, different supranational polity approaches can be observed. On 
the one hand, there are approaches that focus on an economic form of polity and on the other 
hand, authors refer to an inter-state polity, where the Member States are seen as the main 
objects. Both examples conceive of polities differently from national ones.   
References to depositors or large banks as the addressees of financial market regulation, 
reflect an economic and hence partial definition of polity. This reflects arguments that have 
been made about the economic nature of citizenship in the European Union.
381
 The principles 
of the SRM as proposed by the Commission reflect this economic perspective as they entail, 
for example, the prohibition of any discrimination against banks, their depositors, creditors or 
shareholders on grounds of nationality or their place of business. The focus is hence put on 
the economic aspects of these actors. This reflects the same division of labour that can be 
traced back to the ordo-liberal origin and that has been observed in the parameters of 
legitimacy, values and politics. The underling rationale is that this limitation of the polity on 
its economic aspects is justified because the other  - political- aspects are satisfied on the 
national level.  
The idea of polity can also be different with regard to what is considered as members of said 
polity. Intergovernmental approaches consider the European polity as made up by states. In 
the context of the SRM, approaches that emphasize the importance of interstate agreements 
for the resolution fund take such an inter-governmental stance.  
Supranational approaches, either by focusing on a partial understanding of the polity or by 
taking an intergovernmental approach, hence forward different – supranational – 
understandings of polity. The SRM provides evidence for both. 
3.6.2. National polity approaches 
National polity approaches forward a national polity ideal also for the European level. They 
either suggest ways in which the European polity may develop towards this ideal, or, if this is 
deemed impossible, dismiss the possibility of a European polity altogether or take a multilevel 
approach according to which the national polity prevails over the European one until it lives 
up to the standards of a national polity.  
National polity approaches to functionalism argue that the benefits of the EU will lead to the 
development of a loyalty towards it that will pose the basis of a polity that entails a notion of 
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sameness or identity like the national one. The wealth that the EU generates is seen as crucial 
for the development of this loyalty towards the Union;
382
 however other elements are also 
forwarded as contributing to the development of a common identity. Authors insisting on a 
sense of belonging have forwarded ‘culturalist’ ideals for the European Polity.
383
 The most 
significant one of them is the establishment of a European citizenship, which goes beyond the 
limited reach of economics and also encompasses a political dimension to this citizenship.
384
 
It was a symbolic counterpart to the increase of participation. The fostering of a direct link 
between the EU and its citizens is important for national polity approaches.  
The importance that the SRM gives to taxpayers and the way in which it addresses them 
directly – even if the taxation is done by Member States – evidences just such an ambitious 
approach. ‘Taxpayers’ is a much more inclusive term than depositors or consumers and 
thereby goes beyond the partial – supranational – notion of polity. At the same time, the 
reference to taxpayers is also revealing in the sense that taxes are not unified in the European 
Union or the banking union.  
The SRM hence refers to national as well as supranational notions of polities. However, it 
also illustrates the tensions between the two, as it remains unclear how those – national and 
supranational – polities relate to each other and which should be given preference in European 
law.  
3.7. Conclusion: Differences between Parameters  
The tension between non-state and state arguments runs through all the parameters. This is 
also true of the debate on European law. However, here a difference between the parameters 
can be observed. In legality, politics and governance the practice of European law developed 
in a way that mixes the approaches and the debate moves beyond bi-polar categories. In the 
context of legitimacy, values and polity, no such developments can be observed and the 
debate remains bi-polar. In the parameter of values in particula, the crucial role of the 
European Court of Justice is apparent.  
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This illustrates the special place many authors attribute to European law in the field of 
transnational law. The framework suggests looking at this ‘specialty’ from the standpoint of 
the non-state/state tensions. The different parameters allow a distinction to be made between 
the ways in which European law did move beyond the non-state/state tension and the ways in 
which it did not. In the parameter of values, this section also considered the potential to use 
the framework for the analysis of the debate on the role of the European Court of Justice.  
The analysis of the arguments on European law have shown that in questions of legality, 
politics and governance the debate has moved beyond bi-polar categories. The practice of 
European law has led to compromises that overcome the non-state/state tension. However, in 
questions of legitimacy, values and polity, the bipolar categories hold and the non-state/state 
tension persists.  
The next Chapter will examine whether any evidence exists as to the difference between 
parameters in transnational law. If such evidence does exist, it might provide an insight for a 
future approach to transnational law and the lessons that European law teaches about 
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4. The Bi-polar Debate on Transnational Law and 
Transnationalization 
The following Chapter will focus on bi-polarity in legal thinking on transnational law. The 
arguments and approaches will be structured according to non-state/state categories in all six 
parameters of law in order to analyze in which instances the thinking about transnational law 
has overcome the non-state/state tension.   
Private regulation and global constitutionalism will form the endpoints of the non-state/state 
spectrum. The actual example of transnational law – the regulation of the resolution of large 
financial institution – is looked at from the perspective of Global Administrative Law (GAL). 
GAL is given a predominant place here in order because it helps elaborate on the example of 
the FSB. Especially, in the law-making parameters it will form different kinds of 
compromises between private regulation and global constitutionalism. In spite of this focus on 
GAL, the framework serves to evaluate and classify a range of transnational theories. In 
Chapter 5 the outcomes form the analysis here will be brought together to this end.  
Similarly to the Chapter on European law, a difference between parameters will become clear 
as parameters of legality, politics and governance provide for more instances beyond bi-
polarity than the parameters of legitimacy, values and polity.  
The framework will be illustrated according to the example of the debate on the Key 
Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions. Faithful to the 
transnational law perspective, the focus will be on the rules on the functioning of the FSB (its 
legal form and its mechanism of enforcement), and the measures aimed at global systemically 
important financial institutions (GSIFIs) that develop regulatory fora beyond the state level. 
The Charter of the FSB
385
 as well as its thematic peer review mechanism will be looked at 
more closely.
386
 The peer reviews are part of the FSB Framework on Strengthening 
Adherence to International Standards
387
 alongside leadership by example and the adherence 
toolbox. They are part of the responsibilities of the Standing Committee on Standards 
Implementation (SCSI).   
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With regard to the KAs that aim at tackling resolution beyond the state level, the focus will be 
on: 
8 Crisis Management Groups (KA 8, CMG) 
9 Institution-specific cross-border cooperation 
agreements 
(KA 9, COAGs) 
 
10 Resolvability assessments (KA 10 Resolvability 
assessments) 
11 Recovery and resolution planning (KA 11, RRP) 
4.1. Bi-polar approaches to the legality of transnational law 
With regard to the parameter of legality, procedural approaches focus on the suitability of the 
functional and or informal ways of the development of transnational law for the complex 
context of transnationalization. Formal approaches on the other hand, emphasize the 
importance of the ‘hardening’ of these developments. Procedural approaches are very 
common across all theories of transnational law. However, private regulation with its focus on 
efficiency, flexibility and accommodation, can be attributed to the procedural pole, while 
global constitutionalism emphasizes the importance of legal certainty and the legalization or 
hardening of soft law.  GAL can be positioned on the spectrum between the two as it has the 
potential to offer compromises between the two and thereby overcome bipolarity. It merges a 
procedural ‘observation’ with a formal ambition of improving the procedural development of 
transnational law through administrative principles.  
With regard to the FSB Key Attributes, procedural approaches emphasize the flexibility that 
standards, peer review and colleges provide and the importance of maintaining it by limiting 
the formalization or hardening of these structures. On the other hand, formalist approaches 
urge  the ‘hardening’ of the standards and the FSB ‘regime’. GAL succeeds in integrating 
these competing pressures and thus overcomes bi-polarity. With the example of peer review, 
it will be illustrated how GAL can combine the two and therefore overcome the non-
state/state tension with regard to the legality of transnational law.  
4.1.1. Procedural legality approaches 
Procedural approaches are predominant in transnational law. Not only is procedural law-
making seen to be better fit to the pluralistic transnational environment, private regulation 
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also sees it as more efficient. Approaches of standardization
388
 and functional integration
389
 
strongly rely on procedural arguments. GAL takes a procedural reality as its starting point as 
it ‘observes’ the development of administrative law in self-regulating entities.
390
  
The development of self-regulation and the importance thereof in many fields has been one of 
the main drivers of the transnational law debate in general.
391
 In the field of financial market 
regulation the example of stock exchanges has been widely debated as a successful example 
of private regulation.
392
 However, in the current context, the debate focuses much less on 
private regulation because of the crisis and the specific example of resolution authorities. The 
regulation of the resolution of banks is a priori a decision against the self-regulation of the 
sector. However, the take of private regulation on pluralism is reflected in the debate about 
resolution authorities. The arguments can be split between ones which focus on the 
descriptive force of pluralism, according to which pluralism provides an account of 
transnational law that is factually true (or truer, when developed against arguments of global 
constitutionalism)
393
 and one which focus on accommodation and flexibility in transnational 
law. In the context of the FSB standards both flow into the working of GAL. 
From a procedural perspective the FSB standards and peer-reviews are celebrated for 
allowing for deliberation, flexibility and feedback. With regard to the FSB’s mandate the 
emphasis is put coordination above all else. The main function of peer review is to “provide 
feedback from peers on the implementation and effectiveness of standard and policies”
394
; 
Learning, encouragement and cooperation are at the center.
395
  
The development of firm-specific cross-border regulatory entities provides another example 
for the cooperation focus as it is said that “Such arrangements enhance preparedness for a 
crisis and facilitate the management of any such crisis and, if necessary, the orderly resolution 
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 As they bring together “supervisory authorities, central banks, resolution 
authorities, finance ministries and the public authorities responsible for guarantee schemes of 
jurisdictions that are home or host to entities of the group that are material to its resolution, 
and should cooperate closely with authorities in other jurisdictions where firms have a 
systemic presence,”
397
 cooperation is strengthened while still providing for flexibility. “CMGs 
have been focusing more recently on developing a clearly articulated resolution strategy for 
their respective G-SIFIs. These strategies outline, at a high level, the strategic approach to 
resolution that is likely to be adopted should the need arise, but they do not prescribe the 




The implementation of the KAs is treated as a priority under the FSB Coordination 
Framework for Implementation Monitoring (CFIM). The monitoring and reporting process it 
entails can also be looked at from a procedural perspective. “The objective of the peer review 
is to evaluate FSB member justifications’ existing resolution regimes and any planned 
changes to those regimes using the Key Attributes as a benchmark.”
399
 The process is seen as 
open-ended, fueled by continuous feedback.
400
  
Procedural approaches resonate with the self-generative function of administrative law within 
and outside of the state stipulated by GAL.
401
 According to Ladeur, the ‘experimental search 
process of the administration’ that is instrumental in the development of general 
administrative law exists beyond administrations and drives the development of GAL.
402
 
Standards and peer review can be seen as attempts to improve self-administration through 
administrative principles like transparency and accountability. However, as in the general 
approach of GAL, the ideal of more established procedures and ‘carefully crafted 
administrative mechanisms that are sensitive to the institutional and normative context’
403
 
ultimately leads to friction with the pluralistic environment that GAL itself takes as its starting 
point. Not only will there be “losses to efficiency, more difficulty in reaching consensus, and 
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 but there is also strong bias toward formalization. This unease between its 
pluralistic starting point and its formalistic outcome puts GAL at the limits of bi-polar 
analysis.  
4.1.2.  Formal legality approaches  
Formalist approaches portray transnational law as a transitory phenomenon. They are 
preoccupied with legal certainty and the hardening of transnational law. I will distinguish here 
between global constitutionalism that has a more ambitious or ‘holistic’ view of transnational 
law or global law and approaches of legalization or hardening that are focusing on instances 
where transnational law resembles state law that also influence GAL. 
Global constitutionalism has evolved beyond a vision of global law
405
 that resembles state 
law. Yet it is suggested that the variety of different approaches still share a state inspired ideal 
of legal order. With regard to the Key attributes, such an ideal is the most apparent in the 
‘legalization’ of the FSB recommendations themselves. The original FSB ‘recommendations’ 
have transformed, at least verbally into ‘international standards.’ Riles points out that while 
these standards do not have legal quality “in practice, these standards seem to shade into a 
regime that takes on more and more of the trappings of traditional international legal rules and 
norms.”
406
 The key attributes for instance turned into the “international standards for 
resolution mechanism.”
407
 While this may seem a merely rhetorical change, it has also been 
endorsed as such at the G20 Summit in Cannes. In its ‘consultative document’ on recovery 
and resolution planning of November 2012, the Key Attributes are referred to as “Key 
Attributes Requirements” and it is further specified that “At the Cannes Summit in November 
2011, the G20 Leaders endorsed the Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for 
Financial Institutions (‘the Key Attributes’) as the international standard for resolution 
regimes, following a public consultation process.”
408
 
However, other more subtle approaches of legalization or formalization have been developed. 
Calliess and Renner for instance suggest a ‘functional’ approach that evaluates transnational 
law in regard to its potential to fulfill the function of law. If this function is the regulation of 
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behavior, there will be a strong focus on enforcement.
409
 Indeed, such arguments have been 
made in context of the FSB, where for instance Riles ‘warns’ about a sliding of the learning 
function of peer reviews into supervision.
410
 Riles analyzes the actual review questionnaire on 
risk governance in this vein concluding that: “The questionnaire acknowledges that there is no 
clear international standard regard proper procedures for risk governance and that the purpose 
of the review is to evolve toward consensus concerning a standard. This, it would seem to be a 
neutral vehicle for deliberation and consultation. However, the specific questions posed to 




Instead of asking what institutions a jurisdiction envisages, the questionnaire introduces for 
example “the concept of a “risk committee” as “a specialized Board committee responsible 
for advising the Board on the firm’s overall current and future risk appetite and strategy, and 
for overseeing senior management’s implementation of that strategy” – clearly suggesting one 
very specific institutional form of risk management from among all possible forms.
412
 
Implementation is often referred to in the charter of the FSB. Formalist approaches can 
emphasize such instances as the function of the SCSI to “ensure comprehensive and rigorous 
implementation monitoring of international financial standards.”
413
 It is said that 
“Resolvability assessments should help identify any remaining barriers to resolution, and 
should inform the development and further improvement of the resolution plan.” The FSB is 
developing more specific guidelines and more detailed guidance to ensure adequate and 
consistent reporting on the implementation of all G-SIFI resolution requirements across 
institutions,
414
 potentially leaving less and less flexibility. 
Formalist approaches further emphasize that the general nature of the “resolution strategies” 
for CMGs are to be seen as transitory, as they “should give the necessary direction to the next 
stage of work in the CMGs, which should aim to develop detailed operational resolution plans 
to implement the strategies and to finalize COAGs.”
415
 These Institution-specific cross-border 
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cooperation agreements can be seen, from a formalist point of view, as the actual goal on 
‘ultimate’ stage of the CMG.  
It has been seen that GAL is open to procedural and formal approaches to the legality of 
transnational law. This openness offers an avenue to overcome the bipolarity in legal thinking 
about transnational law.  
4.2. Bi-polar approaches to the legitimacy on transnational 
law 
Thin and thick understandings of the legitimacy of transnational law coexist in contemporary 
legal thinking. Thin approaches like private regulation focus on instances of performance-
based legitimacy and thick approaches like global constitutionalism focus on the issues of 
representation and participation.  
According to thin approaches, the independence of the FSB and the hardening of its standards 
can be justified on the basis of their performance. Legitimacy deficits, according to thin 
approaches, should be addressed through increased accountability and transparency. Thick 
approaches on the other hand focus on the membership of the FSB and participatory elements 
like the consultations that the FSB is conducting and the regional consultative groups
416
 and 
their potential to enhance participation. However, because of the factual absence of republican 
elements in transnational law, thick approaches either remain hypothetical or end up rejecting 
the legitimacy of transnational law altogether.  
Both thin and thick approaches tend to extend beyond the parameter of legitimacy either by 
developing legitimizing procedures with regard to the legality of law as GAL does or by 
referring to the parameter of governance structure to achieve participation. Applying the bi-
polar framework and the limits of the parameters, the debate on the legitimacy of 
transnational law – as distinct from European law – remains limited.  
4.2.1. Thin legitimacy approaches  
The emphasis across the field on the functional nature of transnational law also affects the 
debate about its legitimacy. Thin approaches are predominant and an undertone of 
performance-based legitimacy runs deep in the field because a comparative advantage to state 
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 Clearer performance-based arguments are made in private regulation and 
more general global legal pluralism with references to efficacy and expertise. Beyond these 
performance-based approaches, other references to ‘thin’ legitimacy are made by approaches 
that forward ideals that should provide a ‘thin normative horizon’.
418
  
The undertone of a presupposed legitimacy of transnational law is illustrated by the position 
that its development has exhibited a proven comparative advantage to state law. This 
undertone is dominant in what is referred to as the descriptive force of global legal pluralism 




Closely related to this is the argument that thicker, input-oriented conceptions of legitimacy 
do not work in transnational law. One example that has informed this perspective is the 
Icelandic “No” to the bail-out referendum. It did not change the ‘reality’ of the debt the 
country was facing due to the collapse of its financial sector.
420
 
Beyond the comparative advantage argument, performance-based notions of legitimacy can 
for instance focus on expertise and efficiency as legitimizing elements. Such arguments are 
made in private regulation but also in general global legal pluralism. Efficiency arguments 
make a link to the symbiotic co-evolution of liberal legitimacy discourse with classical, neo-
classical and institutional economics.
421
 Efficiency arguments were for instance important in 
the risk calibration according to Basel II. The reliance on private expertise and industry 
calculation methods was welcomed as an efficiency gain. In the context of the FSB initiatives 
for the resolution of large financial institutions, they focus on the legitimacy of the board 
itself, the importance of its independence from the G20, the value of its technocratic, 
information-based approach and its benefits in comparison of the IMF. 
Approaches focusing on performance-based legitimacy point out the extensive and far 
reaching achievements of the FSB and the limits of other institutions on the national and 
supranational level. The FSB has for instance been referred to as “an experimental, 
purposeful, and energetic institution that deploys the most innovative international financial 
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 According to thin approaches, this has led to an acceptance 
or presupposition of its legitimacy. 
The legitimacy of technocratic governance, as supported by authors like Bach, combines a 
performance-based approach with the notion that expertise is neutral.
423
 In the context of the 
FSB, this approach is illustrated by authors who support its independence and portray its 
function as that of ‘the bureaucratic arm’ of the G20.
424
 The same logic of delegation is 
apparent throughout the FSB and its structure of plenary session, steering committees and 
several more remote standing committees and consultative groups. Similar arguments could 
also be applied to the CMG.  
4.2.2. Thick legitimacy approaches  
Thick approaches to the legitimacy of transnational law either reject the idea of transnational 
law altogether or they acknowledge the limits of the legitimacy of transnational law but aim at 
its enhancement through the fostering of republican elements.
425
  These approaches are 
focused on issues of participation and representation. The transnational law debate here 
entails references to global constitutionalism, but more commonly constitutional pluralism 
and global governance with a democratic focus.
426
  
The new leadership role of the G20 is a topic that has attracted a lot of attention from authors 
interested in the legitimacy of transnational law. The widening of membership and the 
meaning thereof has been looked at from the perspective of legitimacy. The structure it 
developed with the FSB and other actors of economic governance have been looked at with 
‘constitutional’ ideas in mind.
427
 However, criticism remains substantial. Global governance 
approaches that focus on representation point to the importance of the affected population as a 
part of the decision-making.
428
 The enlarged membership of the G20 and the new FSB does 
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not change the fact that they remain exclusive institutions.
429
 Some emerging economies 
including possible relocation jurisdictions for GSIFIS are not involved. With regard to the 
FSB, it has for instance been argued that “At the individual committees in which important 
policies are often debated and drafted, the representation of North Atlantic regulators on FSB 
and Basel committees is still unduly large in relation to these economies’ market share.”
430
 
Furthermore, even if they would represent the entire state community equally, this would not 
guarantee that world citizens would be represented. Sassen, for instance, sees a detachment of 




Ultimately, thick approaches remain limited to the fostering of participation and 
representation in transnational law-making, which makes the parameter of legitimacy 
dependent on other parameters like legality and governance.  
4.3. Bi-polar approaches to politics in transnational law 
The bi-polar debate on the role of politics in transnational law can be structured in approaches 
of de-politicization that aim to limit the effects of politics in transnational law and approaches 
of politicization that propose transnational law as a means to realize public policy objectives.  
Along with other approaches that advocate the neutrality of technocratic governance, private 
regulation and standardization seem the most prone to de-politicization. A different approach 
is taken by global constitutional pluralism advocates, who recommend politicization in order 
to develop a system of checks and balances. In the context of the parameter of legality, GAL 
provides an interesting insight, as its starting point is shared with private regulation and de-
politicization, yet politicization can be part of the transparency and accountability improving 
measures for which GAL strives.  
In the context of the FSB initiative on the resolution of large financial institution, de-
politicized approaches appreciate the FSB and private actor involvement for reasons of 
neutrality. They also portray the governance by the FSB as ‘governance by information’.
432
 
Approaches urging for politicization point out that de-politicized approaches disregard 
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distributive realities and suggest ways of politicizing non-law.
433
 They emphasize the limits of 
de-politicization in the face of private or national power and attempt to find ways for 
transnational law to either organize counterweights to these powers or to find alternative ways 
of limiting them. However, with regard to the FSB, these attempts remain limited in practice. 
4.3.1. De-politicization approaches 
Approaches on de-politicized transnational law insist on a link between expertise and 
neutrality. The rationale is that by focusing on substance, political tensions can be 
overcome.
434
 Such arguments are quite common in private regulation and standardization. 
However, even if only implicitly, de-politicization seems also to be predominate in GAL. 
The debate on privatization and transnationalization of law beyond the state, illustrates the 
actor-focused part of this argument. Certain authors hail self-regulatory undertakings beyond 
the state as an alternative to a situation of political deadlock in international law.
435
 In the 
absence of political state interests, they are meant, together with expert bureaucrats or not, to 
focus solely on issues of substance. Although not an example of a private initiative, the FSB 
itself is often put forward as an example of this, as it is seen as the technocratic arm of policy 
creation and implementation of the G20.
436
   
Furthermore, authors forward benefits of de-politicized tools of transnational law such as 
technical standards and the benefits of private institutions developing them so as their 
expertise can unfold in between the public and the private sphere.
437
 In this context, 
information-based forms of regulation have been forwarded as methods to de-politicize 
transnational law.
438
 The FSB provides an example of information-based governance by the 
information it makes available on its webpage and the rankings in which it presents. This is 
also true in the context of its efforts on GSIFI resolution. The publication of the GSIFI list is 
such an instance. The list is made public on a yearly basis and allows identifying institutions 
that deserve special attention.   
Moreover, with regard to resolvability assessments, a similar logic as with peer review is 
envisaged. “Implementation of all G-SIFI resolution requirements, including resolution 
strategy, planning, resolvability assessments and COAGs, will be reviewed through 
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resolvability assessments conducted by the resolution authorities and CMGs as well as 
through a resolvability assessment process for G-SIFIs that the FSB expects to launch in 
2013.”
439
 This can also be viewed as an instance of government by information, as the reports 
of self-evaluation though the reporting system should induce a constant process of 
improvement through learning and comparing with peers. Feedback is forwarded as a neutral 
vehicle of learning and adapting. It gives a central role of ideas, expertise and communities of 
experts in producing international law.
440
   
4.3.2. Politicization approaches   
Arguments for the politicization of transnationalization on the other hand focus on distributive 
realities and policy goals that transnational law should actively aim to achieve. It is either 
suggested that de-politicization is impossible and simply conceals existing power dynamics or 
that because of its distributional effects transnational law should actively defend policy goals. 
Approaches that forward such arguments can come from social constitutionalism and promote 
notions such as the international community as a global constitutional order or a global civil 
society.  Others representing normative constitutionalism are focusing more on normative 
values, such as justice or the like.
441
 
Parts of the politicization approaches center on the argument that the de-politicization is a 
diversion of distributive realty and should be inverted for this reason.
442
 The limits of this 
neutrality have also been voiced as a reason for the improvement of GAL. Indicators of 
standards for example have been found to never be entirely innocent. 
443  
The examples of the questions in the peer review surveys make this point; they can be 
suggestive and entail certain judgments about possible options. Form her examination of peer 
review questionnaires, Riles suggests that there is a danger of ‘learning sliding into 
surveillance’.
444
 She points out that the questions are highly suggestive. “The specific 
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Kreide observes at the transnational level that “Politics withdraws from the public sphere and 
becomes an issue for commissions, think thanks, lobbying groups, and NGOs, which are not 
transparent and make far-ranging decisions behind closed doors. The protection of the private 
interests of citizens still belongs to a liberal understanding of politics, whereas international 
politics increasingly moves away from this and become private as well.”
446
 De-politicization 
is seen as an exclusion of the public sphere from transnational law-making. This is 
problematic as it is the citizens that ultimately have to bear the undesired consequences of this 
decision-making process. According to Kreide, politics has lost is anchor in the national 
society and now serves the global economy instead.
 447
  
In order to address these power issues a re-politicization or ‘re-embedding’ is suggested.
448
 
For the FSB this could be important in the context of the crisis management groups. Measures 
could be conceived that prevent the de-nationalization of the state agencies of home or host 
jurisdictions. Again, accountability measures according to GAL could provide a way forward, 
for the re-politicization of crisis management groups. 
4.4. Bi-polar approaches to the values of transnational law 
With regard to the values of transnational law, dependent and independent considerations of 
market and social interests compete in legal thinking. Dependent approaches consider social 
interests as contingent on market interest. Independent approaches look at both, market and 
social interests separately from each other.  
Dependent approaches focus on market imperfections and suggest ways in which 
transnational law, private regulation or private law beyond the state in particular, can support 
the market functioning. Independent approaches, are preoccupied with social policy goals and 
suggest ways in which transnational law can protect these goals from the market, either by 
forwarding ideals of justice as in normative constitutionalism or by advocating the 
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In the context of the FSB initiatives on the resolution of large financial institutions, the FSB 
approach of ‘preparedness’ illustrates a dependent approach. On the other hand, proposals for 
a global Volker rule
450
 or a global resolution authority follow independent approaches.  
4.4.1. Dependent consideration of social and market interests approaches 
Approaches considering social interests as dependent on market interests share a focus on 
markets and ways in which transnational law can enhance their functioning through market 
discipline and incentives. Chapter 2, the FSB ‘preparedness’ focus for national resolution 
authorities was forwarded as an example of a dependent approach. In the context of 
transnational law, the FSB also relies on ‘preparedness’ and the dependent consideration of 
social interests on market interests. From this perspective recovery and resolution plans are 
seen to enhance transparency and thereby increase market discipline.  
‘Preparedness’ is also considered in relation to G-SIFIs and transnational law the preferred 
option of FSB. Preparedness means the organization and preparation of structures that will 
allow cooperation between jurisdictions in case a large financial institution faces difficulties. 
It resonates with the ‘problem-solving’ approach of performance-based notions of legitimacy. 
While the formation of resolution authorities seems to be a market intrusive approach, their 
impact is limited to being prepared.  
Furthermore, the strong emphasize on information sharing and transparency aims at coming to 
terms with market imperfection.
451
 This has been discussed in the context of GAL but also 
applies to other approaches of global governance.
452
 Recovery plans are for instance intended 
to include “(i) credible options to cope with a rage of scenarios including both idiosyncratic 
and market wide stress; (ii) scenarios that address capital shortfalls and liquidity pressures; 
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Other than in preparing market participants, the dependent approach is also apparent in the 
notion of ‘protection’ that is forwarded with regard to resolution plans. Within the 
preparedness approach of the FSB to GSIFIs, evidence of independent approach is limited to 
the notion that resolution plans should help identify “(v) actions to protect insured depositors 
and insurance policy holder and ensure the rapid return of segregated client assets.” The 
protection of social interests is hence limited to the interests of depositors and insurance 
holders. 
The dependent approach is also apparent in the choice of ‘preparedness’ over other options 
that are seen to be harmful to the market and therefore also undesirable from a social 
perspective.  
4.4.2. Independent consideration of social and market interests approaches 
The approach of independent consideration of social and market interests in transnational law 
focuses on the role of transnational law in protecting social interests from the market. The aim 
can be the protection of national social interests – such as the prevention of taxpayer bailouts- 
or the protection of global social interests. Approaches suggest either the imposition of limits 
on the market or the shielding of social interest from it. Many global governance approaches 
forward ideals that should be protected in transnational law. Approaches of law and sociology 




Global governance approaches that were focused on justice or similar ideals found plenty of 
examples in the G20 declarations. The aim of the G20 in London was “To launch a 
framework that lays out the policies and the way we act together to generate strong, 
sustainable and balanced global growth.”
455
 This spirit that is also applied to the domain of 
financial regulation more specifically: “We will take action to build a stronger, more globally 
consistent, supervisory and regulatory framework for the future financial sector, which will 
support sustainable global growth and serve the needs of business and citizens.”
456
  
                                                 
453
 FSB, Key Attributes 2013, 11, 11.5. 
454
 Frerich, 2011, p. 67.   
455
 G 20, London Declaration, 2009. 
456
 G 20, London Declaration, 2009. 
Ph.D. Thesis  




In the context of the FSB, the idea of resolvability entails protection of taxpayers.
457
 However, 
according to the independent approach this is limited as for instance RRPs ‘should make no 
assumption that taxpayers’ funds can be relied on to resolve a firm.’ To the dependent 
approach this is not enough. From the notion of interdependence the idea of a mutual 
dependence of the functioning of the market and a flourishing of society is derived.
458
  
With regard to the protection of national social interests, proposals have been forwarded to 
include market-limiting measures in the development of the international standards on large 
financial regulation. There have been such proposals with regard to the Volker rule.
459
 Also 
product limitations have been discussed in the context of transnational law. This option has 
not only been discussed in academia, but “even some prominent market participants such as 
former Citigroup CEO John Reed and former Citigroup Chairman and CEO Sanford Weill, 
have questioned whether the increasingly large size of financial conglomerates contributes to 




Approaches calling for the protection of global social interests have been limited to coupling 
global financial stability to goals like development and equality. Other approaches, 
originating from the contexts of sociology and law, emphasize the interdependence of social 
and market goals and urge interdependent consideration. The markets are seen as dependent 
on the protection of social interest, as otherwise their destructive force undermines the 
creation of wealth as well as their own functioning. 
4.5. Bi-polar approaches to the governance of transnational 
law 
Bi-polar thinking about the governance structure of transnational law opposes assimilated to 
dis-integrated visions. Assimilation approaches emphasize the importance of unifying 
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governance structures across sectorial or national borders according to the challenge of 
transnationalization at hand. Dis-integrated approaches imagine a global system of checks and 
balances like certain approaches of analogical constitutionalism. Alternatively, when focusing 
on singe regulatory entities, they emphasize the dis-integration within them often arguing in 
favor of the persistence of the national transnational divide. Both categories of approaches, 
assimilated and dis-integrated forward arguments about network structures that seem to not fit 
the bi-polar categories.  
The so-called crisis management groups (CMG or colleges), and the increased collaboration 
along corporate lines that they aim to achieve can be seen as an illustration of the assimilated 
approaches that focus on regulatory regimes. The vision of a global system is reflected in the 
context of resolution authorities by approaches that forward ideas of a global centralized 
resolution authority as part of a global system of governance. Approaches for which the 
governance of transnational law remains dis-integrated, insist on the importance of the inter-
state agreements on which CMGs depend and the importance of national judicial systems in 
resolutions of large financial firms.  
Network structures, according to GAL, could allow both, for instance through the 
communication between courts and CMGs. 
4.5.1. Assimilated governance approaches 
Approaches focusing on assimilated governance structure in transnational law are based on 
the idea that in the absence of state borders, transnational law should be developed or 
develops according to the transnational challenge at hand.
461
 This is the idea of functional 





The challenge of large global institutions that are at risk of failure has been perceived as 
crossing sectorial and national boundaries. Assimilated approaches show these entities as 
disregarding national – potentially also sectorial – limitations, thereby asking for host and 
home state coordination and possibly the institutionalization of this coordination. Finally, it is 
hoped to overcome sectorial boundaries more easily than on the national level.  
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The approaches that theorize at the regime level see a ‘functional integration’ that forms 
‘silos’
464
 spanning across national and transnational levels. Functional integration is important 
in private regulation
465





 Crisis Management Groups (CMG) can arguably be seen as an example of 
functional integration along corporate lines. However, when looking at the ways in which 
CMGs are linked to other institutions the distinction between assimilation and dis-integration 
becomes less clear. They are at the same time cross-border and open for inputs by other 
members of the FSB. CMGs have now been put together for all qualified G-SIFIs, producing 
protocols for information sharing in time of crisis and building relationships between 
regulators. They hence combines a realistic – problem focused – approach with a social 
approach implying that “personal relationships are as significant a source of regulatory 
stability and strength as, for example, sanctions against governments for failure to share 
information.”
468
 Again, GAL accounts for the assimilated governance structure while not 
disregarding their interconnection.  
4.5.2. Dis-integrated governance approaches 
Approaches of dis-integrated governance portray assimilation either as undesirable or 
impossible. Assimilation is undesirable for approaches that value a system of checks and 
balances like global constitutionalism and it is impossible for pluralists because of the 
political reality that makes governance structures reflect power structures, or the persistence 
of national vetoes on transnational law.  
Approaches that view assimilation as undesirable put forward an ideal of a global system of 
checks and balances. Global financial market supervision has been portrayed as one global 
system.
469
 The FSB might be used as one institution in such a project. It includes 24 member 
jurisdictions plus the Bank of International Settlements, the World Bank, the International 
Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) the 
                                                 
464
 I have learned to use this term in a seminar on transnational law by Hans Micklitz and Dennis Patterson at the 
European University Institute in Florence in the fall of 2012. 
465
 Examples of such function ‘regimes’ are for instance provided by Bernstein Lisa, “Opting out of the Legal 
System: Extralegal Contractual Relations in the Diamond Industry”, in the Journal of Legal Studies, Vol. 31, No. 
1, 1992, pp. 115-175, Gulbrandsen Lars, H., “Private and Public Governance Interactions: State Influences in 
Forest and Fisheries Certification Programs”, Draft Paper for Workshop on Transnational Business Governance 
Interactions, EUI, May, 2011. McMillan John and Woodruff Christopher, “Private Order Under Dysfunctional 
Public Order”, in the Michigan Law Review, Vol. 98, 1999-2000, pp. 2421-2485 and many others. 
466
 Krisch 2009 and 2010.   
467
 For an overview on System Theory: Glinski, 2011, p. 79. 
468
 Riles, 2013, p.80. 
469
 Alexander, Dhumale and Eatwell, 2006.  
Ph.D. Thesis  




Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on the Global Financial 
System the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB), the International Association 
of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO) and the committee on payment and settlements systems. 
Approaches focusing on power see disintegration as a condition that cannot be overcome.
470
 
Dis-integration through power can follow national borders as suggested by authors 
emphasizing the persistent importance of nation states. It can also reflect private power either 
in respect to state power or in respect to other private power. With regard to resolution 
authorities, legal analysis has mainly focused on the role of national courts. While the FSB 
Attributes aim to overcome judicial conflict, their success in this area is so far limited.
471
  
The Attributes prescribe that home and host states must address the legal and operational 
impediments to cross-border implementation of resolution actions. Furthermore, both have to 
make commitments that specify legal and operational procedures for implementing resolution 
strategies in a cross-border context. These include for example: 
“(i) Procedural requirements and conditions for (a) recognition of the 
transfer to a bridge or third party purchaser of assets and liabilities 
relating to branches of the failed firm in the host jurisdiction; (b) 
recognition of the transfer to a bridge or third party purchaser of assets 
or shares of majority or wholly owned subsidiaries in the host 
jurisdiction; and (c) execution of a bail-in within resolution; 
(ii) Identification of types of financial contracts and assets that cannot 
be transferred with legal certainty (for example, contracts governed by 
the law of a jurisdiction where the firm does not have a physical 




If taken seriously, these commitments narrow the possibilities for legal redress in national law 
and the resolution regimes for national SIFIs. Such limits are justified according to the Key 
Attributes as “the effectiveness of institution-specific cooperation agreements hinges on the 
home and host authorities having the necessary resolution powers in relation to the firms’ 
operation, including the branch operation of a foreign firm.”
473
 However, progress in these 
fields has been limited and as dis-integration approaches suggest, remains unlikely. In the 
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moment of resolution, it is likely that national interests within each state will prevail and 
influence the course of action.
474
  
With regard to this national bias of courts, it has been suggested that an awareness or 
understanding for the common difficulties can be developed though the fostering of 
interactions amongst courts. Tuori for instance suggests that the common practice of 
transnational law will provide ways of overcoming conflict.
475
 Slaughter has developed a 
theory on networks among courts within which attitudes other than the national can developed 
to common problems.
476
  Ladeur’s approach combines the self-administering tendency of 
GAL with network structures. According to him the evolution of national and transnational 
administrative law allows for a heterearchical form of accountability and legitimation,
477
 
potentially allowing for the combination of assimilated and dis-integrated governance 
structures.  
4.6. Bi-polar approaches to the polity of transnational law  
Non-state and state arguments oppose supranational and national conceptions of the polity of 
transnational law. Supranational approaches propose a form of polity for transnational law 
that is different from the national one. Often, the polity is functionally defined either a global 
polity developing in the face of a global challenge or a partial one in view of a specific 
challenge. National approaches forward a national conception based on sameness or identity 
and on these grounds support the fostering of these elements on the supranational level, 
rejecting the possibility of a supranational polity altogether or insisting on the priority of the 
national polity.  
In the context of the FSB, supranational approaches point to the global interest of the financial 
stability of the global financial market. The coordination needed between supranational 
standard setters as well as the dealing with systemically important financial firms that are 
global are forwarded as issues that concern a polity bigger than the national one. This polity 
can either be partially developed according to functional integration or it can be general 
responding to a global interest in financial stability. Nationalist approaches either reject the 
idea of polity for transnational law and transnational law beyond inter-governmentalism or 
                                                 
474
 Attinger, 2011, p. 16.  
475
 Tuori Kaarlo, “Towards a Theory of Transnational Law”, Conference Draft Paper, Helsinki, 26.08.2010.  
476
 Slaughter, 2005.  
477
 Ladeur, 2011, p. 1. 
Ph.D. Thesis  




they insist on the priority of national legal orders over transnational law in the name of the 
national polity.  
4.6.1. Supranational polity approaches 
For supranational approaches transnational law develops as a reaction to the demands of a 
polity beyond the state. This polity can be partial, as in the context of functional integration  - 
private regulation or more general legal pluralism – or it can be all-encompassing. The FSB’s 
objectives are defined according to a functional but global polity. When considering the 
declarations of its ‘mother’ institution the G20, even the idea of a general global civil society 
to be served is apparent.  
The objectives of the FSB are defined as “in the interest of global financial stability.”
478
 This 
global financial stability is widely accepted as for instance it is said that: the systemic impact 
assessment aim at determine the likely impact of a firm’s failure and resolution on global and 
national financial systems and real economies.
479
 Authors disagree on the polity of regimes 
that develop according to functional integration. Private regulation approaches seem to 
disregard polities largely because participation in the regime is voluntary but binding. 
Approaches of private law beyond the state have been more ambitions or worried about 
polities. Caliess and Zumbansen for instance turn to Held and integrate an idea of affectedness 
into their approach. Teubner has formulated the impact of functional integration on the larger 
public and its partial disregard for it as the dark side of functional integration.  
With regard to the FSB, the crisis led to a very wide formulation regarding a possible polity 
for the FSB. At the London Summit the G20 declared for instance:  “a crisis which has 
deepened since we last met, which affects the lives of women, men, and children in every 
country, and which all countries must join together to resolve. A global crisis requires a global 
solution.” In the context of the FSB, the definition of “GSIFI” supports a similar large 
approach: “institutions of such size, market importance, and global interconnectedness that 
their distress or failure would cause significant dislocation in the global financial system and 
adverse economic consequences across a range of countries.”
480
 
The FSB has also been criticized in the name of supranational polities. The demonstrations 
spurred by the financial crisis and the high level response to it have been forwarded as 
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evidence for an emerging global civil society that demands participation in transnational law-
making. At the same time, these demonstrations can also be seen as addressing a national law- 
maker.  
4.6.2. National polity approaches 
National approaches insist on a polity for transnational law that is based on a polity similar to 
the national one. This is for instance the case in the ambitious approaches to global 
constitutionalism that forward an idea of world law.
481
 Other national approaches reject the 
idea of a supranational polity altogether or at least support the primacy of the national polity 
for law-making.
482
 The effects of transnational law-making are felt nationally and the social 
fabric on which a polity is build is limited to the national context. Cross-border initiatives are 
only a marginal part of the general effort of the national polity to take up transnational 
challenges and are mainly targeted against regulatory arbitrage.
483
 
National approaches emphasize the role of the FSB in improving the national resolution 
authorities. With only up to 3 KAs aimed at cross-border resolutions, these approaches have 
strong arguments. Regarding the FSB mandate further evidence can be found as it is said that 
the FSB will “promote member jurisdictions’’ implementation of greed commitments, 




Cross-border components of resolution regimes can indeed be portrayed as secondary: The 
SIFI Framework sets out recommendations for improving the authorities’ ability to resolve 
such institutions in an orderly manner, without exposing tax-payers to loss, while maintaining 
continuity of their vital economic functions. This may require changes to resolution regimes 
and tools at national levels, and legislative changes to enable resolution authorities to co-
ordinate in cross-border resolutions.
485
 
In the same vein criticisms to the FSB are also voiced by groups that advocate a closure of the 
national regulatory system in the face of transnationalization.  
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4.7. Conclusion: Mixed Approaches to Legality, Politics and 
Governance but persisting bi-poliarty in the other 
parameters 
With regard to transnational law the framework has facilitated a distinction between 
approaches that follow the non-state/state distinction and approaches that in some instances 
succeed in overcoming it. GAL appears to be one of these approaches as it mixes elements 
and manages to find compromises between private regulation and global constitutionalism. 
Similar to the debate in European law, overcoming bi-polarity seems easier in parameters of 
legality, politics and governance than in legitimacy, values and polity.  
Global administrative law, as one of the mixed approaches is a more promising means to 
overcome non-state/state tensions. Its procedural starting point in combination with the 
ambition to improve law-making though administrative principles leads to a compromise 
between procedural and formal legality. Similarly, it supports technocratic governance as well 
as allowing for participation, thereby providing for a possible compromise between de-
politicization and politicization. Finally, through network structures, GAL combines 
assimilated and dis-integrated governance structures. Yet GAL does not provide any 
satisfactory answers to questions of legitimacy, values and polity. The analysis has shown that 
GAL again attempts to produce compromises, yet in these parameters they remain mere 
‘piecemeal improvements.’ On the other hand, the approach to transnational law at the end of 
the spectrum -global constitutionalism and private regulation- reproduced the non-state/state 
tension in each parameter of law.  
On this basis Chapter 5 will outline a way of structuring the transnational law approaches 
according to bi-polarity: approaches that focus on law-making can overcome bi-polarity in 
legality, politics and governance. Approaches that provide answers on the legitimacy, values 
and polity of transnational law re-produce bi-polarity.  
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5. Conclusions from the framework: a plea for an approach to 
transnational law beyond bi-polarity  
This concluding Chapter will put one interpretation of the bi-polar analysis of law and 
transnationalization forward and develop its own starting point to think about transnational 
law. The outcome from the analysis is that transnational law remains ultimately limited by bi-
polarity. Hence, I will conclude with a plea for an approach to transnational law beyond bi-
polarity. 
The call to overcome bi-polarity is based on the analysis in this thesis so far. While the 
distinction is to a certain extent artificial, I will present the different insights according to 
Chapter 2, 3 and 4, differentiation between the legal contexts of law and transnationalization. 
From Chapter 2 and the analysis in national law I will draw evidence for the predominance of 
bi-polarity in legal thinking and link it to the importance of state institutions in law. Bi-
polarity in legal thinking will be portrayed as a consequence or symptom of the co-existence 
of organizational ideals in legal thinking, inherited according to Kennedy, from two past 
globalizations of legal thought. This co-existence of organizational principles makes law 
dependent on a managerial effort that is provided by state institutions, such as the courts. With 
the analysis of the first Chapter, bi-polarity therefore becomes an index of the dependence of 
law on the state and hence allows us to formulate the challenge of transnational law as 
overcoming bi-polarity.  
By suggesting that there is a difference between the six parameters of law, European law will 
be presented as taking up an intermediate position between national law and transnational 
law. In the parameters of legality, politics and governance, a management between the 
organizational principles can be achieved and bi-polarity can be overcome in European law-
making. On the other hand, in the parameters of legitimacy, values and polity, the limitations 
of European law as a model for transnational law become apparent, as bi-polarity cannot be 
overcome and the management between organizational principles depends on European 
institutions like the European Court of Justice. 
Finally, in the context of transnational law this distinction between management through law-
making and persisting co-existence between organization principles, allows one to distinguish 
between the approaches of transnational law. Approaches like GAL focus on law-making and 
hence the parameters of legality, politics and governance. They overcome bi-polarity and 
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reach beyond the state. However, this focus on law making limits them regarding the 
parameters of legitimacy, values and polity. There they ultimately lean again towards the 
creation of state-like institutions such as conflict resolution mechanisms and such as proposals 
of the legalization of global governance.  
On the other hand, approaches that legitimacy, values and polities beyond the state, forward 
proposals of a law beyond the state, yet remain as such also always attackable. System theory 
forwards a position on legitimacy, by suggesting that in a world of functionally integrated 
systems, the common understanding of legitimacy will be limited to a normative horizon, 
thereby forwarding a thin notion of legitimacy for transnational law. Similarly, private 
regulation takes a stance with regard to the values of transnational law; the values are market 
dependent visions of social interests. Finally, global constitutionalism takes a stance with 
regard to the polity of transnational law.  
However the ‘stances’ these approaches take are not definite. The choice between a bottom-
up or top-down perspective that they make haunts them and the bi-polar tension re-appears. 
Global constitutionalism cannot accommodate the pluralism that exists beyond the state. 
System theory risks to betraying its own premises when attempting to conceptualize the 
relationship of the system to its environment, and private regulation struggles to account for 
cooperation that is not guided by interests. In the part on transnational law, this argument will 
be sustained with reference to system theory. Ultimately, the contention of this thesis is that 
transnational law has to address bi-polarity. Arguing on either side just reinforces the tension 
and makes law ultimately dependent on an external management effort by institutions.  
5.1. National law: Bi-polarity and dependence on state 
institutions 
Bi-polar arguments compete in almost all parameters of national law. I am presenting this 
persistence of bi-polar arguments as a symptom of what Kennedy in his “Three Globalizations 
of Legal Thought” termed ‘the co-existence of organizational principles’.
486
 The difficulty 
that became apparent in the parameter of values hence has deeper consequences as the co-
existence of organizational principles means that legal thinking is dominated by two 
competing rationales that once. While each in its time provided guidance to legal thinking, 
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through their co-existence law is made dependent on state institutions. This state-dependence 
of legal thinking through co-existing organizational provides an important insight for the 
study of transnational law. Yet before discussing these insights, attention must be given to the 
role of courts that exemplifies this dependence. In the following, I will revisit the competing 
bi-polar arguments and the importance of courts in finding compromises that follows from 
this competition in all six parameters of law. 
The important role of courts will provide the basis for the analysis of European law; that there 
is a difference between parameters and that in legality, politics and governance bi-polarity can 
be overcome, while in legitimacy, values and polity it persists. The discussion of the insights 
from the Chapter on European law and transnationalization will hence suggest that the 
compromises that law-making finds between the competing poles can remain superficial, and 
leaves it to the courts to strike a balance between the organizational principles. This gives 
judges a lot of power and hence also an exposure to the criticism of judicial activism.  
5.1.1. Bi-polarity in legal thinking: the co-existence of organizational principles 
and transnational law 
In the following I will suggest that the quite large suitability of the bi-polar framework for 
national and European law comes from the fact that two organizational principles co-exist in 
contemporary law. Kennedy demonstrates that the history of legal thought has left behind two 
competing normative ideals that depend on a managerial effort by the state. This has 
important consequences also for law in the context of transnationalization as in the absence of 
the state, dichotomic analysis is at risk of reproducing the competition of normative ideals. I 
will therefore revisit his argument and extend it to the transnational context. 
Current legal thinking does not provide a final normative stand in view of the relationship 
between non-state trend of transnationalization and the state origin of law and instead 
lawmaking engages in a managing exercise that resembles “a confrontation at the level of 
legislation or case law between CLT and the social.”
487
 Financial market supervision, as an 
institution inherited from the times of the rise of the social can be seen as an illustration of 
this struggle for a pragmatic managerial effort.  
The first globalization of legal thought was dominated by the formation and dissemination of 
CLT. Kennedy summarizes the organizational principle of this epoch as ‘the will theory’. An 
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organizational principle is understood as a logic that transcends all legal thinking of its time, a 
mode of thought with a conceptual vocabulary, organizational schemes, modes of reasoning 
and characteristics arguments.
488
 Kennedy does not distinguish the organizational principles 
by their take on a sphere beyond the state. However, attributing the approaches that embrace 
the non-state tendency to the will theory is justified. The “will theory” is fundamentally based 
on the notion that government should protect the rights of legal persons in a way to permit 
them realizing their own wills, restricted only by the attempt and right of others to do the 
same.
489
 This logic can surely be extended to the engagement in activities beyond the state. 
The individualism that provided the normative ideal of CLT, suggests embracing the non-state 
tendency of transnationalization and securing it as a further area in which individuals can 
realize their will. It is no longer protection from the state that is needed, as in the national 
context but the conquest of an additional space should be left to individuals so that they can 
realize their free will. In this sense the neoclassical rationale that is for instance apparent in 
private regulation can be traced back to this dichotomy.  
The legal thinking of this third globalization was a counteraction, yet it could not break as 
fundamentally with its predecessor as the social could. It had to reconcile the call for cutting 
back the social for the sake of economic growth. Yet, at the same time elements inherited by 
the social persisted
490
 and with it also the need to engage with an extended range of issues and 
interests. Similarly, with regard to the external component, the institutions of the social are in 
conflict with the neoliberal support for liberalization around the globe. With regard to 
transnationalization, it therefore makes sense to attribute the insistence of state-like law to the 
era of the social. Transnationalization bears the risk of dis-embedding the social and the 
resistance to that implies clinging to state-like law.
491
 The purposeful role for law goes 
together with high participatory standards of thick legitimacy, the independent consideration 
of social interests and potentially the overall need to protect national social institutions from 
interference. While the will theory supports the procedural legality of law in order to allow for 
the flexibility needed in the complex and fast evolving cross-border setting, formal legality is 
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attributed to the social because it allows protecting (welfare) state institutions from these 
developments.  
Interpretations of the financial and economic crisis of the late 2000’s as a consequence of the 
crowding out of the social institution of deposit insurance and regulation of the financial 
sector by neo-classical liberalization and the shadow banking system can be seen as an 
illustration of the difficulties of the role of law in this managerial effort. With regard to the 
example of the failure of large financial institutions, the will theory would suggest leaving 
these institutions to themselves and their failure to bankruptcy law. The FSB approach of a 
resolution regime contradicts this logic and on the contrary, it gives law a purposeful role of 
providing for a failure that is -hopefully- less painful for society.  The institution of resolution 
regimes can be seen as an institution of the social era, instituted as a counter reaction to the 
cruelty of individualism. Then while not instituted at the time, they are a consequence of the 
deposit insurance that was introduced after the crisis of the 1930s.
492
 They are therefore part 
of the effort to give law its right place, as a purposive activity and regulatory mechanism
493
 
and an example of the strong institutional component
494
 of the social.  
The difficulties of handling the failure of large financial institutions can hence be put in the 
context of contemporary legal thinking that struggles to maintain the institutions form the 
social despite increasing market pressures.
495
 The competition of non-state and state 
arguments – the bi-polarity of the debate in national law – can therefore be understood in the 
larger context of co-existing organizational principles in contemporary legal thinking.  
In the following, this struggle of contemporary legal thinking will be illustrated by revisiting 
the competing arguments on national law and transnationalization in the six parameters of 
law. It will become apparent that while compromises are found in most parameters they 
remain superficial and ultimately depend on a managerial effort. The importance of the courts, 
will support this argument. As compromises in law-making and political process remain 
contestable, it is left to the judges to strike a balance between co-existing organizational 
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principles. No wonder hence that they are referred to as the ‘heroes’
496
 of contemporary legal 
theory.  
5.1.2. Management through state institutions: the example of courts 
With regard to national law, one insight from the framework is that while there is a strong 
tension between both poles of bi-polar analysis in almost all parameters of law, there is also 
an impressive ability to deal with these tensions. In the context of academic writing, the large 
discussion on the public-law/private-law distinction can be seen as evidence of this ability. On 
a practical level, courts do have an important role in allowing law to overcome or ‘administer’ 
the tension that transnationalization caused throughout the parameters of law. In the 
following, the analysis of national law and transnationalization will be examined to find 
examples of such court practice.  
The debate on whether to resolve large financial firms through bankruptcy law or a specific 
resolution process illustrates this point. As the FSB peer review report illustrates, in most 
countries the practical process consists of a compromise between the two that heavily relies 
on courts. In the following, I will look again at the different parameters of law and show how 
courts are important in their regard. 
Legality: Bi-polar analysis of the legality of national law in the face of transnationalization 
has shown the struggle of legalization and codification to keep up with procedural 
developments as well as the limits of formal law to cope with the speed and dynamics of 
cross-border interaction. At the same time, law-making is surprisingly capable of finading 
compromises in moments of conflicts between non/state and state tensions. The peer review 
report has for instance shown that most resolution regimes combine elements of bankruptcy 
law with the possibility for public interest intervention by state institutions.
497
 Nevertheless, 
the importance that is attributed to courts suggests that these compromises in law-making 
might be superficial. This will be further discussed in the context of European law. However, 
it can at least be said that in the context of national law and transnationalization courts play an 
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important role for the legality of law, be it only in finding the right balance between formal 
law and procedural law that is developed in the heat of transnational emergences.  
Legitimacy: In the parameter of legitimacy, the analysis of national law and 
transnationalization has shown that there is a tension between output legitimacy and input 
legitimacy. On one hand, the ability of parliaments or, in the of direct democracy, also the 
people, to grapple with, understand, and ultimately solve issues of transnationalization in a 
good way is in doubt. On the other hand, the profound impact that transnationalization can 
have on people’s lives demands heightened participatory standards. As these tensions are hard 
to solve, courts are crucial for the safeguarding of individual rights that might risk being 
scarified in the interests of the common good. At the same time, courts might also be one of to 
the fora where those hurt by transnationalization can seek reparations. The analysis of 
resolution regimes has provided illustrations of these questions of legitimacy. On one hand 
they are set up in the interests of the republican common good.
498
 On the other hand, political 
processes can at all times interfere with set up bankruptcy proceedings in the name of the 
common good.
499
 Courts have in any case played an important role on one hand for the 
safeguarding of individual rights but also to hear claims of the injured ones.
500
    
Politics: With regard to politics, the bi-polar analysis showed how efforts of de-politicization 
through technocratic governance, privatization and strong independent agencies exists in an 
environment where legal reform or emergency measures remain at all times possible and of 
course highly political. The clash between the worry of conserving the neutrality of law and 
the will to make law responsible for it in the face of its distributional impact is to a large part 
taken up by the continental public-law/private-law debate. While approaches opting for an 
abolition of the distinction are forwarded,
501 
a majority of authors opts for a middle way 
suggesting that, even if the distinction has lost its descriptive accuracy, it can be sustained if 
the conceptual framework allows for a certain mutual openness.
502 
The association between 
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state, public interest, and private actor and private interest remains at least on the theoretical 
level intact but depends largely on a management capacity of the state legitimized through the 
political process. Hoffmann-Riem forwards a functional approach, according to which the 
interplay of private law and public law can be understood as orders of mutual assistance 
(Gegenseitige Auffangordungen).
503
 The typology of this assistance ranges from normative, 
institutional to judicial mechanisms. While subject to a lot of controversy, courts are given an 
important role in finding a working together between private law and public law.  
Values: Bi-polar analysis has also shown how transnationalization emphasises the tensions 
between the values in national law. Enabling of markets as well as the protection of the 
society from them are advocated with regard to cross-border interactions. While the role of 
the European Court is being discussed a lot,
504
 other authors such as Wai, claim that the 
national court remains the most effective and legitimate forum of dispute settlement.
505
 This 
forum of contestation is urgently required as “contestation is needed to address governance 
gaps in this world where many problems are globalised but political and legal forums remain 
primarily situated in the nation-state, where national governments tend to be parochial in their 
regulatory focus, and where international institutions such as the WTO are only weakly 
empowered to address the full range of cross-border problems that arise in a global 
society.”
506
  This implies that their judiciary carries an important role in safeguarding these 
values in the application of the law.  
Governance: The bi-polar analysis demonstrated that with regards to governance structure, 
transnationalization has led to efforts of creating assimilated governance structures that reach 
across sectorial and national boundaries and that are able to respond to the challenge that does 
not respect either boundary. The formation of crisis management colleges is just one example 
that has been touched upon. At the same time, it became clear that for a number of reasons 
that range from path dependency, worries about checks and balances and of course 
nationalism, dis-integration of governance in national law is bound do persist.  The potential 
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of courts to function as a link between that can act in the national context with the 
transnational in mind that applies in the context of values is important also in the context of 
governance structure. Between disintegrated and assimilated governance structure networks 
of courts seem a promising alternative.  
Polity: With regard to polity, different approaches have been forward regarding which polity 
shall prevail. Are there interests of a supranational polity to be followed? Or do the citizens 
that are strongly involved in the conduct of transnational business form a constituency that 
should be paid tribute in the context of national law and transnationalization? In the context of 
resolution authorities: how important are banks and what is their relationship to the 
‘taxpayers’? These and other questions are troubling for the polity aspect of national law. Yet, 
as the analysis showed in Chapter 2, often these questions are not addressed in the law and it 
is left to courts to strike a balance. According to Attinger the crisis of the late 2000s has 
shown that courts often act as guardians of the interests of the national polity.
507
 At other 
times they are called upon to find the right balance between the interests of a transnational 
and a national polity. 
Throughout the parameters of law, legal thinking in national law remains very bi-polar. At the 
same time, state institutions like courts are important to provide for a compromise between 
the non-state and state actors. This importance of courts suggests that law-making only 
superficially addresses the non-state/state tension and leaves the ultimate decision to courts. 
Transnationalization can hence be seen as an enhancement of the trend that can be observed 
with the co-existence of organizational principles.  
5.1.3. National law: The limits of overcoming the co-existence of organizational 
principles in law-making and the importance of state institutions 
With the analysis of national law and transnationalization I am suggesting that there is an 
important link between the co-existence of organizational ideals and the role state institutions 
like courts play in the context of transnationalization. This thought provides a bridge to the 
discussion of European Law. There, this link becomes even clearer; the criticism the 
European Court of Justice faces when applying this law suggests that the accommodation has 
remained superficial.   
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The co-existence of organizational principles, inherited from two previous globalizations of 
legal thinking, forces law to find a compromise. Transnationalization can be seen as an 
additional layer of this challenge. The organizational principles of both classical legal 
thinking and the social-legal aspects, entail an implication for transnationalization. 
Individualism can be seen to be supportive or encouraging of the non-state tendency, while 
the social implies a protection from this tendency and hence an inclination to the state.  
Understanding transnationalization along the lines of competing organizational principles also 
explains the importance of courts in this context. They yet again have to strike the usual 
balance when organizational principles need to be administered. The incorporation of FSB 
Attributes into national law combines procedural and formal law-making, de-politicization as 
well as politicization and dis-integrated and integrated governance structure. However, 
ultimately a tension remains. The importance of courts and other state institutions is at the 
same time indicative of this tension, as it is a consequence thereof. Because the co-existence 
is not to be overcome, ultimately a balance needs to be struck. Striking this balance cannot be 
done by law itself but depends on an external decision-making that remains debatable. It is 
along these lines that the discussion about the role of courts in contemporary legal thinking 
can be explained. In the co-existence of organizational principles, their decisions ultimately 
strike the balance between organizational principles always at risk of blurring the line 
between judicial decision taking and judicial activism. 
Transnationalization accentuates this difficulty; because of its complexity and speed it 
challenges the established role of state institutions and heightens the pressure on the 
legitimacy standards for this exercise. The importance of state institutions in the context of 
co-existing organizational principles becomes illustrative of the dependence of the law on 
state institutions. On a more general level, it illustrates the dependence of law on institutions 
and contexts for its legitimacy. This argument will be pursued in the next part on European 
law. 
Similarly to the national context, law-making in the EU can quite well accommodate the co-
existence of organizational principles. However, with regard to the other parameters, the 
legitimacy challenges are more accentuated. This is so, because in the European context, the 
dependence on institutions for accommodation is more precarious, as the European 
institutions themselves are less established and more vulnerable to doubts regarding their 
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decision. In the next part I will show how the debate on European law and 
transnaitonalization can be structured accordingly 
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5.2. European law: differences between parameters  
With regard to Chapter 3 on European law, the insight is that there is a difference between 
parameters. While within certain parameters compromises between both poles are found, 
within others the debate remains bi-polar. With reference to Kennedy, I will distinguish 
between the parameters of legality, politics and governance that are evidencing the praxis of 
contemporary law-making, and legitimacy, values and polity as the theoretical backdrop that 
is still unsettled by the co-existence of organizational principles. In law making, bi-polarity 
can be overcome, yet questions of legitimacy, values and polity remain unresolved and the 
coexistence of organizational principles cannot be overcome.  
First, the examples discussed in Chapter 3 in the parameters of legality, politics and 
governance will be looked at as illustrations of contemporary law-making according to 
Kennedy resulting from the mixture of neoformalism and policy analysis. The parameters of 
legality, politics and governance will illustrate the actual practice of the law of the third 
globalization that results from the “un-synthesized coexistence of transformed elements of 
CLT with transformed elements of the social.”
508
 The way in which the difference between 
organizational principles can be overcome in law-making and the self-organizational forces it 
hints to, will link with the discussion on Global Administrative Law and global governance in 
transnational law in Chapter 5.3. 
Next, I will show that in the parameters of legitimacy, values and polity, the debate on 
European law remains still largely bipolar. These parameters reflect the theoretical backdrop 
of law-making that is still dominated by the co-existence of two organizational principles. As 
the look at Scharpf and Walkers’ approaches has suggested, a rapprochement between the 
poles is dependent on combinations between the national and the European level. As in the 
national context, the compromises between the two poles in the parameters of legitimacy, 
values and polity, ultimately depend on institutions; bi-polar argumentation persists and is 
only silenced by European political-solutions.   
Ultimately, European law does not provide a blueprint for transnational law. Instead, as bi-
polarity can be overcome in law-making but persists in the theoretical backdrop, the 
difference between parameters allows us to classify approaches to European law in four 
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categories; authors of the first category focus on law-making.
509
 Two and three forward non-
state and state visions
510




5.2.1. Legality, politics and governance: accommodation between organizational 
ideals in law-making   
With regard to these three parameters the analysis in Chapter 3 shows that the making of 
European law moved beyond the bi-polar distinctions. The legality of European law combines 
formal as well as procedural elements. European law-making allows for de-politicization as 
well as politicization and its governance has the potential to integrate dis-integrated as well as 
assimilated governance structures.  
Kennedy tries to make sense of contemporary law-making. He observes an unlikely mix 
between neoformalism and policy analysis that combines a mode of deduction within a 
system of positive law with the balancing of conflicting considerations.
512
  
In the following the three first parameters in European law will be looked at more closely and 
the developments across bi-polar categories will be interpreted as the ability within law-
making to overcome the non-state/state tension by itself.  
With its combination of three elements, the legality of European law merges procedural and 
formal characteristics and thereby allows for a compromise between the non-state/state 
tensions in this parameter of law. The elements to determine the legality of European law are 
a legal basis, proportionality and subsidiarity. From the outset it seem that the requirement a 
legal basis provides for the neoformalism while proportionality and subsidiarity are tests that 
come from policy analysis. Yet at the same time, the two are even more intertwined. For 
instance with regard to the requirement of a legal basis, the analysis in Chapter 3 has shown 
that even within this requirement policy analysis is relevant. Article 114 TFEU provides a 
justification on grounds of an approximation effect and the objective of furthering market 
integration. Thereby including procedural elements in the analysis of the formal requirements. 
The potential centralization the SRM achieves and  the enhancing of the harmonization by the 
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BRRD are therefore looked at in the context of the legal basis exam.
513
 Yet also with regard to 
the ‘procedural’ or policy analysis requirements a blurring occurs. The requirement of 
proportionality, from the outset a procedural requirement, puts a limit onto the consideration 
of functional developments, by putting them into the context of competing individual 
rights.
514
 The balancing or weighing of one against the other accommodates between 
conflicting values and therefore also organizational principles. The functional development is 
hence put in context of the general framework of European Law.
515
 While proportionality has 
acquired a very important place in law-making in general and also explicitly in the context of 
the European Union, it is suggested that the practical relevance of the subsidiarity principle 
never met the expectation of politicians and theorists.
516
 However, it does add another 
condition as action is only justified at the Union level if it is better suited than at the national 
or local level. This condition hence mirrors the considerations made under the legal basis 
requirement. The legality of European law combines a managerial effort of proportionality 
and subsidiarity with the formalistic reference to a legal basis, thereby combining formal and 
procedural characteristics of legality.  
The analysis in Chapter 3 has shown that regarding to politics European law-making 
combines politicization and de-politicization. According to Kennedy, contemporary law-
making strives to combine a pragmatic approach - apparent in in the economic image of a 
pragmatically regulated market
517
 – with the needs of the civil society. The European Union, 
on the one hand aimed at the development of an internal market, yet at the same time 
confronted with demands of a civil society, can be looked at as an illustration of Kennedy’s 
analysis. The variety of ways in which European law-making allows for de-politicization as 
well as politicization can be seen as an effort to satisfy the needs of a pragmatically regulated 
market as well as the ones of its civil society. The efforts to strengthen the independence of 
the European Central Bank have provided an example of de-politicization, as they limited the 
power of the Council. At the same time, they constitute a politicization as they involved 
national representatives instead of Commission bureaucrats. The example of the SRM is 
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limited, as European law-making in other domains provides for more politicization options for 
the civil society. In the field of financial market regulation, these remain limited so far. 
However, in general, while debatable, European law-making has been opened up to civil 
society participation.
518




Regarding the governance structure of European law making has a potential to integrate 
assimilated as well as disintegrated governance structures. The Lamfalussy procedure, 
developing the context of the Financial Service Action Plan, can be viewed as an 
illustration.
520 
It has been presented as an attempt to improve and adapt the legislative process 
in the EU to the fast moving, global capital markets, a multilevel legislative structure was 
introduced that at the same time increased the level of specialization within committees and 
spread out responsibility amongst them.
521
 The functional assimilation has been combined 
with a disintegration across levels, thereby establishing fora for the exchange between 
Member State and the formation of (technocratic) consensus, while at the same time 
maintaining a system of checks and balances.
522
 Supervision of banks long remained exempt 
from these efforts.
523
 Yet the structure of the new single resolution mechanism also combines 
assimilated and disintegrated governance structures, as it assimilates national representatives 
in its boards while at the same time, it involves different European bodies in the decision 
making. The executive session of the Single Resolution Board is composed by a chair and 
four independent full-time member.
524
 Additionally, representatives of home states, and where 
applicable host states, participate in concrete cases and even authorities of non-participating 
Member States shall be invited.
525
 At the same time, when a bank is actually placed under 
resolution, the ultimate appreciation of whether the resolution action is in the public interests 
falls to the Commission and then even to the Council.
526
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In the parameters of legality, politics and governance, European law moved beyond the bi-
polar discussion. In various ways, the opposing poles of the non-state/state tension have been 
integrated and combined within law-making. However, in the parameters of legitimacy, 
values and polity, similar combinations have not been developed. Instead the law-making 
parameters are charged to stretch towards providing solutions also for the parameters of 
legitimacy, values and polity. Harbo for instance suggests that with the proportionality 
principle allows to combine the “liberal rights-based constitutional rationality with a strong 
commitment to a welfare state.”
527
 Yet, such stretching is not enough to address the questions 
of the parameters of legitimacy, values and polity.  
The next part will summarize how in these parameters the debate remains bi-polar. Then, in 
conclusion on this part about European law, I will forward that because of this mismatch 
between a compromise in law-making but a persisting disaccord with regard to legitimacy, 
values and polity, European law cannot serve as a blueprint for transnational law. Instead, it 
reiterates the difficulty faced in national law, yet due to the weaker institutional 
legitimatization, the tension between organizational principles appears more dramatically. 
However, the difference between parameters provides a way of structuring the European law 
debate.  
5.2.2. Legitimacy, values and polity: Coexisting organizational ideals in 
European law and importance of European institutions  
With regard to the parameters of legitimacy, values and polity, the bi-polar analysis of 
European law is very similar to the one in national law. The debate does not extend beyond 
bi-polar categories. On a theoretical level, the only rapprochement between the poles is 
achieved through multilevel arguments, for instance Scharpf’s legitimacy intermediation.
528
 
Otherwise a part of the non-state/state tension is bound to remain, as seen with Walker’s 
notion of polity legitimacy that ultimately depends on the definition of the European polity 
somewhere between non-state and state.
529
 On a practical level, institutions, in this case the 
European Court of Justice, are therefore important as they ultimately decide between co-
existing organizational principles. The analysis of Kennedy still applies; also in European 
law, the remains of classical legal thinking are competing with the social. The struggle of the 
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national courts in striking a balance between the formalistic application of law and giving law 
a purposeful social policy interpretation applies to the European Court of Justice as well. The 
Court is of course, first and foremost operating in a vertical tension, the one between the 
European level and the national level. Yet, as the extent of the competences of the EU is 
bound to a market integrating logic, the tension between Union and member state at least 
partly reproduces the tension between the organizational principles inherited from the area of 
classical legal thinking and the social. Multilevel arguments can attempt to take on this 
tension, and thereby constitute one of the categories of European legal thinking that I will 
forward in conclusion.  
 
The debate on the legitimacy of European law is split into thin approaches and thick 
approaches; combinations of the two are limited to multilevel arguments. The same is true in 
the parameters of values and polity. There are either state-like visions of European law 
forwarded or non-state visions. Compromises combine the two levels, and thereby do not in 
fact overcome the non-state/state distinction. 
With regard to legitimacy, Scharpf and Walker, are two of the leading authors that will be 
discussed here. On a very simplified level it can be said that they are either relying on ideas of 
a division of labour between the European level and the Member State level (Scharpf and 
Walker) or at the end of the day remain stuck with the non-state/state tension (Walker). 
Scharpf forwards the idea of a legitimacy intermediation in a multilevel European polity. 
According to him, the lack of republican legitimacy on European level has to be made up for 
at the national level. Legitimacy intermediation works through a two-step compliance 
between the Member State level and a European level. If these legitimating relationships are 
cut or undermined, the legitimacy of the Union is at peril.
530
 From the perspective of Scharpf, 
the SRM is problematic – it does not entail the necessary elements for republican legitimacy, 
yet at the same time it undercuts the provision of legitimacy at the national level because it 
ties the hands of national institutions to provide for financial market supervision or resolution 
of financial institutions.  
Walker, on the other hand, disaggregates legitimacy according to the characteristics of the 
political entity in question. He distinguishes between performance legitimacy, regime 
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 and polity legitimacy. His approach is multilevel in the sense that he attributes 
performance and regime legitimacy to the European Union, yet it faces more difficulty with 
regard to the polity legitimacy. He holds that it will depend on the definition of the European 
Polity itself. In these ‘deep waters’ he observes that it is “far easier and far less controversial 
to conceive of the EU in terms of what it is not rather than what it is.”
532
 The non-state/state 
tension is hence just shifted from the parameter of legitimacy to the one of polity. For the 
polity - similarly suffering from the impossibility to overcome the non-state/state tension – 
Walker disaggregates the idea of a ‘political community’. He proposes for ‘political’ a 
measure of autonomous political authority and for ‘community’ a social dimension, sense of 
“belonging to” and “identification with.”
533
 The polity remains a matter of degree not able to 
quiet “skeptical questions, most forcefully put by state constitutionalists in legal discourse and 
by liberal integovernmentalists in international relations,”
534
 hence not overcoming the non-
state/state tension.  
The tension with regard to polities is illustrated in the context of the SRM. On one hand the 
BRRD is directed at the national resolution regimes, hence implying a national notion of 
polity. On the other hand, the BRRD as well as the SRM are steps towards a banking union 
that should benefit the taxpayers in Europe. However, as there is not tax Union, there is no 




It is beyond doubt that Scharpf and Walker’s approaches are very important. It is probable 
that the legitimacy of European law, as well as transnational law ultimately, has to rely on a 
division of labour with the national level or that it cannot be conceived of differently from on 
a spectrum.
536
 However, for the legal thinking on legitimacy, multilevel approaches do not 
solve the tension between non-state and state, much like courts that manage or administrate it. 
This becomes very clear in the parameter of values. In the context of the general principles of 
European law but also according to its own principles, the SRM shall respect individual 
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 social interests.  
However, as discussed in the context of legality, the justification of the SRM itself is based on 
its contribution to market integration. This tension persists and it will ultimately be left to the 
ECJ to strike a balance.
541
  While for the SRM not yet
542
 relevant, the debate on judicial 
activism of the European Court of justice illustrates that these difficulties are tied to the co-
existence of organizational ideals.
543
 The interpretations of European law by the Court are at 
the same time crucial in the making of European law and harshly criticized. What is the role 
of the Court? Should the Court give predominance to the freedoms? Or protect the national 
welfare systems?
544
 Or advance social protections by itself?
545
 The debate remains bipolar 
because it is left to the judge to ultimately strike the balance between the two. Similarly to 
national law, the “hero figure of the third globalization is unmistakably the judge who brings 
either policy analysis or neoformalism to bear.”
546
 According to Kennedy, the European Court 
of Justice is neoformalist in its interpretation of the freedoms of movement while operating in 
a system of pre-established social institutions.
547
 Therefore, the judge is not only a hero but 
“must answer the charge that s/he is a usurper, doing “politics by other means.””
548
 Similarly 
to the national context, the challenge to which judges are exposed illustrates the limits of the 
compromise that is found in law-making. While the processes overcome bi-polarity, the 
compromises they reach are not beyond doubt. Their application is difficult and often requires 
an additional balance to be struck. Arguments about too much or not enough judicial activism 
by judges, evidence doubts with regards to the balance that is struck. Like in the national 
context, the verdict of the Court regarding the balance will depend on the institution or its 
context to convey additional legitimacy on it. The European Court of Justice faces from some 
authors the criticism not to do enough for the protection of social interests and from other it 
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faces the criticism that it limits economic freedom and stretches its competences though 
rulings that protect social interests. Ultimately, the Court remains vulnerable to both 
criticisms, and the debate reflects the co-existence of organizational principles.   
Structuring the debate on European law and transnationalization into bi-polar categories 
shows that there is a difference between parameters. In legality, politics and governance, 
European law-making has led to compromises and developments that overcome the non-
state/state tension. In the parameters of legitimacy, values and polity, the tension persists and 
the outcomes depend on European institutions. In the next part, I will argue that because of 
this mismatch between law-making and its theoretical backdrop, European Law cannot serve 
as a blueprint for transnational law.  
5.2.3. European law: No blueprint for Transnational Law 
According to this thesis, European law is not a blueprint for transnational law. It is rather an 
illustration of the tension between the developments that are possible in the context of law-
making and the persistence of bi-polarity in the context of the theoretical backdrop of law-
making. In the context of co-existing organizational principles, law on the national as well as 
on the European level depends ultimately on the legitimacy that is conveyed on it through 
other institutions. The bi-polar analysis of European law hence did not provide a model for 
transnational law but instead a way of structuring the debate on European law according to the 
meaning that is attributed to the difference between law-making beyond bi-polarity and 
persisting co-existing organizational principles. Four approaches can be distinguished; the two 
reproduce bi-polarity as they take either state or non-state stances towards the European 
Union. The latter two overcome bi-polarity either by focusing on law-making only or by 
introducing multilevel arguments.  
The first category entails the approaches that support the overcoming of bi-polarity also with 
regard to the theoretical backdrop. To these approaches, Europe should
549
 progress in a state-
like fashion; aiming at thick legitimacy, developing a court that is also a social court and 
becoming a political Union.
550
 They forward a statist ideal for the European Union. These are 
the approaches that have forwarded in Chapter 3, the importance of the independent 
consideration of social interests and the development of a European polity that will be based 
on identity similar to what currently exists at the national level. It is an evolving approach that 
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believe in the development of state-like entities. It can for instance build on the vision of a 
Union that provides for welfare that creates a loyalty, and an ultimately a sense of belonging.  
The current imbalance or tension is just a sign of the institutional context that has not yet 
developed far enough. For such approaches, the Single Resolution Mechanisms is just a 
development in this direction and will have to be accompanied by a unified tax-system, a 
pension model and ultimately a political union. It might not be legitimate at the moment, yet it 
is a transitory and necessary phase in the development towards the state of the European 
Union or at least a more integrated version of it that can provide for compromises between 
organizational ideals.  
The second category of approaches takes the difficulties to overcome the bi-polarity of 
coexisting organizational principles on the theoretical level as an indication for the 
impossibility of the European model. The accommodation that is achieved in law-making is 
superficial and illegitimate; law-making processes have sidelined legitimacy, values and 
polity questions. The difference between parameters illustrates this mismatch and urges for a 
return to the national level. Instead of developing a state-like Union, the Union should be 
dismantled and reduced to a solely international treaty that aims at reducing transaction costs 
and remains within the confines where compromises between coexisting organizational 
principles can be provided through national institutions. These approaches cling to the 
importance of the inter-state agreement for the Single Resolution Mechanism and foresee that 
ultimately the mechanism is bound to failure due to national interests.
551
 Member states will 
oppose the gradual mutualization of funds, or they will at least continue to privilege the 
financial institutions that they regard as their national champions.
552
   
Finally the authors in the third and fourth category of approaches to European law can be 
presented together. To them the difference between parameters is meaning full and either 
suggest focusing on law-making only or on accommodation by turning to multilevel 
solutions.
553
 The accommodation that happens in law-making on the European level has to be 
accompanied by provision of legitimacy regarding the persisting co-existence of 
organizational ideals. Therefore, a close link to the national level and strong national 
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institutions are required to provide accommodation with regard to legitimacy, values and 
polity.
554
 This recalls the original ordo-liberal model of the EU and urges for a strict 
functional definition of the competences of the EU.
555
 Or it remains a puzzle that cannot yet 
be solved.
556
 In the context of the SRM it is the arguments that distinguish between the 
legitimacy of the single supervisory mechanism and the one of the SRM on grounds that the 
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5.3. Overcoming bi-polarity in law-making or choosing 
sides? Bi-polarity and the limits of transnational law  
In this final part, the insights to be drawn are the most debatable. After all, the question 
regarding the meaning of the non-state/state distinction for the study of transnational law 
cannot easily be solved. It is for this reason that the main contribution of this thesis is an 
analytical framework. Nevertheless also a theoretical argument shall be made and developed 
in the following. Namely, it is suggested that transnational law can address bi-polarity either 
by focusing on law-making only, or transnational law theories can forward theoretical stands 
with regard to legitimacy, values and polity of transnational law, yet bi-polarity will reappear 
in the tension between the system and its environment or the global constitution and 
pluralism.   
The focus on law-making will be illustrated with the example of GAL. Through law-making 
GAL finds compromises beyond the non-state/state distinction in transnational law. Naturally, 
its compromises are less established than in European law-making, but parallels can 
nevertheless be drawn. However, at the same time, GAL is also limited to law-making and 
therefore to legitimization through better law-making. It cannot forward answers to 
legitimacy, values or polity by itself. 
On the other hand, system theory will be forwarded as an example of the latter option of 
transnational law theories. System theory forwards notions of legitimacy, values and polity of 
transnational law. They develop from below and according to a reflexive rationality, shared 
by a functionally defined entity, thereby overcoming bi-polarity within the social system that 
develops. However, the analysis will show that while system theory addresses bi-polarity 
within the systems, a tension remains regarding the relation of the system to its environment. 
While the non-state/state tension is translated into to an environment/system tension, bi-
polarity ultimately limits the analysis of transnational law.  
The move beyond bi-polarity within the parameters of legality, politics and governance 
illustrates the potential of what I call here ‘mixed’ theories of transnational law. On the 
spectrum of transnational theories, these are placed between global constitutionalism and 
private regulation or system theory. The analysis in Chapter 4 illustrates the potential of 
global administrative law in overcoming bipolar categories. However, this potential remains 
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limited to the law-making parameters and cannot propose notions of legitimacy, values and 
polity beyond procedural improvement.  
With regard to the theoretical backdrop – legitimacy, values and polity – system theory 
suggests answers. The legitimacy of a system is reflexive and provided from below. The 
values are defined by the rationality of the system and its polity is functionally defined like 
the entire system. However, in each parameter system theory also proposes an solution 
regarding the external face of the system, the relations with its environment. While the system 
is entirely independent its constitutionalization depends on the observation of other reflexive 
processes in other systems.
558
 As will be shown, this external face reintroduces bi-polar 
tensions.  
Finally, according to this thesis bi-polarity remains a limit for transnational legal theory. 
Ultimately part of the challenge that courts face at the national level when faced with 
questions of transnationalization, and that European institutions face at the European level, 
and that transnational law itself cannot entirely address, have a commonality in bi-polarity. 
Ultimately, transnational law puts a reminder to legal theory in general that it simply has not 
yet addressed the question regarding the relation of its inner face to its outer face.  
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Chart V: Law-making theories of transnational law and theoretical backdrop theories of 
transnational law, the examples of GAL and System Theory 
5.3.1.  GAL: Overcoming bi-polarity in law-making 
In the parameters of legality, politics and governance, GAL provides successful examples of 
overcoming bipolarity. The different ways in which GAL accommodates between the non-
state and state poles, are instances of managing co-existing organizational principle within 
law making. With regard to the parameter of legality the focus is on regulation by information 
for the parameter of politics on peer review and for governance on networks.  
On the basis of this observation, the categorization of transnational theories with a focus on 
law-making can be portrayed according to Chart V as overcoming bi-polarity in the 
parameters of legality, politics and governance. However, a differentiation from the analysis 
of European Law is in place. The way European legality not only overcame bi-polarity but 
transformed into a legality that has institutional and large political backing, is not copied in 
the transnational context. There is a similarity in how procedural elements can be 
supplemented with formal elements, yet the degree of legality is not the same. With regard to 
politicization the difference is not as clear-cut. While de-politicization is quite accentuated in 
transnational law – in addition to the technocratization, the privatization might further 
increase the distance from regulator to constituency - it can very well be that this privatization 
also allows for politicization.
559
 With regard to governance on the contrary the blurring of 
assimilated and disintegrated governance structure has progressed more strongly in the 
transnational context than in the European context. There exists an enormous variety of 
governance structure in transnational law.  
These arguments will in the following be sustained with reference to the resolution of global 
financial institution from the point of view of GAL. Regulation by information will be 
forwarded as an illustration of procedural law-making that is complemented by formal 
elements, therefore showing potential to overcome bi-polarity.  
5.3.1.1. Transnational legality: GAL and regulation by information 
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The production of records in transnational law has been looked at as one of the methods of 
legalization of transnational law. It has been argued, for instance that the publication of the 
rulings and justifications of alternative dispute resolution mechanism is crucial in the 
understanding of the difference between law and social norms.
560
 In the following, the 
information requirements of the FSB will be forwarded in a similar line of argument, 
suggesting that the information requirement opens the door to the introduction of formal 
elements into the procedural legality of FSB law-making.  
GAL – through regulation by information – has therefore the potential to overcome the 
transnational tension between non-state and state tendencies in transnational law with regard 
to the parameter of legality. The formulation is chosen with prudence because of course the 
degree of legality and overcoming bi-polarity is a different, lesser one, than in the context of 
European law.  
On a more general level, GAL challenges bipolarity in the parameter of legality, because it 
unites a procedural starting point with ambition to improve the legitimacy of transnational 
law. In the words of Ladeur: “Administrative law as a product of administrative 
experimentation …and its judicialisation.”
561
 This idea links back to the functionalist 
arguments on administrative law according to which it is “characterized by the enabling 
processes to cope with fundamental uncertainty and the dynamic of the self-transformation of 
society and to generate forms on binding them in order to allow for co-operation, co-
ordination, and learning.”
562
 In Chapter 4, we saw that the Basel Committee of Banking 
Supervision readily lends itself to an analysis of GAL. The FSB, as seen in Chapter 4, can be 
analyzed accordingly. From the point of view of legality, regulation of information provides 
an especially interesting example.  
Regulation by information allows us to add formal requirements to the development of 
procedural law. “Regulation by information deploys certain standards of “indicators” to 
publicly rank or comparatively evaluate countries’ performance with respect to a 
predetermined global standard.”
563
 An example for such regulation by the FSB is the FSB 
scoreboard. This list is available on the FSB’s website and ranks countries and regulators 
according to their compliance with FSB’s standards. While from a governance perspective it 
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is argued that the majority of prominent indicators in global governance appear to operate in 
even more diffuse ways, by influencing profession, public and political opinion in new 
directions.
564
 Other indicators provide bases for awarding benefits and penalties. Regulation 
through information hence allows not only for the development of best practices but also 
documents this development and its result. In this way, regulation by information offers a way 
toward bridging between the procedural and the formal quality of transnational law.  
A wide range of examples of GAL that bring the procedural nature of transitional law closer 
to formal requirements has been studied. The disclosure of information
565
, a duty to provide 
reasons
566
, principles like reasonableness and proportionality
567
 and alternative dispute 
resolution
568
 are just some examples.  
5.3.1.2. Re-politicization in transnational law: GAL and peer review 
While of course lending itself very well at a de-politicization approach, the importance of 
technocratic or private law-making in transnational law is seen at the same time as offering 
possibilities of politicization of transnational law. These arguments focus on the potential of 
technocratic or private law-making to enhance or at least allow or participation from the 
affected constituencies. In the context of the FSB, the peer review procedure can be looked at 
from this point of view. The peer review process is a technocratic one. However, the feedback 
it entails opens the door to politicization through the reporting of not only technical 
difficulties but also feedback on the reception of regulation and its implication for the public. 
GAL therefore offers a way of thinking about overcoming the tension between a de-
politicized technocratic transnational law making and the politicization thereof.  
Governance by information does not only allow for the sanctioning of transnational law, it 
also offers the possibility to install feedback mechanisms. Peer review is often forwarded as a 
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superior mechanism of accountability to electoral accountability because of its ability to 
develop with the regulation process and allow feedback about it, hence constantly evolving 
with it.  
It is argued that peer review provides for better popular accountability than the traditional 
formal “principal-agent” model of democratic accountability (in which elected “agents” are 
accountable through elections to the public as a “principle”) because the deliberative process 
entailed in peer review – what they term ‘dynamic accountability’ – allows for a more 
substantive and meaningful form of accountability than electoral accountability. Peer Review 
imposes the obligation to justify the exercise of discretion on implementing ‘agents’. As the 
actors at all levels learn from and correct each other, the hierarchical distinction between 
principals and agents is undermined and a form a dynamic accountability develops.
569
 Peer 
review thereby, opens accountability to possibilities that may have been overlooked by the 
principal.  
The consultations that the FSB holds in view of its standard setting initiatives could be 
expanded through the levels. This last point relates to the structural part of the argument 
supporting GAL and the potential of networks to offer a middle way between assimilated and 
dis-integrated governance.  
The dynamic and two-way functioning of peer review, as well as its controlling function, 
should be equally feedback mechanism should and could be enlarged for including feedback 
on the impact on citizens
570
 as well. 
Pushing the mechanism of peer review and the feedback it allows for one step further, the 
range of actors involved at all levels could also be expanded to include actors that will secure 
more democratic accountability towards the national level or groups affected by the 
regulation. As found by Mattli and Woods: “Regulatory institutions that supply participatory 
mechanisms that are fair, transparent, accessible, and open […] are more likely to produce 
common interests regulation.”
571
 Sassen for instance suggests that as states are to an extent 
enablers of globalization, they do also have leverage to shape it. This is to a large extent a 
structural argument and will be further developed in the next part, but it has also implications 
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for the relationship between transnational law and politics. The feedback that is allowed for 
though peer review seems to offer a possibility to include such representative elements into 
the regulatory process. 
5.3.1.3. Integrated governance in transnational law: GAL and networks  
Governance structure has attracted a lot of writing in transnational law. The variety of 
examples of governance in transnational law also provides many examples of how assimilated 
and disintegrated governance structures can be combined and therefore how bipolarity can be 
overcome. Here the focus will be on the example of networks. With reference to the FSB and 
the regulation of the failure of global financial institutions, the integration of national 
authorities in crisis management colleges and their interaction among them and with national 
authorities can be seen as networks and hence a combination between assimilated and dis-
integrated governance.  
The original concept of a breaking down of the state – the disaggregated state
572
- into its 
agents that then form networks with their counterparts throughout the world is often attributed 
to Slaughter.
573
 She formulated this idea in terms of ‘judicial globalisation.’
574
 For her, this 
concept describes the growing interaction between national regional and international courts 
leading to the “gradual construction of a global legal system.”
575
 In her model, transnational 
law is seen as a driver for the development of this system, as judges are looking increasingly 
towards each other, being in need of guidance for the application of new ‘international’
576
 
rules to national subjects and litigants.
577
 The co-operation between financial supervision 
agencies in the context of the BCBS can be analysed according to a similar network logic, 
accommodating between the dis-integrated national governance and the assimilated global 
ones. National supervision agencies would hence be part of the national dis-integrated system 
but at the same time link it to the assimilated global governance structure. 
Slaughter’s arguments have been taken up by a number of authors in their attempts to theorise 
a transnational legal order.
578
 She describes an empowerment that takes place in the networks. 
In the face of legal complexity that stems from new transnational constellations, national 
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judges are empowered though the contacts with other courts.
579
 This increase in knowhow 
might make a crucial difference in a world where uncertainty causes a fundamental problem. 
Furthermore, Wai sees the possibility that networking between judges can lead to an 
advancing of broader policy debates in the global context.
580
 “High-profile litigation cases 
concerning foreign business conduct related to environmental or human rights, (…) can help 
to raise general issues about corporate social responsibility in a global context.”
581
 This falls 
short of constituting an order in itself, yet nevertheless bears the potential to extend the 
limitations to private regulatory autonomy in the transnational space. All in all, the logic of 
networks and the collaboration of national organs across countries, seem to suggest a middle 
way. 
Ladeur links the emergence of networks closely to the rise of a new mode of production and 
organization that is supported by the importance of information as the principal resource of 
production. He sees the development of heterarchical self-organization in order to process 
information. Technological knowledge is therefore no longer concentrated in stable expert 
communities, but is instead distributed in overlapping project-oriented ‘epistemic 
communities’ which combine general and specific knowledge production.
582
 According to his 
understanding of networks, they would allow not only a vertical accommodation between 
different governance structures but allow heterarchical interaction across the board.  
Networks seem to have a similar potential to serve as a channel to introduce the concerns of 
the national polity and thereby bridge between the national and the supranational polity. 
Sassen for example suggests a wider view on the concept of citizenship as she asks “to what 
extent citizenship, even though highly formalized, might actually be less finished as an 
institution than its formal representation indicated.”
583
 However, her concern is not the de-
territorializing of the institution, like many post national approaches would suggest, but 
instead its potential to allow for a link for citizens in national and transnational politics 
through the partial reshaping of their political subjectivity.
584
 Instead of changing the entire 
state-based concept, the aim is to enlarge it to include a global aspect. 
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Networks can be conceived to have this potential, as network nodes can be located on all 
kinds of levels. The heterarchical structure as described by Ladeur and the variety of different 
nods it can include should be able to include additional nodes that reflect such citizen 
participation.  
If we take the illustration here and look at the institutions of the FSB, the colleagues that unite 
regulators across states along the lines of corporate structures, other network nodes that also 
include national or citizens interests could be included as well.  This would allow for 
integration in the transnational law-making market interests, transnational process and 
national protection of social interests.  
So, while the legality, politics and governance of transnational law is different form the one of 
European law, it is similar in the way it offers methods of overcoming bi-polarity. However, 
GAL does not focus on questions of legitimacy, values or polity. The extent to which GAL 
inquires into questions of legitimacy, is in ‘improving’ law-making procedure to make them 
more legitimate, yet here it is always limited to the procedural perspective. It is in this way 
that the distinction between law-making parameters and parameters of the theoretical 
backdrop can be used to distinguish between approaches of transnational law. The next part 
will look at a theory that takes a more accentuated stands on legitimacy, values and polities on 
the system level but that fails to overcome bi-polarity in the context of the system and its 
environment.  
5.3.2. System Theory:  overcoming bi-polarity at the system level  
With regard to the parameters of legitimacy values and polity the same blurring of bi-polar 
categories cannot be observed. On the contrary, in Chapter 4, it was shown that the debate in 
these parameters reproduces the non-state/state tension caused by transnationalization. Non-
state visions of these concepts collide with state visions and at the end of the day are 
dismissed as non-law.  
When an accommodation between poles is not possible in the contexts of legitimacy, values 
and polity, in contrast to law-making, transnational law is left with two options. Either a top- 
down approach or a bottom-up one is chosen. Yet by presenting this choice, transnational 
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legal theory is at danger of facing just another, similar bi-polar tension than the one between 
state and non-state. Chart 4
585
 illustrates this point.  
In the following, by way of illustration, these three parameters will be approached from the 
perspective of system theory, hence a bottom-up perspective is chosen.
586
 With functional 
integration, system theory takes an alternative starting point to the national delineation on 
which national and international law are based.
587
 Yet at the same time it differs from global 
constitutionalism as it takes fragmentation as a starting point and insurmountable condition of 
transnational law. According to system theory, transnational law develops in transnational 
communities “or autonomous fragments of society, such as, the globalized economy, science, 
technology, the mass media, medicine, education and transportation, are developing an 
enormous demand for regulating norms which cannot however, be satisfied by national or 
international institutions.”
588
 These fragments make themselves directly use of law and create 
their own private legal regime.
589
  
In all three parameters, system theory provides a self-reflexive answer, where the functionally 
defined autarchic system produces its own rationality that provides and defines its legitimacy, 
values and polity with reference to itself, hence forwarding thin, dependent and supranational 
notions of legitimacy, values and polity.  
However, in all three parameters, the question regarding the external face of the system – its 
relation to other systems or its environment- proves more difficult. This is where I will 
suggest that even when taking ‘sides’ and forwarding a notion of legitimacy, values and polity 
for transnational law, the tension remains. This time the tension is between the system and its 
environment.  
Again, reference will be made to the example of resolution of global financial institutions. 
The application of system theory on financial regulation is not counterintuitive. From the 
analysis of the previous chapters, we saw that the consideration of national boundaries is not 
always appropriate to look at the regulation of financial markets and the resolution of global 
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financial institutions. For instance the crisis management colleges that were developed 
according to FSB recommendations can be looked at very well from a functional integration 
point of view. Also the relations of the FSB to the IOSCO and IAIS, the private global 
accounting standardization bodies, as well as national supervisors and national banks, lend 
themselves well to a functional integration perspective. However, the specific example of the 
FSBs approach to resolution authorities is a bit harder to apply to system theory. The lack of 
formal private participation from the industry as well as civil society and more generally the 
top down approach of the FSB, hinders a convincing application. I will therefore refer not 
only to FSB examples, but more generally global financial market regulation. 
In particular, illustrations will be taken from Teubners article of 2010 on the financial and 
economic crisis of the late 2000s. In this article, he applies a system theory perspective to 
global financial economy. For Teubner the crisis provided an example where the autopoietic 
self-reproduction of a social system reverts into a communicative compulsion to repetition 
and growth, bringing self-destructive consequences in its wake. The independent system is 
hence not entirely independent, as it, left to the wrong dynamics, can develop a self-
destructive growth. Needed is a constitutionalization of the system from within, in the shadow 
of politics and according to two ideals; the preservation of the system itself and of its 
environment.
590
 Teubner for instance forwards that the national banks should act as 
constitutional courts of the economic constitutions providing for intense reflections on the 
social consequences while guarding the economic constitution.
591
 The tension between 
dependent and independent consideration of interests in the values of transnational law is 
hence not overcome.  
While the application of GAL has been developed throughout the thesis and especially 
Chapter 4, the take on system theory will be less detailed. However the next part shall 
demonstrate that even approaches that elaborate on questions of legitimacy, values and polity 
of transnational law from a non-state perspective, face difficulties in staying away from the 
non-state/state tension.   
5.3.2.1. Transnational legitimacy: self-reflexive legitimacy or a thin common 
philosophical horizon? 
Functional integration, as a starting point of system theory, provides at least two ways to look 
at legitimacy; the legitimacy within the functional system and its external face, the legitimacy 
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of the system in function to other systems. Teubner’s take on system theory provides answers 
to both. Yet while the first provides a clear non-state vision of thin legitimacy, the latter 
alludes to the idea of a ‘common philosophical horizon’, which is hard to classify between 
thin and thick legitimacy. 
The global legal landscape is made up of a variety of functionally integrated public, private or 
hybrid instances of regulation that are said to make autonomous law with a claim to global 
validity,
592
 reflecting the fundamental multidimensional fragmentation of global society 
itself.
593
 Regarding legitimacy within the system, system theory suggests that it is produced 
by the system itself. The autopoietic
594
 system is self-sufficient and legitimacy is produced 
from ‘below’.
595
 “Through their own operative closure, global functional systems create a 
sphere for themselves in which they are free to intensify their own rationality.”
596
 They 
produce not only substantive rules in their area of functional integration, but they also produce 
their own procedural rules on law-making, law-recognition and legal sanctions. This is how 
Teubner describes reflexive norm-building within the system. Self-referencing as it is, it 
hence also produces its own legitimacy.  
However, following the logic of functional differentiation, law itself developed globally as a 
unitary social system. This unity is no longer structure-based as it was meant to be in 
international law with the nation state as its structure but it is to be understood as allowing for 
a link between the different systems. The legitimacy question with regard to this external face 
of the system is more complex. Teubner introduces a constitutional perspective by arguing, 
that to transform the reflexive norm-building in a system into a constitutional norm-building, 
the systems have to link their “legal reflexive processes with reflexive processes of other 
societal spheres.”
597
 The ability of developing thorough reflexive social processes has to be 
combined with an ability to observe the processes in other systems. This relates to what I have 
referred to as the external face of legitimacy; beyond the system, there is another 
constitutional requirement of consideration of other system that norm-making has to fulfill. 
However, this consideration is a very limited one. In the words of Teubner, the external face 
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of the systems law is limited to a “simple normative compatibility” instead of “hierarchical 




Nevertheless, it becomes clear that the legitimacy of transnational law is a thin one: self-
reflexive and limited to the simple normative compatibility with legitimacies of other systems. 
With regard to their external face, systems hence can subordinate themselves to a, 
“necessarily abstract, seeming common philosophical horizon, to which they orient their own 
rule-making”
599
 achieving a thin legitimacy of its law in the external face. The relationship 
between the internal legitimacy from below and this horizon is not clear. This tension between 
internal and external becomes even more apparent in the parameter of values.  
5.3.2.2. Values in transnational law: internal system rationality or external 
pressures to self-limitation? 
The take of system theory on the values of transnational law indicates its difficulty to avoid 
bi-polarity. Then while on the level of the system, the all-encompassing rationality of the 
system implies a dependent consideration of interests, this is not so clear when looking at the 
relation of the system to other systems or its environment. When rationalities of systems 
collide, Teubner suggests an approach of mutual observation that moves towards a 
compatibility. When rationalities endanger themselves, he opts for a ‘externally compelled 
self-limitation of the systems.’
600
 Both of these proposals complicate the take of system 
theory on the values of transnational law dramatically and reintroduce the tension between 
dependent and independent considerations of interests and hence non-state and state 
understanding of law.  
The take of system theory on the considerations of interests is very straightforward; all 
interests are considered dependently from the rationality of the system. In the words of 
Fischer-Lescano and Teubner, systems develop their “own rationality without regard to other 
social systems, or indeed, regard to their national or human environment.”
601
 Applied on the 
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global financial economy, this would mean that the market-supporting approach that was 
apparent in bankruptcy solutions to failing financial institutions is appropriate. 
However, Teubner introduces limitations to this simple logic. On one hand, there is the 
difficulty of colliding rationalities of different systems. How are we to decide when the legal 
regimes of two different social systems and hence rationalities collide?
602
 On the other hand 
there is the danger of self-referencing and re-production of a system turning into a compulsion 
to growth that can be self-destructing.
603
 To Teubner, the financial and economic crisis was an 
instance of such destructive growth, which he compares to an addiction on the social system 
level.
604
  With regard to both scenarios, Teubner turns to what he calls constitutional norm-
building. Like in the parameter of legitimacy, in the external face, systems have to link their 
legal reflexive process with reflexive processes of other social spheres. Through these 
linkages they can work towards a limited compatibility with other systems rationalities and 
thereby over time avoid conflict. With regard to the danger of self-destruction, the opening of 




What does this imply for the values of transnational law according to system theory? It is hard 
to say. Teubner introduces a binary meta-code to introduce truly constitutional structures. 
This binary code of constitutional/unconstitutional is ranked above the legal code legal/illegal 
and allows for the consideration of both the rationality in law and the other social system in 
question. For the example of the global financial economy he stipulates “The meta-code 
requires that it be ranked above the legal as well as the economic binary code […] the meta-
code generates different meanings according in each case to whether it is attempting to 
control the economic code-operations or the legal operations. On its economic side, it serves 
the reflection of the societal function of the payment options and searched for forms of 
economic activity that are environmentally viable. On its legal side, it institutes the separation 
of simple law from superior constitutional law, and judges legal acts according to whether 
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they correspond to constitutional values and principles.”
606
 The reflexive functioning of social 
systems is hence not to be intervened with except in certain cases. According to Teubner, 
“defense against the three possibilities of collision is central – self-destruction of the system, 
environmental damage in the widest sense (endangering the integrity of the social, human and 
natural environments), threats to world society”607 
Yet the decision of what will be served on which instance does not seem obvious. This 
ambiguity exposes system theory again to the tension between dependent and independent 
consideration of interests and put an important qualification on its non-state approach.   
5.3.2.3. Transnational polity: the functional polity or a global civil society? 
With regard to the polity parameter, the same mechanic can be observed. While the polity at 
the system level is without doubt of a non-state nature, because it is functionally defined, a 
second notion of polity is referred to in the environment of the system, yet again challenging 
the non-state stances of system theory and exposing it to non-state/state tension in 
transnational law.  
Functional polities cut across the various layers “that bind sub-, supra-, or transnational 
communities.”
608
 They hence unite the participants in the social system under the rationality 
of this system. This polity is a non-state polity because it is not defined by citizenship or 
representation. “‘Polity’ in this context should not be understood in the narrow sense of 
institutionalized politics; it refers as well to non-political configurations of civil society, in the 
economy, in science, education, health, art or sports, in all those social sites where 
constitutionalizing takes place.”609 Brought together by the rationality of the system in 
question, it is forming a non-state polity. By analogy, the non-political configurations of civil 
society in the social site of financial market regulation must be including all sorts of market 
participants on the supply side but also on the demand side, regulators at all levels, market 
infrastructures such as stock exchanges and many more. Yet again, what about the ‘public’? 
Which public? In this sense the financial regulation example provides an illustration of a 
functional polity as well as of the difficulty of its delineation.  
However, again the understanding of polity in system theory is complicated by the relation of 
the system to its environment. Teubner refers to a brother civil society that is external to the 
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system and charged with the constitutional task of applying “massive pressure in the function 
system that internal self-limitations are configured and become truly effective”610 
The relation of the civil society to the system is not clear it can be included or also explained 
as ’civil society’ countervailing powers from other contexts, media, public discussions, 
spontaneous protests, intellectuals, social movements, NGOs or trade unions”
611
 
System theory illustrates hence a bottom-up approach to the legitimacy, values and polity of 
transnational law. However, in each parameter a tension between this bottom-up approach and 
a top-down vision becomes apparent. 
5.3.3. Transnational law and bi-polarity: law-making, bottom up or top down?   
From applying the bi-polarity framework on the debate on transnational law it appears that 
only in law-making, bi-polarity can be overcome. In the other three parameters a choice 
between a bottom-up or a top-down approach has to be made. However, by taking this choice 
the tension reappears on another level. Three categories of approaches to transnational law 
can hence be distinguished. The approaches that focus on law-making, bottom-up approaches 
and top-down approaches to transnational law. 
The example of GAL illustrated that transnational law provides for very interesting examples 
in the parameters of legality, politics and governance. In legality, the law-making is not as 
established as in the European context, yet with regard to the role of politics and especially 
governance, developments in the transnational context might even have outgrown the variety 
in the European law-making. Yet, law-making approaches remain limited to procedural 
perspectives on legitimacy, values and polity.
612
 System theory was used as an illustration of a 
bottom-up approach. The insights gained can be generalized in the sense that most bottom-up 
approaches face difficulties to theorize beyond functional integration. Legitimacy that is 
founded on contractual relationships and consent always bears the potential of tension with 
other such contracts.
613
 On the other hand, top-down approaches face difficulties addressing 
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the plurality in or the fragmentation
614
 of the global legal order.
615





 and institutional constitutionalism
618
 as well as 
institutional approaches to global governance
619
 the like. Top-down approaches struggle with 
the lack of unity at the global level. To address this struggle such approaches have to stretch 
towards global governance approaches. In the same way system theory faces difficulties 
regarding to the environment of the system, top-down approaches face difficulties to account 
for the pluralities of systems and their distinctness within.   
This leaves us with the choice to either limit our theoretical inquiry to law-making or to 
remain ultimately limited by tensions that cannot be overcome. Less limits to regulatory 
creativity and more possibility for private actor involvement make the transnational context 
unique laboratory for the development of regulatory phenomena. However, as appeared in the 
previous analysis, this creativity is seriously limited. Even if the tension between non-state 
and state is overcome it reemerges in other forms opposing bottom-up and top-down or 
system and environment.     
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6. Thesis summary: Law Beyond Bi-polarity? 
Structuring the debate on transnationalization and law according to the non-state/state 
distinction has shown that the theory of transnational law remains limited by this distinction. 
The tension between the non-state regulatory developments and the state origin of law 
transcends the entire field and remains unsolved. Yet, it also allows for a useful structuring of 
debate of transnationalization and law.  
The disentangling of the non-state state distinction into six parameters has allowed to see how 
transnationalization affects law differently in parameters of law-making then in parameters 
that depend on the theoretical backdrop.   
In national law this difference could be put in the context of co-existing organizational 
principles. From the structuring exercise it appeared that the missing orientation due to the co-
existence of organizational principles explains the contradiction between superficial norm 
compromises in law-making and the difficulty of the application of this law through the courts 
that is emphasized in the transnational context.  
In European law the difference between law-making and theoretical orientation was 
confirmed. In legality, politics and governance the law-making of the EU has blurred bi-polar 
categories. However, the bi-polarity persisted in the context of legitimacy, values and polity. 
This allowed to structure the approaches to European law into three categories; the ones that 
reject its legitimacy, the one that insist on furthering its legitimacy and the ones that refer to a 
form of multilevel approach. The use of these categories was illustrated in the context of the 
debate on the European Court of Justice.   
Also in transnational law, law-making approaches blurred bi-polar categories more easily. 
Inquiring into the reasons for this ease as well as its consequences will provide interesting 
avenues for the theory of transnational law. The frequent claim of ‘descriptive’  force of 
approaches that focus on law-making as well as the repeated reference to transnational law as 
a ‘methodology’ support this hunch.   
On the other hand, another direction for further research was identified by structuring exercise 
of the debate on legitimacy, values and polity of transnational law. There the tension between 
bottom-up and top-down approaches provides interesting questions for further research.  
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The particular debate in transnational law that has been structured according to the framework 
– the resolution of large financial institutions – has illustrated the importance of the bi-polar 
tension in practice. National courts struggle to address the non-state/state tensions in all 
parameters of law. Beyond the state, the example of the KAs has shown that development of 
law is limited to law-making. The  legitimacy, values and polity of the FSB and its KAs 
remain debated; non-state and state visions of transnational law are opposing each other.  
Bi-polarity, defined as the reliance on distinctions that are based on the distinction between 
non-state and state, has proven to be a useful tool to structure the debate. Yet at the same time 
it is also an inspiring and even haunting way of looking at the field of transnationalization and 
law; forcing legal theory to question the relation between system and environment, non-state 
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